ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

33. The discussion about the components of accountability was first made in relationship to Russia by Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Prospects for Containing Conflict in the Former Second World," *Security Studies* 4, no. 3 (1995): 552–583; see also Lena Jonson and Clive Archer, eds., *Peacekeeping and the Role of Russia in Eurasia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996). For an extended argument about a "partnership" between the UN and regional organizations, see Alan K. Henrikson, "The Growth of Regional Organizations and the Role of the United Nations," in *Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organizations and World Order*, ed. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 122–168.

34. Andrew Moravcsik, "Striking a New Transatlantic Bargain," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 4 (2003): 74–89. See also Bastian Giegrich and William Wallace, "Not Such a Soft Power: The External Deployment of European Forces," *Survival* 46, no. 2 (2004): 163–182.

35. For a discussion of the unsettling numbers, see the annual publications of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Strategic Survey 2005/2006 and the Military Balance 2005–2006* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

CHAPTER 2

UN Security Efforts During the Cold War

THE UN CHARTER'S requirement for unanimity among the permanent members of the Security Council indicated the realities of the power politics of the day. The council was created less out of naïve idealism and more out of a hardheaded effort to mesh state power with international law, a link that is necessary for effective enforcement. However, the underlying assumption that members would often agree was not borne out with any frequency until after the Cold War. The veto held by the P-5 is not the real problem; disagreement among those with power is.

THE EARLY YEARS: PALESTINE, KOREA, SUEZ, THE CONGO

The onset of the Cold War ended the big-power cooperation on which the postwar order had been predicated. Nonetheless the UN became involved in four major security crises: Palestine (1948), Korea (1950), Suez (1956), and the Congo (1962). After Israel declared its independence in 1948, war broke out between it and its four neighbors—Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria. Soon thereafter, the Security Council ordered a cease-fire under Chapter VII and ultimately created an observer team, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) under Chapter VI to supervise it. UNTSO observer groups were deployed, unarmed, along the borders of Israel and its neighbors and operated with the consent of the parties involved. Close to 600 observers were eventually deployed, including army units from Belgium, France, the United States, and Sweden. Troops had no enforcement mandate or capability, but their presence did deter truce violations. To exercise their mandates without relying upon military might, they relied on the moral authority of the United Nations. Also, warring parties knew that their truce violations would be objectively reported to UN headquarters in New York for possible further action. Although observers wore the uniforms of their respective national

armies, their first allegiance theoretically was to the world organization, symbolized by UN armbands. Later, blue helmets and berets became the trademark of UN peacekeepers. The observers were paid by their national armies and granted a stipend by the world organization. UNTSO's activities continue to be financed from the UN's regular operating budget.

UNTSO has performed a variety of important tasks. UNTSO observers set up demilitarized zones along the Israeli-Egyptian and Israeli-Syrian borders, established Mixed Armistice Commissions along each border to investigate complaints and allegations of truce violations, and verified compliance with the General Armistice Agreements. If a truce violation occurred, the chief of staff of UNTSO attempted to deal with the matter locally, negotiating cease-fires when necessary. Finding means of de-escalating crises before they blossom into significant threats to the peace has been a chief function of the operation. UNTSO also became a training ground and resource center for other peacekeeping operations; its observers and administrators were consistently redeployed in other parts of the world. UNTSO's experience over the years has been integrated into other operations to improve their functioning.

UNTSO did, unfortunately, contribute to a freezing of the conflict. From 1949 to 1956 and then to 1967, the main parties to the conflict were unwilling to use major force to break apart the stalemate. UNTSO was there to police the status quo. Being freed from major military violence, the parties lacked the necessary motivation to make concessions for a more genuine peace. This problem of successful UN peacekeeping contributing to freezing but not solving a conflict was to reappear in Cyprus and elsewhere.

The first coercive action taken in the name of the United Nations concerned the Korean peninsula.[1] UN involvement in this crisis merits careful attention because arguably the UN engaged in a type of collective security there between 1950 and 1953. World War II left Korea divided, with Soviet forces occupying the North and U.S. forces the South. The UN call for withdrawal of foreign troops and elections throughout a unified Korea was opposed by communist governments, leading to elections only in the South and the withdrawal of most U.S. troops. In 1950, forces from North Korea (the Democratic Republic of Korea), which was informally allied with the Soviet Union and China, attacked South Korea (the Republic of Korea). The United States then moved to resist this attack on a small noncommunist state.

