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10. John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," *Washington Quarterly* 15, no. 3 (1992): 114.

11. For a discussion of these issues, see Mackinlay, *Peacekeepers*; and Pierre Le Peillet, *Les berets bleus de l'ONU* (Paris: Editions France-Empire, 1988).

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13. See F. T. Liu, *United Nations Peacekeeping and the Non-Use of Force* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992).

14. For a discussion of this period, see S. Neil MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985); Elizabeth Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World* (New York: Praeger, 1985); and Jerry Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1986).

15. For a discussion, see Bjorn Skogmo, *UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1989); and E. A. Erskine, *Mission with UNIFIL* (London: Hurst, 1989).

16. See Marianne Heiberg, "Peacekeepers and Local Populations: Some Comments on UNIFIL," in *The United Nations and Peacekeeping*, ed. Indar Jit Rikhye and Kjell Skjelsback (London: Macmillan, 1990), 147–169.

17. See Jeffrey Harrod and Nico Shrijver, eds., *The UN Under Attack* (London: Gower, 1988).

18. See David P. Forsythe, *The Politics of International Law: U.S. Foreign Policy Reconsidered* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

19. See Henry Wiseman and Alistair M. Taylor, *From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe* (New York: Pergamon, 1981); and Stephen John Stedman, *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991). The League of Nations had previously tried limited sanctions against Franco's Spain.

20. Audie Klotz and Neta C. Crawford, *How Sanctions Work: Lessons from South Africa* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999).

CHAPTER 3

UN Security Operations After the Cold War

A THAW IN THE Cold War marks an important period of transition for the United Nations. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sought to reduce East-West tensions by reinvigorating multilateralism generally and UN peacekeeping more particularly.[1] The USSR began making payments on its debt of over $200 million to the UN in 1987, thereby renewing international interest in the United Nations and collective security. Gorbachev officially redefined the Soviet Union's relationship with the UN in 1988 at the General Assembly, calling for an extension of his domestic "new thinking" to apply to the management of international conflicts. In particular, UN peacekeeping provided a face-saving means to withdraw from what Gorbachev described as the "bleeding wound" of Afghanistan.

Changes in the Soviet Union's attitude toward the UN influenced the international climate and more particularly the U.S. approach to the world organization. In 1988, President Ronald Reagan abruptly altered his public stance and praised the work of the organization, the Secretary-General, and UN peacekeepers.[2] After helping to spearhead attacks that had led to almost a decade of UN-bashing, he declared at the General Assembly that "the United Nations has the opportunity to live and breathe and work as never before" and vowed to repay U.S. debts to the organization. This orientation was continued by President George H. W. Bush, a former U.S. permanent representative to the UN. Great-power cooperation grew, allowing the Security Council to resume part of its role as a guarantor of international peace and security. The UN also provided a convenient way for France, Great Britain, and Russia[3] to maintain international preeminence despite their declining economic, political, and military significance. The UN also enabled the United States to proceed as a hegemonic rather than dominant power, allowing it to act through the UN on the basis of cooperation rather than having to coerce other states into compliance.

THE FIRST UN MILITARY OPERATIONS AFTER THE END OF THE COLD WAR, 1988–1993

In 1988 and 1989, collegiality and regular collaboration among great powers in the Security Council was politically possible. After a ten-year gap in deploying new UN security operations, five post–Cold War operations (listed at the bottom of Table 2.1) were launched—in Afghanistan and Pakistan, astride the Iran-Iraq border, and in Angola, Namibia, and Central America (for Nicaragua).

These were largely traditional peacekeeping operations; however, they also incorporated some improvisations that are so characteristic of the evolution of UN peacekeeping. For example, there were large numbers of civilians working in tandem with soldiers in Namibia and Central America. The first supervision of domestic elections as well as the collection of weapons from insurgents took place in Nicaragua. These precedents illustrated clearly the UN's capacity for growth in the new era, just as improvisation and task expansion had been present in earlier UN activities. At the same time, these new operations were essentially extensions of the time-tested recipe for UN peacekeeping. In particular, all enjoyed the consent of fighting parties and relied upon defensive concepts of force employed by modestly equipped UN soldiers, few of whom came from armies of the major powers. Peace operations begun since 1991 are listed in Table 3.1; those that continue as of December 2005 are found in Table 3.2; and those that have been completed since 1956 are listed in Table 3.3. Two of the operations also fall into the traditional peacekeeping category—the follow-up operation in Angola and the one in the Western Sahara.[4]

Three operations begun during this period are so different in scope and mandate that to characterize them as "peacekeeping" stretches analytical categories almost to the breaking point. UN operations in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Somalia indicated the new challenges for the UN. The evolution of these and two other subsequent operations (Rwanda and Haiti) illustrates the limits of UN military operations, which is where we conclude this chapter. Another UN operation in the Iraq-Kuwait war merits a separate discussion because its deployment followed the first UN collective security action of the post–Cold War era.

All of these operations are quite distinct from traditional peacekeeping. The distinction between the former and latter, with Somalia as the turning point, will become clear by the end of this chapter. However, before we analyze precisely how the new field operations illustrate challenges for the future, we need to examine in more detail a few cases of post–Cold War cooperation that cemented big-power collaboration and made possible the movement toward bolder UN operations. At a maximum, these cases suggest the revival of collective security as a possible policy option for governments.