At the UN, the USSR was boycotting the Security Council to protest the seating of Taiwan as the permanent member instead of communist China. The United States knew the Security Council would not be stymied by a communist veto and could adopt some type of resolution on Korea. So Washington referred the Korean situation to the council. The Truman administration ordered U.S. military forces to Korea albeit before the Security Council approved a course of action. The council passed a resolution under Chapter VII declaring that North Korea had committed a breach of the peace. Before the council recommended,

but did not require, that UN members furnish all appropriate assistance (including military assistance) to South Korea, the USSR abandoned its boycott and returned to its council seat late in 1950. The General Assembly improvised, through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, to continue support for the South in the name of the United Nations.

In essence, Security Council resolutions on Korea provided international legitimacy to U.S. decisions. The Truman administration was determined to stop communist expansion in East Asia. It proceeded without a congressional declaration of war or any other specific authorizing measure, and it was prepared to proceed without UN authorization—although once this was obtained, the Truman administration emphasized UN approval in its search for support both at home and abroad.

The UN's symbol and reputation were therefore thrust into a security dilemma of major proportions, even though the permanent members of the council, and the communist government of China outside the council, were definitely not in agreement. Once the USSR returned to council deliberations, direct military actions being taken in the UN's name became impossible. Absent the USSR, a unified UN command had been established. In reality, however, the UN deputized the United States to lead the defense of South Korea in the name of the United Nations. When the early tide of the contest turned in favor of the South, Truman decided to carry the war all the way to the Chinese border. This was a fateful decision that prolonged the war by bringing Chinese forces into the fight in major proportions—and thus continued the war until 1953, when stalemate restored the status quo ante. All important strategic and tactical decisions pertaining to Korea that carried the UN's name were in fact made by the United States. Other states, such as Australia and Turkey, fought for the defense of South Korea, but that military operation was, in fact, a U.S. operation behind the UN flag.

The defense of South Korea was not a classic example of collective security. A truncated Security Council clearly labeled the situation a breach of the peace and authorized the use of military force, something that was not to occur again during the Cold War. The council in effect authorized military support for the South, but it did not mandate it, a form of council action that was to be repeated in the 1990s concerning Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia. However, neither the council nor its Military Staff Committee really controlled the use of UN symbols. No Article 43 agreements transferring national military units to the UN were concluded. And the Secretary-General, Trygve Lie of Norway, played almost no role in the situation once he came out clearly against the North Korean invasion. The Soviet Union stopped treating him as Secretary-General. Given that power play, he was eventually forced to resign because of his ineffectiveness. He was legally correct to take a public stand against aggression, but it then left him without the necessary political support of a major power, Moscow. Subsequent Secretaries-General tried to learn from his difficulties, representing Charter values but, they

Prisoners guarded by a South Korean soldier wait to be taken to a POW camp near Inchon in October 1950. (UN Photo 32240)

hoped, without antagonizing the permanent members whose support was necessary for successful UN action.

The 1956 Suez Canal crisis resulted in the first use of what became known as "peacekeepers" to separate warring parties. France, Britain, and Israel had attacked Soviet-backed Egypt against the wishes of the United States, claiming a right to use force to keep the Suez Canal open after Egyptian president Gamel Abdel Nasser had closed it. Britain and France used their vetoes, blocking action by the Security Council. The General Assembly resorted to the Uniting for Peace Resolution—this time for peacekeeping, not enforcement—and directed Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld (of Sweden) to create a force to supervise the cease-fire between Israel and Egypt once it had been arranged. The first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) oversaw the disengagement of forces and served as a buffer between Israel and Egypt. In this instance, the United States and Soviet Union were not so far apart. In fact, U.S. president Dwight D. Eisenhower acted

Congolese refugees uprooted from their homes by fighting in Katanga Province wait for water at a refugee camp in September 1961. (UN Photo 71906)

in the spirit of collective security by preventing traditional U.S. allies from proceeding with what he regarded as aggression. UN peacekeeping in 1956 and for a decade thereafter was hailed as a success.

The efforts by the world organization to deal with one of the most traumatic decolonizations, in the former Belgian Congo (then Zaire and more recently the Democratic Republic of Congo), illustrated the limits of peacekeeping. The ONUC (or the French acronym United Nations Operation in the Congo)[2] almost bankrupted the world organization and also threatened its political life, and Secretary-General Hammarskjöld lost his own life in a suspicious plane crash in the country.

This armed conflict was both international (caused by the intervention of Belgium in its former colony) and domestic (caused by the secession of a province within the new state). The nearly total absence of a government infrastructure entailed a massive involvement of UN civilian administrators in addition to 20,000 UN soldiers. After having used his Article 99 powers to get the world organization involved, the Secretary-General became embroiled in a situation in which the Soviet Union, its allies, and many nonaligned countries supported the national prime minister, who was subsequently murdered while under arrest; the Western powers and the UN organization supported the president. At one point the president fired the prime minister, and the prime minister fired the president, leaving no clear central authority in place. This type of political vacuum created enormous problems for the United Nations as well as the opening for action.

UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld visits children of a village composed of Yemeni immigrants in the Jerusalem hills in May 1956. (UN Photo 50052)

Instead of neutral peacekeepers, UN forces became an enforcement army for the central government, which the UN Secretariat created with Western support. This role was not mandated by the assembly or council, and in this process the world organization could not count on cooperation from the warring parties within the Congo. Some troop contributors resisted UN command and control; others removed their soldiers to register their objections. The Soviet Union, and later France, refused to pay assessments for the field operation. This phase of the dispute almost destroyed the UN, and the General Assembly had to suspend voting for a time in order to dodge the question of who was in arrears on payments and thus who could vote. The USSR went further in trying to destroy Hammarskjöld's independence by suggesting the replacement of the Secretary-General with a troika (or a three-person administrative structure at the top of the organization). Four years later, the UN departed from a unified Congo, an ac-

complishment. However, it had also acquired an operational black eye in Africa because of its perceived partisan stance. No UN troops were sent again to Africa until the end of the Cold War (to Namibia). The UN also incurred a large budgetary deficit and developed a hesitancy to become involved in internal wars. Questions about funding lay unresolved, to arise again in later controversies.

The 1973 Arab-Israeli War ended with the creation of the second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II). This lightly armed interpositional force became the blueprint for other traditional peacekeeping operations. UNEF II was composed of troops from Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Canada, Ghana, Indonesia, Nepal, Panama, Peru, Poland, and Senegal—countries representing each of the world's four major regions. The operation consisted of over 7,000 persons at its peak. UNEF II's original mandate was for six months, but the Security Council renewed it continually until 1979, when the U.S.-brokered Israeli-Egyptian peace accord was signed. UNEF II functioned as an impartial force designed to establish a demilitarized zone, supervise it, and safeguard other provisions of the truce. Small-scale force was used to stop those who tried to breach international lines. The presence of UNEF II had a calming influence on the region by ensuring that Israel and Egypt were kept apart. The success of both UNEF I and II, and the problems with the operation in the Congo, catalyzed traditional peacekeeping, the subject to which we now turn.

UNDERSTANDING PEACEKEEPING

The effective projection of military power under international control to enforce international decisions against aggressors was supposed to distinguish the United Nations from the League of Nations. The onset of the Cold War made this impossible on a systematic basis. A new means of peace maintenance was necessary, one that would permit the world organization to act within carefully defined limits when the major powers agreed or at least acquiesced.

UN peacekeeping proved capable of navigating the turbulent waters of the Cold War through its neutral stance and limited range of activities. Again, global politics determined the nature of UN activities. Although peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the Charter, it became the organization's primary function in the domain of peace and security. The use of troop contingents for this purpose is widely recognized as having begun during the 1956 crisis in Suez. Contemporary accounts credit Lester B. Pearson, then Canada's secretary of state for external affairs and later prime minister, with proposing to the General Assembly that Secretary-General Hammarskjöld organize an "international police force that would step in until a political settlement could be reached."[3]

Close to 500,000 military, police, and civilian personnel—distinguished from national soldiers by their trademark powder-blue helmets and berets—served in UN peacekeeping forces during the Cold War, and some 700 lost their lives in UN service during this period. Alfred Nobel hardly intended to honor soldiers

when he created the peace prize that bears his name, and no military organization had received the prize throughout its eighty-seven-year history. This changed in December 1988, when UN peacekeepers received the prestigious award. This date serves as the turning point in the following discussion to distinguish UN security activities during and after the Cold War.

The Cold War and the Birth of Peacekeeping, 1948–1988

The lack of any specific reference to peacekeeping in the Charter led Hammarskjöld to coin the poetic and apt expression "Chapter six and a half," which referred to stretching the original meaning of Chapter VI. And certainly peacekeeping "can rightly be called the invention of the United Nations," as then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali claimed in *An Agenda for Peace*.[4] The lack of a clear international constitutional basis makes a consensus definition of peacekeeping difficult, particularly because peacekeeping operations have been improvised in response to the specific requirements of individual conflicts. Despite the lack of consensus and the multiplicity of sources,[5] former UN under-secretary-general Marrack Goulding provided a sensible definition of peacekeeping: "United Nations field operations in which international personnel, civilian and/or military, are deployed with the consent of the parties and under United Nations command to help control and resolve actual or potential international conflicts or internal conflicts which have a clear international dimension."[6]