TABLE 3.1 UN Peace and Security Operations from the End of the Cold War to the Present

Years Active	*Operation*
1991–1992	United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC)
1991–1995	United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL)
1991–1995	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II (UNAVEM II)
1991–present	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)
1991–2003	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)
1992–1993	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC)
1992–1993	United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I)
1992–1994	United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ)
1992–1995	United Nations Protection Force, former Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR)
1993–1994	United Nations Mission Uganda-Rwanda (UNOMUR)
1993–1995	United Nations Mission in Somalia II (UNOSOM II)
1993–1996	United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)
1993–1996	United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR)
1993–1997	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL)
1993–present	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)
1994	United Nations Aouzou Strip Observer Group (UNASOG, Chad/Libya)
1994–2000	United Nations Mission in Tajikistan (UNMOT)
1995–1996	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, Croatia (UNCRO)
1995–1997	United Nations Angola Verification Mission III (UNAVEM III)
1995–1999	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (UNPREDEP)
1995–2002	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH)
1996–1997	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH)
1996–1998	United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium (UNTAES)
1996–2002	United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP)
1997	United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA)
1997–1999	United Nations Observer Mission in Angola (MONUA)
1997	United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH)
1997–2000	United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH)
1998	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG)
1998–2000	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA)
1998–1999	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL)
1999–present	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)
1999–present	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)
1999–2002	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)
1999–present	United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC)
2000–present	United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)
2002–2005	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)
2003–present	United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)
2004–present	United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI)
2004–present	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)
2004–present	United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB)
2005–present	United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

TABLE 3.2 Ongoing UN Peace and Security Operations as of 31 October 2005 [with starting dates] (estimated total cost of operations from 1948 to 30 June 2005 about $36 billion)

1. United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), Middle East, May 1948:
   Appropriation for 2005: $29.04 million
   Current strength (military) 151
2. United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), January 1949:
   Appropriation for 2005: $8.37 million
   Current strength (military): 44
3. United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), March 1964:
   Approved Budget for 07/05-06/06: $46.51 million (gross), including voluntary contributions of one-third from Cyprus and $6.5 million from Greece
   Current strength (military and police personnel): 911
4. United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), Golan Heights, June 1974:
   Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $43.71 million
   Current strength (military): 1,030
5. United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), March 1978:
   Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $92.23 million
   Current strength (military): 2,009
6. United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), April 1991:
   Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $47.95 million
   Current strength (military and police personnel): 235
7. United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), August 1993:
   Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $36.38 million
   Current strength (military and police personnel): 132
8. United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK), June 1999:
   Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $252.55 million
   Current strength (military and police personnel): 2,222
9. United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), October 1999:
   Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $113.22 million
   Current strength (military and police personnel): 1,530
10. United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), November 1999:
    Commitment Authority for July 2005–June 2006: $403.41 million
    Current strength (military and police personnel): 16,221
11. United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE), July 2000:
    Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $185.99 million
    Current strength (military): 3,285
12. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), May 2002:
    Data unavailable
13. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), September 2003:
    Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $760.57 million
    Current strength (military and police personnel): 15,945

TABLE 3.2 (*continued*)

14. United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOCI), April 2004:
    Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $386.89 million
    Current strength (military and police personnel): 7,558
15. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), June 2004:
    Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $494.89 million
    Current strength (military and police personnel): 8,867
16. United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), June 2004:
    Approved Budget for July 2005–June 2006: $307.69 million
    Current strength (military and police personnel): 5,642
17. United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), March 2005:
    Commitment Authority for July 2005–October 2005: $315.99 million
    Current strength (military and police personnel): 3,917
18. United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), May 2005:
    Requested Budget for May 2005–May 2006: $22.028 million
    Current strength: 15 military training advisers, 40 police training advisers, and 20 police

Source: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

THE REBIRTH OF PEACEKEEPING

The UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), the UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), the first UN Angola Verification Mission, and the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) were missions that renewed peacekeeping's visibility and perceived workability in the international arena of conflict resolution. UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, and UNTAG are also significant because they afforded the UN the opportunity to demonstrate its usefulness in war zones, a capacity that had been frozen from 1978 to 1988. Successes built confidence and allowed the UN to move back toward center stage, and the operations provided the space to experiment with innovations beyond the scope of previous deployments.

These operations are examples of "observation," a diverse set of tasks that occupies the least controversial part of the peacekeeping spectrum. Traditionally, observation has meant investigation, armistice supervision, maintenance of a cease-fire, supervision of plebiscites, oversight of the cessation of fighting, and reports to headquarters. It has been expanded to include the verification of troop withdrawal, the organization and observation of elections, the voluntary surrender of weapons, and human rights verification. These operations are distinct from the other traditional task: interposition—placing peacekeepers between belligerents along a cease-fire line.

UNGOMAP verified the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan after 1988. The USSR had entered the country in 1979 to ensure a friendly Afghan government in Kabul. By the early 1980s Afghanistan had become Moscow's