The first thirteen UN peacekeeping and military observer operations deployed during the Cold War are listed in Table 2.1.[7] Five were still in the field in December 2005. From 1948 to 1988, peacekeepers typically served two functions: observing the peace (that is, monitoring and reporting on the maintenance of cease-fires) and keeping the peace (that is, providing an interpositional buffer between belligerents and establishing zones of disengagement). The forces were normally composed of troops from small or nonaligned states, with permanent members of the Security Council and other major powers making troop contributions only under exceptional circumstances. Lightly armed, these neutral troops were symbolically deployed between belligerents who had agreed to stop fighting; they rarely used force and then only in self-defense and as a last resort. Rather than being based on any military prowess, the influence of UN peacekeepers in this period resulted from the cooperation of belligerents mixed with the moral weight of the international community of states.[8]

Peacekeeping operations essentially defended the status quo. They helped suspend a conflict and gain time so that belligerents could be brought closer to the negotiating table. However, these operations do not by themselves guarantee the successful pursuit of negotiations. They are often easier to institute than to dismantle, as the case of over four decades of this activity in Cyprus demonstrates. The termination of peacekeeping operations creates a vacuum and may have serious consequences for the stability of a region, as happened in 1967 at the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli War following the withdrawal of UNEF I at Egypt's request.

TABLE 2.1 UN Peacekeeping Operations During the Cold War and During the Initial Thaw

Years Active	*Operation*
1948–present	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO, based in Jerusalem)
1949–present	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)
1956–1967	United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I, Suez Canal)
1958	United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL)
1960–1964	United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC)
1962–1963	United Nations Force in New West Guinea (UNSF, in West Iran)
1963–1964	United Nations Yemen Observation Mission (UNYOM)
1964–present	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
1965–1966	United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM)
1965–1966	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic (DOMREP)
1973–1979	Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II, Suez Canal and later the Sinai Peninsula)
1974–present	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, Golan Heights)
1978–present	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFL)
1988–1990	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP)
1988–1991	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG)
1989–1990	United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG, in Namibia)
1989–1991	United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I)
1989–1992	United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)

Detailed histories of the first decades of peacekeeping are readily available. One illustration of the UN's handling of conflict in this period of East-West tensions helps to set the stage for a discussion of general principles that will bring in other UN operations. The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) represents a classic example of international compromise during the Cold War. This operation was designed as a microcosm of geopolitics, with a NATO member and a neutral on the pro-Western Israeli side of the line of separation, and a member of the Warsaw Pact and a neutral on the pro-Soviet Syrian side. UNDOF was established on May 31, 1974, upon the conclusion of disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria that called for an Israeli withdrawal from all areas it occupied within Syria, the establishment of a buffer zone to separate the Syrian and Israeli armies, and the creation of areas of restricted armaments on either side of the buffer zone. UNDOF was charged with verifying Israel's withdrawal, establishing the buffer zones, and monitoring levels of militarization in the restricted zones.

UNDOF employed 1,250 armed soldiers, including ninety military observers. Troop deployment emphasized equal contributions by countries that

were either politically neutral or sympathetic to the West or East. Originally, Peru, Canada, Poland, and Austria provided troops for the operation. (The Peruvian troops were replaced by Iranians in 1975 and by Finns in 1979.) Canadian and Peruvian forces operate along the Israeli side; Polish and Austrian troops operate in Syrian territory.

Despite the declared hostility between Israel and Syria, UNDOF proved instrumental in maintaining peace in the Golan Heights between the two longtime foes. From 1977 through 2005, no major incidents have occurred in areas under UNDOF's jurisdiction. Success is attributable to several factors: the details of the operation were thoroughly defined before its implementation, leaving little room for disagreement; Israel and Syria cooperated with UNDOF; and the Security Council supported the operation fully.

Principles of Traditional Peacekeeping

The man who helped give operational meaning to "peacekeeping," Sir Brian Urquhart, has summarized the characteristics of UN operations—which can be gleaned inductively from the case of UNDOF—during the Cold War as follows: consent of the parties, continuing strong support of the Security Council, a clear and practicable mandate, nonuse of force except in the last resort and in self-defense, the willingness of troop contributors to furnish military forces, and the willingness of member states to make available requisite financing.[9] Developing each of the characteristics serves as a bridge to our subsequent discussion of subsequent UN efforts that extend beyond traditional limitations because many of these traditional standard operating procedures would need to be set aside or seriously modified in order to confront the challenges of many post–Cold War peace operations.

Consent Is Imperative Before Operations Begin. In many ways, consent is the keystone of traditional peacekeeping, for two reasons. First, it helps to insulate the UN decision-making process against great-power dissent. For example, in Cyprus and Lebanon the Soviet Union's desire to obstruct was overcome because the parties themselves had asked for UN help.

Second, consent greatly reduces the likelihood that peacekeepers will encounter resistance while carrying out their duties. Peacekeepers are physically in no position to challenge the authority of belligerents (either states or opposition groups), and so they assume a nonconfrontational stance toward local authorities. Traditional peacekeepers do not impinge on sovereignty. In fact, it is imperative to achieve consent before operations begin.

The emphasis that traditional missions place on consent does have drawbacks, as two observers have noted: "Peacekeeping forces cannot often create conditions for their own success."[10] For example, belligerents will normally consent to a peacekeeping mission once wartime goals have been achieved or losses [illegible]. In instances where neither of these conditions

has been met, it becomes necessary to find alternate ways to induce warring parties to achieve and maintain consent. Moreover, major powers need to pressure their clients not only to consent but also to negotiate. When the political will is lacking, wars either continue unaddressed by the organization, or UN peacekeepers become inextricably tied down in conflict—neither able to bring peace to the area nor able to withdraw from it. For example, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), originally deployed in 1964 to separate warring Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities, and then given a new mandate in 1974, remains in the field because consent for deployment has not been matched by a willingness to negotiate the peace. Likewise, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), established in 1949; UNDOF, created in 1974; and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), deployed in 1978—all continue to operate because of the absence of political conditions allowing for their removal.

Peacekeeping Operations Need Full Support from the Security Council. The council's support is necessary not only in the beginning stages of the mission, when decisions regarding budgets, troop allotments, and other strategic priorities are made, but also in its later stages, when mandates come up for renewal. The host of problems in the Congo illustrates the dangers of proceeding without the support of the major powers in the Security Council. Backing by both the United States and the Soviet Union of UNEF I in the General Assembly was the only case in which the United States and the Soviet Union abandoned the Security Council and then resorted to the General Assembly to get around a veto. A practice has developed for the Security Council to renew the mandate of missions several times—frequently semiannually for years on end—in order to keep pressure on parties who may be threatened with the possible withdrawal of peacekeepers. Full Security Council support also enhances the symbolic power of an operation.

Participating Nations Need to Provide Troops and to Accept Risks. Successful peacekeeping missions require the self-sustained presence of individual peacekeeping battalions, each of which is independent but also functions under UN command. Frequently they deploy in areas of heavy militarization. Mortal danger exists for peacekeepers. Democratic governments in particular that provide troops must be willing to accept the risks inherent in a given mission, and they also must be able to defend such expenditures and losses before their parliaments.

Permanent members do not normally contribute troops except for logistical support, a specialty of the United States, which during the Cold War essentially airlifted most start-up troops and provisions for UN operations. Keeping major powers from an active role in peacekeeping was imperative for the neutrality that successful peacekeeping strives to attain. Washington and Moscow were thought to be especially tainted by the causes that they supported worldwide

The experience with exceptions to this rule has been mixed. Because of the special circumstances involved in Britain's possession of extraterritorial bases on the island of Cyprus, the United Kingdom was involved in the UN's operations there from the outset; that effort has been worthwhile. The experience of French peacekeepers deployed in UNIFIL in Lebanon was a source of problems because of France's perceived involvement as an ex-colonial power on the Christian side of the conflict. Consequently, French troops came under attack by local factions and were forced to withdraw from the zone of operations and to remain in the UN compound in Naquora. This experience was a smaller-scale indication of the problems that would be incurred later by both the United States and France in the non-UN operation in Beirut in 1984, when some 300 soldiers were killed.[11]

A Clear and Precise Mandate Is Desirable. The goals of the mission should be clear, obtainable, and known to all parties involved. Enunciation of the mission's objectives reduces local suspicion. Yet a certain degree of flexibility is desirable so that the peacekeepers may adapt their operating strategies to better fit changing circumstances. The goals of the operation may be expanded or reduced as the situation warrants. In fact, diplomatic vagueness may at times be necessary in Security Council voting to secure support or to keep future options open.

Force Is Used Only in Self-Defense and as a Last Resort. Peacekeepers derive their influence from the diplomatic support of the international community, and therefore they use force only as a last resort and in self-defense. The *Peacekeeper's Handbook* states this wisdom: "The degree of force (used) must only be sufficient to achieve the mission on hand and to prevent, as far as possible, loss of human life and/or serious injury. Force should not be initiated, except possibly after continuous harassment when it becomes necessary to restore a situation so that the United Nations can fulfill its responsibilities."[12]

Peacekeeping techniques differ greatly from those taught to most soldiers and officers by their national training authorities. However, in the past only the Scandinavian states and Canada have trained large numbers of their recruits and officers specifically for the peacekeeping method. Soldiers from other countries have often found themselves unprepared for peacekeeping situations where the prohibition against the use of force contradicts their standard military training.