TABLE 3.3 UN Peace and Security Operations: Completed as of December 2005

Location	*Acronym/Name*	*Duration*
Middle East	UNEF I/First United Nations Emergency Force	November 1956–June 1967
Lebanon	UNOGIL/United Nations Observation Group in Lebanon	June 1958–December 1958
Congo	ONUC/United Nations Operation in the Congo	July 1960–June 1964
West New Guinea	UNSF/United Nations Security Force in West Guinea (West Irian)	October 1962–April 1963
Yemen	UNYOM/United Nations Yemen Observation Mission	July 1963–September 1964
Dominican Republic	DOMREP/Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	May 1965–October 1966
India and Pakistan	UNIPOM/United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission	September 1965–March 1966
Middle East	UNEFII/Second United Nations Emergency Force	October 1973–July 1979
Afghanistan and Pakistan	UNGOMAP/United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	April 1988–March 1990
Iran and Iraq	UNIIMOG/United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	August 1988–February 1991
Angola	UNAVEM I/United Nations Angola Verification Mission I	January 1989–June 1991
Namibia	UNTAG/United Nations Transition Assistance Group	April 1989–March 1990
Central America	ONUCA/United Nations Observer Group in Central America	November 1989–January 1992
Iraq and Kuwait	UNIKOM/ United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission	April 1991–October 2003
Angola	UNAVEM II/Angola Verification Mission II	June 1991–February 1995
El Salvador	ONUSAL/United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador	July 1991–April 1995
Cambodia	UNAMIC/United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia	October 1991–March 1992
Cambodia	UNTAC/United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia	March 1992–September 1993
Former Yugoslavia	UNPROFOR/United Nations Protection Force	March 1992–December 1995
Somalia	UNOSOM I/United Nations Operation in Somalia I	April 1992–March 1993
Mozambique	ONUMOZ/United Nations Operation in Mozambique	December 1992–December 1994
Somalia	United Nations Operation in Somalia II	March 1993–March 1995
Rwanda and Uganda	UNOMUR/United Nations Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	June 1993–September 1994

TABLE 3.3 *(continued)*

Location	*Acronym/Name*	*Duration*
Haiti	UNMIH/United Nations Mission in Haiti	September 1993–June 1996
Liberia	UNOMIL/United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia	September 1993–September 1997
Rwanda	UNAMIR/United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda	October 1993–March 1996
Chad and Libya	UNASOG/United Nations Aousou Strip Observer Group	May 1994–June 1994
Rwanda	Operation Turquoise	June 1994
Angola	UNAVEM III/United Nations Angola Verification Mission III	February 1995–June 1997
Croatia	UNCRO/United Nations Confidence Restoration Organization	March 1995–January 1996
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	UNPREDEP/United Nations Preventive Deployment Force	March 1995–February 1999
Croatia	UNTAES/United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Balanja, and Western Sirmium	January 1996–January 1998
Haiti	UNSMIH/United Nations Support Mission in Haiti	July 1996–July 1997
Guatemala	MINUGUA/United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala	January 1997–May 1997
Angola	MONUA/United Nations Observer Mission in Angola	July 1997–February 1999
Haiti	UNTMIH/United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti	August 1997–November 1997
Croatia	United Nations Civilian Police Support Group	January 1998–October 1998
Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL/United Nations Mission of Observers in Sierra Leone	July 1988–October 1999
Central African Republic	MINURCA/United Nations Mission in Central African Republic	April 1998–February 2000
Haiti	MIPONUH/United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	December 1997–March 2000
East Timor	UNTAET/United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor	October 1999–May 2002
Tajikistan	UNMOT/United Nations Mission in Tajikistan	December 1994–May 2000
Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH/ United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	December 1995–December 2002
Prevlaka Province, Prevlaka; Croatia/ Federal Republic of Yugoslavia	UNMOP/United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	February 1996–December 2002
East Timor	UNMISET/ United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	May 2002–May 2005

Note: Although authorized by the UN Security Council, Operation Turquoise was commanded and financed by France.

Vietnam. The Soviets had become inextricably tied down in an unwinnable conflict against the *mujahideen*, armed local groups backed by Pakistan and the United States—and a few others like Saudi Arabia. The Gorbachev administration sought a face-saving device to extricate itself. The 1988 Geneva Accords provided the means to achieve Soviet withdrawal, mutual noninterference and nonintervention pledges between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the return of refugees, and noninterference pledges from the United States and the Soviet Union. These accords had been brokered by the United Nations and the indefatigable efforts of Under-Secretary-General Diego Cordovez.

The deployment of UNGOMAP was not accompanied by the political will needed to implement the international agreements concerning peace, elections, and disarmament. The symbolic size of the operation—fifty officers divided between Islamabad and Kabul—attested to its inability to independently perform tasks other than reporting on the Soviet withdrawal after the fact. The operation paved the way to a potential peace by reducing the direct East-West character of the conflict; however, the power vacuum left by the Soviet withdrawal also set the stage for the rise of the Taliban.

Just south of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq War of 1980–1988 drew to a close. Eight years after the war began, one year after the Security Council ordered a cease-fire with the compulsory intent provided for under Chapter VII, and after about a million lives had been lost, UNIIMOG was set up by the Security Council in August 1988 to ensure the maintenance of the cease-fire astride the international border. It established cease-fire lines between Iranian and Iraqi troops, observed the maintenance of the cease-fire, and investigated complaints to defuse minor truce violations before they escalated into peace-threatening situations.

Composed of only 350 unarmed observers from some twenty-five states, UNIIMOG nonetheless played a useful role in preserving the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq, two countries whose mutual antagonism continued after the cessation of hostilities. In its first five months alone, UNIIMOG investigated some 2,000 complaints of truce infractions. Although UNIIMOG was instrumental in stopping a deterioration of the situation, it was more Iraq's diminished position after the 1991 Persian Gulf War that kept the peace than any diplomatic effort.

In Africa, Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed a trilateral agreement on December 22, 1988. This provided for the simultaneous withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and of South African troops and administrators from Namibia. This diplomatic breakthrough was monitored successfully by the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission, which led the way for the UN-sponsored peace process that brought Namibian independence on March 21, 1990, from South Africa's illegal colonial rule. The second UNAVEM was more problematic because civil war returned in spite of UN-supervised elections at the end of 1992; the difficulties faced by this group are discussed with other more problematic operations later in this chapter.