Using minimal force affords several advantages.[13] With limited military capability, peacekeepers have insufficient firepower to threaten belligerents, who are apt to treat peacekeepers with less suspicion than they direct toward regular forces. Peacekeepers are often able to mediate and forestall local flare-ups of violence.

Traditionally, peacekeeping forces have had the luxury of operating without enemies. The need to operate at peak military efficiency has not been as great as it would have been if "enemies," in the normal sense of the term, had existed. As a result, the administrative, technological, and strategic structures that sustain

Brian E. Urquhart, under-secretary-general for special political affairs, answers questions in June 1985 about his mission to the Middle East to free soldiers of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon. (UN Photo 165579/Y. Nagata)

peacekeeping have reflected the need for professional diplomatic and political expertise more than the need for professional soldiers.

"CHAPTER SIX AND A HALF" ON HOLD, 1978–1988

From 1948 to 1978 thirteen UN peacekeeping operations took place. In the ten years after 1978, however, no new operations materialized, even as a rash of regional conflicts involving the superpowers or their proxies sprang up around the globe.[14]

The last operation approved before the hiatus of a decade highlights the difficulties encountered by the United Nations during this period. UNIFIL in Lebanon was beset with problems similar to those experienced in the Congo during the 1960s, where domestic conflict and an absence of government structures had given the world organization an operational black eye.[15] UNIFIL's difficulties illustrate the dangers inherent in operations that lack both clear mandates and the effective cooperation of belligerents and that operate amidst political chaos and great-power disagreement.

UNIFIL was established at the Security Council's request on March 19, 1978, following Israel's military incursion into southern Lebanon. Israel claimed that military raids and shellings by members of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), who were based in southern Lebanon, threatened Israeli peace and security. Israel's response embarrassed its primary ally the United States. We [illegible]

used its influence in the Security Council to create UNIFIL as a face-saving means for Israel to withdraw. The operation's duties included confirmation of the Israeli withdrawal; establishment and maintenance of an area of operations; prevention of renewed fighting among the PLO, Israel, and the Southern Lebanese Army (Christian militia backed by Israel and led by Major Saad Haddad); and the restoration of Lebanese sovereignty over southern Lebanon.

At UNIFIL's maximum strength, over 7,000 soldiers were deployed, including contingents from Canada, Fiji, France, Ghana, Iran, Ireland, Nepal, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, and Senegal. UNIFIL encountered significant problems due to the conflicting interests of the major parties involved in southern Lebanon. Israel refused to cede control of the South to UNIFIL, choosing instead to rely upon Major Haddad's Southern Lebanese Army, which resisted UNIFIL's efforts to gain control in the area. The PLO demanded that it be allowed to operate freely in the South to continue its resistance against Israel. The Lebanese government insisted that UNIFIL assume control of the entire region, including areas controlled by Haddad. Consequently, UNIFIL found itself sandwiched between the PLO and Haddad's forces; its contingents routinely came under fire. The PLO continued its military maneuverings against Israel, and Haddad's forces continued their attacks on the PLO. In 1982, as Israel reinvaded Lebanon and marched to Beirut, UNIFIL stood by, powerless, in the face of Israel's superior firepower and the unwillingness of troop contributors or the UN membership to resist. UNIFIL's refusal to stand its ground echoed Egypt's 1967 request to withdraw UNEF I; once UN troops were pulled out, war ensued.

The lack of political will among the regional participants and troop contributors was matched by the incapacity of the Lebanese government's army and police. Yet, UNIFIL became part of the local infrastructure,[16] and its withdrawal would be disruptive. It would have resulted in greater instances of fighting between the PLO, Israel, and Haddad's army, and a probable third Israeli intervention would almost certainly have been countered by direct Syrian opposition. Despite its limitations, UNIFIL continues to operate.

Much of the impetus for the increased tension between East and West and for the end of new UN deployments came from the United States after the Reagan administration assumed power in 1981. Elected on a platform of anticommunism, the rebuilding of the national defense system, and fiscal conservatism, the administration was determined to roll back Soviet gains in the Third World. Washington scorned the world organization and cast it aside as a bastion of Third World nationalism and procommunism. The UN's peacekeeping operations were tarred with the same brush. The Reagan administration also refused to pay its assessed dues (including a portion of the assessment for UNIFIL, which Washington had originally insisted upon).[17] The organization was in near bankruptcy at the same time that U.S. respect for international law seemed to evaporate and unilateral action gained favor.[18] Intervening in Grenada, bombing Libya, and supporting insurgencies in Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, and

Israeli troops withdraw in accordance with UNDOF disengagement agreement. (UN/DPI Photo/N. Nagata)

Cambodia attested to U.S. preferences. The Soviet Union countered these initiatives. Central America, the Horn of Africa, much of Southern Africa, and parts of Asia became battlegrounds for the superpowers or their proxies. This situation changed only with the Gorbachev regime in the Soviet Union and the advent of *glasnost* and *perestroika*, which figure in the next chapter.

ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

Short of sending international forces, a group of states may attempt to isolate an aggressor by cutting off diplomatic or economic relations with a view toward altering offensive behavior. These are coercive, albeit nonforcible, actions—the first step in Chapter VII's enforcement progression. Diplomatic and economic sanctions are significantly more emphatic than the political influence that makes up the everyday stuff of foreign policy, even if less emphatic than the dispatch of troops.

On a spectrum ranging from political influence to outside military intervention, economic sanctions are a form of nonforcible enforcement. For the same reasons that real collective security was not possible during the Cold War, these milder forms of enforcement were also largely underused. The exceptions were the cases of two pariahs, Rhodesia and South Africa, whose domestic racist policies were widely condemned. As a reaction to Rhodesia's

independence (UDI) from the United Kingdom in 1965, the Security Council in 1966 ordered limited economic sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter for the first time in UN history.[19] Whether the trigger was more due to the UDI or the human rights situation for Africans is debatable, but the result was that the council characterized the domestic situation as a "threat to the peace." The council toughened the stance against the white-minority government by banning all exports and imports (except for some foodstuffs, educational materials, and medicines). These sanctions became "comprehensive" in 1968.

The sanctions initially extracted some costs from the government of Rhodesian prime minister Ian Smith. But, ironically, they eventually helped immunize the country against outside pressure in the form of nonforcible sanctions because they prompted a successful program of import substitution. In short, Rhodesia diversified its economy. Although most members of the UN complied, some of those who counted did not. The United States, for example, openly violated sanctions after the Byrd amendment by Congress allowed trade with Rhodesia, even though the United States had voted for sanctions in the Security Council. According to U.S. judicial doctrine, if Congress uses its statutory authority to violate international law intentionally, domestic courts will defer to congressional action in U.S. jurisdiction. Many private firms as well as some other African countries also traded with Rhodesia, including the neighboring countries of Mozambique (a Portuguese colony) and the Republic of South Africa.

Although the Security Council authorized a forceful blockade to interrupt supplies of oil and the British navy did halt a few tankers, there was insufficient political will to effectively blockade the ports and coastlines of Mozambique and South Africa. Hence, the Security Council helped but can hardly be credited with the establishment of an independent Zimbabwe in 1979. The UN's use of economic sanctions in this case was more important as legal and diplomatic precedent than as effective power on the ground.

UN-imposed sanctions against South Africa reflected the judgment that legally approved racial separation (apartheid) within the country also was considered a threat to the peace. Limited economic sanctions, an embargo on arms sales to South Africa, boycotts against South African athletic teams, and selective divestment were all part of a visible campaign to isolate South Africa. These acts exerted pressure; however, it is difficult to quantify their impact. Initially, South Africa's high-cost industry thrived by trying to replace missing imports (as had Rhodesia's), and it even managed to produce a variety of sophisticated arms that eventually became a major export. The transition to democracy (and the end of white rule) probably resulted more from the dynamics of the internal struggle by the black majority and the end of the Cold War than from nonforcible sanctions. Sanctions no doubt contributed to altering the domestic balance by demonstrating the risks and the costs of being isolated, but measuring their precise impact requires greater empirical work.[20] As in Rhodesia, some major states were slow to endorse sanctions on South Africa, and others participated in trade under the table that lessened sanctions' impact.

The Rhodesian and South African experiences show how the UN, through the Security Council, can link the domestic policies of states to threats to international peace and security and thereby justify Chapter VII action. Earlier, we pointed out the power of self-definition, and thus the council expanded the definition of a threat by the use of sanctions as enforcement tools for a domestic issue and thereby set an important precedent. UN sanctions are analytically distinct from bilateral economic sanctions or those imposed by treaty (for example, the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone). The UN Charter never uses the word "sanctions" in Chapter VII, but Article 41 speaks of "measures not involving the use of armed force," which "are to be employed to give effect to its decisions." The continued use of partial or comprehensive sanctions has come under increased criticism because of their impact on vulnerable populations within targeted countries, a subject to which we return at the end of Chapter 3.

NOTES

1. See Leon Gordenker, *The UN Secretary-General and the Maintenance of Peace* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967); and Leland M. Goodrich, *Korea: A Study of U.S. Policy* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1956).

2. The tradition of acronyms in English was set aside as operations in Spanish- and French-speaking countries became more widespread beginning in the late 1980s.