UNTAG was established to facilitate and monitor South Africa's withdrawal from Namibia, to set up free and fair elections, and to determine the future government and constitution of Namibia. This was one of the last major decolonization efforts under UN auspices. UNTAG was tasked with monitoring and facilitating the departure of South Africa's army and the withdrawal and confinement of the South-West Africa People's Organization's (SWAPO) fighters to base camps in Angola, monitor the southwest African police force controlled by South Africa to prevent meddling in elections, oversee the repeal of discriminatory laws that threatened the fairness of the election, help ensure the respect for amnesty to political prisoners, and provide for the return of all Namibian refugees. UNTAG also registered voters and facilitated information about the election process.

At its maximum deployment, nearly 8,000 persons were involved in UNTAG—about 4,500 military personnel, 2,000 civilian personnel, and 1,000 police officers. It was the first sizable operation in Africa since the contested one in the Congo almost three decades earlier. The operation was rushed into the field in order to respect an April deadline. Hundreds of SWAPO fighters crossed the border on the first day after the UN's deployment in violation of the letter of the agreement, although they claimed that they had interpreted the text otherwise. In any event, South Africa–supported defense forces killed several hundred SWAPO guerrillas, the heaviest casualties in two decades of armed conflict.

But the parties to the conflict, in particular South Africa, were committed to making the operation work. UNTAG is generally considered a success. Virtually the entire population was registered to vote. SWAPO won forty-one of seventy-two seats in the Constitutional Constituents Assembly and was duly empowered to lead the formation of the Namibian government. On March 21, 1990—ahead of schedule and under budget—UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar swore in Sam Nujoma as president of Namibia.

UNTAG provides a helpful analytical hinge between the old and new types of UN security operations. It went smoothly because traditional rules were followed—especially consent and minimal use of force. At the same time, it undertook several new tasks related to civil administration, elections, and police activities. These tasks foreshadowed new UN activities that would intrude more into the affairs of "sovereign" states rather than being part of a decolonization effort.

MOVING TOWARD THE NEXT GENERATION

The work of the United Nations in Central America during the late 1980s and early 1990s provides a transition in our discussion of the progressive movement toward a new generation of peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations.[5] World politics was changing and so were the possibilities for UN action. Governments removed political obstacles that had previously blocked or impeded

activities by the world organization. Although not at all comparable in most ways, the UN's efforts in Central America were similar to the Afghanistan operation in that the world organization was helping a superpower move beyond an unwinnable confrontation in its own backyard.

An analysis of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN), and the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) illustrates the complex transition process that the UN's peace and security functions began to undergo. These also set the stage for the analysis of the UN-sponsored Chapter VII enforcement action against Iraq. ONUSAL in particular shows the independent nature of UN action when states give the world organization some political room to maneuver. All of this was made possible not only by the rise of Gorbachev in the Soviet Union but also by the replacement of Reagan with President George H. W. Bush (father of President George W. Bush).

In the late 1980s, the conclusion of the so-called Esquipulas II agreements between the countries of Central America—Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras—began the peace process that ended a decade of civil war and instability in the region. The cornerstone of the agreements involved setting up free and fair elections in Nicaragua. In addition to calling for elections, the Esquipulas II agreements prohibited aid to rebel groups and the use of the territory of one state for guerrilla activity in another. ONUCA (1989–1992) was established to ensure that these provisions were respected. Although ONUCA was officially an "observer" mission, duties were far-reaching. They included verifying that all forms of military assistance to insurgent forces had ceased and preventing states from sponsoring such activity for infiltration into neighboring countries. ONUCA observers made spot checks and random investigations of areas prone to guerrilla activity along the borders of Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica. Although the signatories to Esquipulas II were expected to cooperate with ONUCA, the participation of the Nicaraguan resistance movement, the Contras, was not ensured until after the electoral defeat of the Sandinista government in February 1990. ONUCA military observers operated in a tense, potentially dangerous situation where armed attacks were possible.

ONUCA's mandate expanded after the Nicaraguan election to include demobilizing the contras. Bases were set up inside the borders of Nicaragua, where many rebel soldiers came and handed over some of their weapons and military equipment to ONUCA soldiers, who destroyed them and helped to advance demilitarization. In spite of the continued existence of arms among disgruntled partisans of both the Contra and Sandinista causes, this was the first instance of UN involvement in demilitarization through the physical collection and destruction of armaments. This task is important for conflict resolution in areas where heavily armed regular as well as irregular forces need to be drastically reduced before any meaningful consultative process can occur. The collection of arms has been integrated into numerous subsequent UN peacekeeping operations and has been made even more rigorous.[6] The importance of such a task was recognized by the United Kingdom as part of its efforts to end direct rule over Northern Ireland in 1999–2000.

ONUVEN was created to ensure the fairness of elections in Nicaragua and is the first example of UN observation of elections inside a recognized state, an extraordinary intrusion according to conventional notions of domestic jurisdiction. It operated in tandem with ONUCA's soldiers, but ONUVEN consisted of some 120 civilian observers who monitored the election process, from start to finish, to ensure that it was free and fair. They verified that political parties were equitably represented in the Supreme Electoral Council; that there was political, organizational, and operational freedom for all political parties; that all political parties had equal access to state television and radio broadcasts; and that the electoral rolls were drawn up fairly. It also reported any perceived unfairness to the Supreme Electoral Council, made recommendations about possible remedial action, and reported to the Secretary-General.

One unusual development was the extent to which the UN operations were linked to supporting efforts from regional and nongovernmental organizations. The UN and the Organization of American States—in particular, the secretaries-general of the UN and the OAS—cooperated closely in diplomacy and in civilian observation. During the Nicaraguan elections, a host of such nongovernmental groups as former U.S. president Jimmy Carter's (the Council of Freely Elected Heads of Government) provided additional outside observers as part of a large international network.