3. Max Harrelson, *Fires All Around the Horizon: The UN's Uphill Battle to Preserve the Peace* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 89.

4. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: UN, 1992), para. 46.

5. Other definitions can be found in *United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping* (New York: UNDPI, 1990), 4; Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1990), 1; and Boutros-Ghali, *Agenda*, para. 20.

6. Marrack Goulding, "The Changing Role of the United Nations in Conflict Resolution and Peace-keeping," speech given at the Singapore Institute of Policy Studies, March 13, 1991, 9. See also Marrack Goulding, "The Evolution of Peacekeeping," *International Affairs* 69, no. 3 (1993): 451–464. See also his *Peacemonger* (London: John Murray, 2002).

7. For further analyses of peacekeeping during the Cold War, see Thomas G. Weiss and Jarat Chopra, *Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text* (Hanover, NH: Academic Council on the United Nations System, 1992), 1–20. For a discussion of operations during the Cold War but with an emphasis on transferring lessons to the present, see Sally Morphet, "UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring," in *United Nations, Divided World: The UN's Roles in International Relations*, ed. Adam Roberts and Benedict Kingsbury (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 183–239. The United Nations published its own volume, *The Blue Helmets* (New York: UN, 1985), which was revised in 1990 and 1996. Updates are now on the United Nations website at www.un.org. See also Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, Documents and Commentary*, vols. 1–4 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969, 1970, 1980, 1981).

8. For a discussion of UN and non-UN operations in a comparative military perspective in this period, see John Mackinlay, *The Peacekeepers* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1989). See also Augustus Richard Norton and Thomas G. Weiss, *UN Peacekeepers, Soldiers with a Difference* (New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1990); William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993); and Paul Diehl, *International Peacekeeping* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).

9. Brian Urquhart, "Beyond the 'Sheriff's Posse,'" *Survival* 32, no. 3 (1990): 198; see also his autobiography, *A Life in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).

10. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (1992): 114.

11. For a discussion of these issues, see Mackinlay, *Peacekeepers*; and Pierre Le Peillet, *Les berets bleus de l'ONU* (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1988).

12. International Peace Academy, *Peacekeeper's Handbook* (New York: Pergamon, 1984), 56.

13. See F. T. Liu, *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

14. For a discussion of this period, see S. Neil MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1985); and Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986).

15. For a discussion, see Bjorn Skogmo, *UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989); and E. A. Erskine, *Mission with UNIFIL* (London: Hurst, 1989).

16. See Marianne Heiberg, "Peacekeepers and Local Populations: Some Comments on UNIFIL," in *The United Nations and Peacekeeping*, ed. Indar Jit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsback (London: Macmillan, 1990), 147–169.

17. See Jeffrey Harrod and Nico Shrijver, eds., *The UN Under Attack* (London: Gower, 1988).

18. See David P. Forsythe, *The Politics of International Law: U.S. Foreign Policy Reconsidered* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

19. See Henry Wiseman and Alistair M. Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* (New York: Pergamon, 1981); and Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991). The League of Nations had previously tried limited sanctions against Franco's Spain.

20. Audie Klotz and Neta C. Crawford, *How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).

CHAPTER 3

UN Security Operations After the Cold War

A THAW IN THE Cold War marks an important period of transition for the United Nations. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reduce East-West tensions by reinvigorating multilateralism generally and UN peacekeeping more particularly.[1] The USSR began making payments on its debt of over $200 million to the UN in 1987, thereby renewing international interest in the United Nations and collective security. Gorbachev officially redefined the Soviet Union's relationship with the UN in 1988 at the General Assembly, calling for an extension of his domestic "new thinking" to apply to the management of international conflicts. In particular, UN peacekeeping provided a face-saving means to withdraw from what Gorbachev described as the "bleeding wound" of Afghanistan.

Changes in the Soviet Union's attitude toward the UN influenced the international climate and more particularly the U.S. approach to the world organization. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan abruptly altered his public stance and praised the work of the organization, the Secretary-General, and UN peacekeepers.[2] After helping to spearhead attacks that had led to almost a decade of UN-bashing, he declared at the General Assembly that "the United Nations has the opportunity to live and breathe and work as never before" and vowed to repay U.S. debts to the organization. This orientation was continued by President George H. W. Bush, a former U.S. permanent representative to the UN. Great-power cooperation grew, allowing the Security Council to resume part of its role as a guarantor of international peace and security. The UN also provided a convenient way for France, Great Britain, and Russia[3] to maintain international preeminence despite their declining economic, political, and military significance. The UN also enabled the United States to proceed as a hegemonic rather than dominant power, allowing it to act through the UN on the basis of cooperation rather than having to coerce other states into compliance.