The operation began in August 1989 and ended in February 1990 with the surprising electoral defeat of the Sandinista government. ONUVEN's success—which was fortified by its linkages to the OAS and private groups—enhanced the prospects of UN election-monitoring teams working within the boundaries of states. This practice has gained wider international acceptance even when no armed conflict has taken place. For instance, from June 1990 to January 1991, the United Nations Observer Mission to Verify the Electoral Process in Haiti (ONUVEH) performed tasks similar to the missions in Nicaragua, which set the stage for subsequent UN action when the duly elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown. ONUVEN's civilian composition changed the content of peacekeeping's definition by blurring the distinction between civilian and military operations and between security and human rights.

In neighboring El Salvador, ONUSAL was an essential element in helping to move beyond a decade of brutal civil war in which over 75,000 persons had been killed and serious human rights abuses had taken place. The government and rebel sides, and their foreign backers, came to a stalemate. This created the conditions for successful and creative UN mediation. Negotiations under the good offices of the UN Secretary-General led to a detailed agreement on January 1,

1992, which was actually initialed a few hours after Javier Pérez de Cuéllar had completed his second five-year term.

An essential component of moving beyond the war was the use of UN civilian and military personnel in what, by historical standards, would have been seen as unacceptable outside interference in purely domestic affairs. Ongoing human rights abuses were to be prevented through an elaborate observation and monitoring system that began before an official cease-fire. Previous violations by both the army and the government as well as by the armed opposition, the FMLN, were to be investigated by a truth commission. The highly controversial findings—including the documentation of a former president's approval of the assassination of a dissident archbishop and the incrimination of a sitting defense minister in other murders—served to clear the air, although the exact impact of the political processes within the country took time to have effects. There was also a second commission to identify those military personnel who had committed major human rights violations.

In addition, ONUSAL personnel collected and destroyed many insurgents' weapons and helped oversee the creation of a new national army staff college, where students included former members of the armed opposition in addition to new recruits and members of the national army. Some of the early UN involvement on the ground in El Salvador took place even before the cease-fire was signed, thus putting UN observers at some risk.

Whatever the ultimate value of these experiences for making future UN security operations possible, the renaissance in the world organization can certainly be traced to the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The consequences not only influenced governments trying to deal with Central America but also continued to be felt in the international arena long afterward.

MOVING TOWARD ENFORCEMENT

The creative adaptations by the UN's member states and civil servants have proved to be as important as the grand visions and long-term plans for international organizations. Political changes and crises occur, and then governments and the United Nations react. Precedents are created that circumscribe what can be possible later. UN actions in the Persian Gulf beginning in 1990 set important precedents relating to collective security, humanitarian actions, and sanctions.

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi armed forces swept past the border of neighboring Kuwait and quickly gained control of the tiny, oil-rich country. The invasion met with uniform condemnation in the United Nations, including the Security Council's first unequivocal statement about a breach of the peace since 1950 and the Korean War. From early August until the end of the year, the Security Council passed twelve resolutions directed at securing Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. The council invoked Chapter VII, Articles 39 through 41, to lay the guidelines for the first post–Cold War enforcement action. Resolutions 661 of August 6 and 665 of August 25 called upon member states to establish economic sanctions against Iraq and to use force to police them. Resolution 678 of November 29 authorized member states to use "all necessary means" to expel Iraq from Kuwait and thus represented a major shift in strategy. The organization's experience during the Persian Gulf War contains valuable lessons about the needs of a workable collective-security system for the future.

At Washington's insistence the date of January 15, 1991, was negotiated as the deadline for the use of military force. Iraq remained in Kuwait past this date, and the U.S.-led coalition of twenty-eight states began military operations two days later.[7] A bombing campaign against Iraq and its troops commenced, followed by a ground war one month later with about half a million U.S. military personnel. The coalition's victory reversed the Iraqi invasion and occupation at minimal cost in blood and treasure. It placed the United Nations at the center of the international security stage.

Members of the Allied Coalition lost relatively few lives, but tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians and perhaps many more soldiers were killed, so questions were raised about the proportionality of UN-sponsored actions.[8] The Security Council's process of decision-making and the conduct of the war have led some critics to be skeptical about the precise value of the Gulf War as a precedent for subsequent Chapter VII enforcement action.[9] Dominance by the United States, the decision to replace nonforcible sanctions with force as the dominant means of ensuring Iraq's compliance with the organization's wishes, the extensive use of force that ensued, and the UN's inability to command and control the operation are also concerns. Each of these criticisms raises important questions about the ability of the UN's collective-security apparatus to function properly. The criticisms remained pertinent in 2003 when primarily the United States and the United Kingdom made the decision to go to war with Iraq after failing to receive a Security Council blessing.

Strengths and Weaknesses of UN Involvement in the 1991 Gulf War

The first criticism of the Persian Gulf War—that the United States too easily used the United Nations to rubber-stamp its own agenda—was a more general criticism of geopolitics after the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a superpower. Washington used its influence to foster perceived national interests, creating and maintaining a diverse coalition against Iraq. The process by which the coalition was created illustrated the extent to which the UN had become a reflection of U.S. influence. The UN had never been a completely neutral forum—Western dominance in the early years had been partially replaced beginning in the 1960s by the Third World's "automatic majority" in the General Assembly, but not in the Security Council. This Third World majority had contributed to a new popular sport, UN-bashing, for two Republican administrations. Yet the United States was able to use its considerable political and economic clout in the Security Council to ensure that its Persian Gulf agenda was approved. Political

concessions were provided to the Soviet Union to gain its approval for enforcement and to China for its abstentions (instead of vetoes). The United States promised financial aid and debt relief to a number of developing countries for their votes and withdrew aid commitments to Yemen in retribution for its opposing the use of force. This is precisely the way a hegemonic power is supposed to operate, making the "side payments" necessary to get many other states to consent to what the hegemon desires.[10] Moreover, Kuwait, a member state of the UN, had been attacked by traditional means; the question of aggression or breach of the peace was reasonably clear.

A second criticism centers on how the nonforcible sanctions mandated by the Security Council were overtaken by forcible ones after only three months. According to Article 42, the Security Council may authorize force after all other means of settlement, and economic sanctions in particular, have proven inadequate. Yet the Security Council chose to use military force before the sanctions leveled against Iraq had had a chance to take full effect. Critics pointed out that in South Africa, by contrast, partial sanctions had not been discarded in favor of military force even though that country's racist policy had been condemned for decades. They also noted that Israel's expansion and continued occupation of territories from 1967 had not been met with either economic or military sanctions. At the same time, sanctions take a long time to take effect, and in the meantime violence continues and even can increase. When economic sanctions were applied later to Haiti, some observers said military force should have been used earlier and would have caused less suffering. The record regarding the use of nonforcible sanctions and military force suggests that the politics of the day play a large part in determining a course of action and, ultimately, the sequence in which action is taken. The UN continued to use economic sanctions against Iraq after the end of the formal military operations, and they were removed after the U.S. invasion in 2003 with UN approval.

The third criticism of the handling of the 1991 Persian Gulf War is that no limits on the use of force were enacted and that the organization exerted no control over the U.S. military operation. According to the Charter, military enforcement operations are to be directed and controlled by the Military Staff Committee so that the UN can exercise control and military forces can be held accountable to the international community for their actions. As in Korea forty years earlier, command and control of the Gulf War was in the hands of the U.S.-led coalition forces. Only this time, in the Persian Gulf, there was no blue flag and no decision specifically authorizing the preponderant U.S. role. The Security Council was essentially a spectator, but U.S. control appeared necessary for reasons of efficiency as well as political support.

Resolution 678 authorized "all necessary means" and made no restrictions on what kind of, how much, and how long force could be used. According to critics, the United States had left with a blank check to pursue the expulsion of Iraq. Authorizations of this kind may run contrary to the spirit of the world organization's Charter, especially in this case because there was extensive civilian injury

Medical personnel from the multinational forces carry an Iraqi refugee into a camp near Safwan, Iraq, in March 1991. (UN Photo 158302/J. Isaac)

and damage inside Iraq. Logistically, however, it may be the only feasible way for the UN to enforce its decisions.

These doubts and criticisms about the handling of the Persian Gulf War are pertinent to the UN's future security operations not because they are necessarily accurate but because they are widespread. The Persian Gulf War provides the first example of the existing security apparatus in an enforcement action in the post–Cold War era. Although the organization proved successful in achieving its stated objective—the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait—the way that this goal was achieved continues to be debated by diplomats, lawyers, and scholars. There was simply no alternative but to "subcontract" to the twenty-eight members of the U.S.-led coalition. In view of the UN's limited capacities, such a procedure for enforcement operations seems inevitable for the foreseeable future.

As former Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali himself points out, the UN will "perhaps never be sufficiently large or well enough equipped to deal with a threat from a major army equipped with sophisticated weapons."[11] The organization was ill prepared to handle the test posed by the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Thus, the role of the council regarding collective security and military enforcement remains that of collective legitimization rather than operational control of combat forces. And if the council fails to agree, major powers may well proceed with what they perceive as legitimate use of military force, as illustrated by the war to oust Saddam Hussein in 2003.

Forceful Action in Northern Iraq on Behalf of Humanitarian Values

On April 5, 1991, the Security Council passed resolution 688. It declared that the international repercussions of Saddam Hussein's repression of Kurdish and Shiite populations constituted a threat to international peace and security. It insisted that Iraq allow access to international relief organizations so that they could care for the beleaguered groups. Elite troops from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands moved into Iraq—without explicit approval from the Security Council—and carved out a safe haven above the thirty-sixth parallel, which they guarded to ensure the security of UN relief operations. The council had already taken a broad view of its duty to protect human rights in Rhodesia and South Africa, but this resolution was a dramatic and straightforward linkage between human rights and international peace and security. The notion of human security inside states was much discussed in the corridors of the UN. In Iraq, the Hussein government agreed eventually to the presence of UN guards providing security to agencies working with Iraqi Kurds, but obviously under Western military pressure.

Many in the West applauded resolution 688 as a vigorous step toward enforcing human rights protection,[12] but others feared the precedent. "Who decides?" became a rallying cry for those, particularly in the global South, who opposed granting the Security Council, dominated by Western foreign policy interests, the authority of Chapter VII to intervene for arguably humanitarian reasons. Later military responses with a humanitarian justification—in Somalia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Rwanda, Haiti, Kosovo, and East Timor—served to keep the debate alive about the weight to be given state sovereignty relative to the international community's duty to protect human rights. This theme reappears in later humanitarian crises in this chapter, as does the reformulation of the "responsibility to protect."[13]

The effort under UN auspices in northern Iraq actually continued the efforts of outside actors to help persons in dire straits that had been attempted in the late 1960s in the Nigerian civil war, and which had led two scholars to write about "an extraordinary remedy, an exception to the postulates of State sovereignty and territorial inviolability that are fundamental to the traditional theory if not actual practice of international law."[14] These events suggest a double standard. Certain humanitarian crises and widespread media coverage create a domestic and international political climate that fosters action by the United States, sometimes towing the United Nations in its wake. Similar if not greater humanitarian emergencies in other parts of the world (for example, in Liberia, Angola, Sudan, or Democratic Congo) are ignored for long periods. Moreover, events in the spring of 1991 created a controversial reference point for later decisions also pertaining to Iraq. In 2003 the United States, the United Kingdom, and certain lesser powers decided to use force pursuant to earlier council resolutions demanding widespread disarmament by the Saddam Hussein government. Once again, the council had not explicitly authorized military force, but the United States and its allies claimed a right to interpret previous resolutions as they saw fit.

NONFORCIBLE SANCTIONS IN THE POST–COLD WAR ERA: HUMANITARIAN DILEMMAS

As noted already, economic sanctions have long been seen as a policy option to give teeth to certain international decisions. We have discussed above the Cold War pattern and its two notable exceptions (UN-approved sanctions on Rhodesia and South Africa). But the Security Council resorted to them more than a dozen times during the 1990s. Partial or comprehensive sanctions were decided on by the Security Council against various countries: Iraq, the states of the former Yugoslavia, Libya, Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda. Moreover, the council also imposed them on several nonstate actors, including the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia (when it was called Kampuchea), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the Afghan faction known as the Taliban, which also called itself the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. More needs to be known about their precise impact, in particular about their negative and sometimes dire humanitarian consequences.[15]

Research reveals three pertinent challenges. The first results from the nature of modern warfare as exemplified by the 1991 Persian Gulf War.[16] The Gulf crisis dramatizes the extent to which the international responses in modern armed conflicts can themselves do serious harm to innocent and powerless civilians. The political strategies adopted, the economic sanctions imposed, and the military force authorized by the Security Council not only created additional hardships but also complicated the ability of the UN's own humanitarian agencies to help civilians caught in the throes of conflict. OAS and UN economic sanctions may have harmed as many as 100,000 people in Haiti in 1993, most of whom were children.

A range of sanctions is available to the UN when a state refuses to respect a decision made by the Security Council. Before the council decides on enforcement action with potentially major humanitarian consequences, organizations with humanitarian competence and responsibilities could be consulted. Whether the impact is upon citizens in the pariah country or elsewhere, the staff of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the World Food Programme (WFP) are well situated to warn against, anticipate, and monitor such consequences. There are also private humanitarian agencies that consult regularly with UN bodies and can provide informed information on the humane impact of sanctions. Among these, the International Committee of the Red Cross usually has personnel on the ground as well as a reputation for accurate reporting.

In Iraq, the decision to use economic sanctions to force compliance with weapons inspections had damaging effects on women and children in Iraq. The ICRC and a few other agencies reported on the looming crisis in the first half of the 1990s. UNICEF in 1998 found that 90,000 deaths occurred yearly in Iraq as a result of sanctions, and 5,000 children a month were dying. The gender dimensions of sanctions are often overlooked, as women (and female children) tend to bear the brunt as they sacrifice their food rations for the male members of their families.

If the Security Council decides to proceed, governments could provide resources to the UN system so that it could respond fully to the immediate and longer-term human consequences of sanctions.[17] These options were clearly not explored during the 1991 Persian Gulf crisis. UN planning in 2003 in anticipation of a coalition attack on Iraq, while improved, was also insufficient.

The second challenge is an eminently practical one. How does the UN provide humanitarian sustenance after the initial outpouring of international concern has subsided and humanitarian interests are left to vie with other causes for the international spotlight? Resolution 688 insisted that Iraq provide the United Nations with humanitarian access to its people, a watershed for the UN.[18] Yet, the exact impact of sanctions on the behavior of the Iraqi government is not well understood. Iraq reacted negatively against UN assertive humanitarianism, creating havoc for UN and NGO efforts. The Iraqi regime, whose human rights abuses against its own population and brinkmanship tactics were well documented, still had understandable reactions against the Security Council's treatment of Iraq. International assistance flowed more easily to minority populations in revolt against Baghdad than to civilians in equal need in parts of the country under the central government's control. Eventually, the Security Council approved a program of allowing Iraq to sell oil in order to pay for food and other civilian needs, which in turn led to numerous abuses.

The third challenge relates to timing the deployment of UN military forces in conjunction with economic sanctions. The UN Charter assumes that nonforcible sanctions should be tried first; only when they fail should collective military action ensue. The suffering civilian populations of the former Yugoslavia and Haiti provided compelling reasons to rethink the conventional wisdom. In the former Yugoslavia, vigorous and earlier preventive deployment of UN soldiers to Bosnia and Herzegovina (rather than just to Croatia, with a symbolic administrative presence in Sarajevo) might have obviated the later need for sanctions to pressure Belgrade and Serbian irregulars and might have prevented that grisly war. This reasoning justified in part the preventive positioning of UN observers as part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia in December 1992. In Haiti, some observers, with considerable reason, queried whether an earlier military enforcement action to restore an elected government would have entailed far less civilian suffering than extended economic sanctions did, particularly because the willingness to use such overwhelming force was visible in September 1994. In short, the reluctance to use force may not always be a good thing, if delay means that civilians suffer and aid agencies are projected into conflict as a substitute for needed military intervention.

OPERATIONAL QUANDARIES: CAMBODIA, THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, SOMALIA, RWANDA, AND HAITI

Several UN operations during the 1990s serve to highlight the inadequacy of the principles of traditional peacekeeping to meet the challenges of the new world disorder. In order to deal with the kinds of challenges faced by the United Nations in operations such as the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), the second and third UN Angola Verification Missions (UNAVEM II and UNAVEM III), the UN Protection Force in the former Yugoslavia, the first and second UN Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM), the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), and the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH), the world organization sought new ways of responding to conflict.

These operations were qualitatively and quantitatively different from UN operations during the Cold War. The formal consent of the parties simply could not be assumed to mean very much on the ground. Also, the military effectiveness required from, and the dangers faced by, UN military forces went far beyond the parameters of traditional lightly armed peacekeepers. Moreover, these operations suggest the magnitude of the new demands on the UN for services that threatened to overwhelm troop contributors and to break the bank. If classic peacekeeping was said to be based on Chapter "VI.5," these new field operations could be considered part of Chapter "VI.9"—that is, very close to the war-fighting orientation of Chapter VII.

After stable levels of about 10,000 troops and a budget of a few hundred million dollars in the early post–Cold War period, the numbers jumped rapidly. In the mid-1990s, 70,000 to 80,000 blue-helmeted soldiers were authorized by the UN's annualized peacekeeping budget, which approached $4 billion in 1995. Accumulated total arrears in these years hovered around $3.5 billion—that is, almost equal to this budget and approaching three times the regular UN budget. The roller-coaster ride continued between 1996 and 1998, when both the number of soldiers and the budget dropped precipitously by two-thirds, at least partially reflecting the world organization's overextension and administrative indigestion. It changed again in the new millennium as police efforts in Kosovo and military ones in Timor and the Congo began. Throughout, arrears remained at a critical level, and the world organization's cash reserves often covered barely one month's expenditures. (Table 3.2 depicts ongoing UN security operations as of December 2005, and Table 3.3, those previously completed.) As the 1990s came to a close, significant cash-flow problems continued—former UN undersecretary-general for administration Richard Thornburgh earlier had referred to

Participants in an UNTAC demining course learn to cope with tripwires near Siem Reap Town, Cambodia, 1993. (UNHCR Photo/L. Guest)

the situation as a "financial bungee jump"—even if the amount of money appeared almost trivial or a "bargain" according to a prominent group of bankers.[19] In 2005, the estimated annual cost of eighteen UN peace and security missions was approximately $5 billion. The relative size of this expenditure should be kept in mind—it is over two and a half times as large as the UN's regular budget of $1.9 billion and represents the equivalent of half of the entire UN system's expenditures (not including the international financial institutions, IFIs).

Compared with the U.S. Defense Department's budget of close to half a trillion dollars in the same year—more than the rest of the world's militaries combined—UN peacekeeping is a bargain indeed.[20] The UN's annual budget for security operations during that same period would represent only a few days of Operation Desert Storm in 1991 or about the annual budget of the New York City police and fire departments. The assessed U.S. contribution to these operations, about 30 percent of the total bill, was only about .05 percent of the U.S. defense budget. The cost of a few weeks of fighting in Iraq in 2003 or of occupation thereafter, estimated at some $1 billion per week, dwarfs either the annual UN administrative budget of about $1.8 billion or the annual total spending of the UN system of some $10 billion.

What exactly were the operational quandaries? The Cambodian operation amounted to the UN's taking over all of the important civilian administration of the country while simultaneously disarming guerrillas and governmental armed forces. The UN registered most of the nation for the first democratic election in the country's history. The UNTAC deployment was based—as are most UN undertakings—on national budgetary projections out of touch with real military requirements. These estimates were based on best-case scenarios; the situation on the ground was closer to worst-case ones.

Japan's desire—sustained in part by U.S. and other pressures—to make a large contribution to this operation in "its own region" was important—especially given the later U.S. desire to "pick and choose" among complicated field operations. Despite many problems and sometimes fatal attacks on its personnel, Japan stayed the course in Cambodia—in part because it was urged to do so by Yasushi Akashi, a Japanese national who was head of the UN operation in that country. Also, Japan wanted to prove that it deserved a seat on an expanded Security Council, which provided another reason for its larger role in UN security policy.

Years of internal conflict had left Cambodia's infrastructure devastated and its population displaced. In response, the United Nations invested over $1.6 billion and over 22,000 military and civilian personnel. Yet UNTAC's success was hardly a foregone conclusion, particularly in light of the Khmer Rouge's unwillingness to respect key elements of agreements and Prince Norodom Sihanouk's stated position that the peace process and elections should continue with or without the Khmer Rouge. Failure here could have seriously undermined the confidence of member states attempting an undertaking of this scale or complexity elsewhere.

The May 1993 elections were a turning point. A Khmer Rouge attack on a UN fuel and ammunition dump three weeks before the elections exposed how inadequately prepared UN soldiers were to resist even symbolic military maneuvers, let alone a return to full-scale civil war. However, the elections were held and returned Prince Sihanouk to power as the head of a coalition that included the former government and part of the opposition—but excluded the Khmer Rouge. The UN's achievement was that the Cambodian people struggled for power for the first time by means of a secret ballot. The relative lack of violence—the Khmer Rouge had demonstrated that it could attack with impunity—happened in spite of UNTAC, not because of it. However, the United Nations began to pull out its personnel as quickly as possible, raising concerns that a larger civil war might erupt. The uneasy internal peace managed to hold, the Khmer Rouge continued to weaken, and the UN stayed heavily involved in diplomacy—mainly trying to liberalize the Heng Sen government, as in discussions about what to do about past and present violations of human rights.[21]

In the former Yugoslavia, the UN began its first military operation on European soil after many years in which regional conflicts were assumed to be a monopoly of developing countries. The Balkans and some former Soviet republics soon emerged as the possible scene of increased demand for UN security operations.[22] The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia entailed violence and displacement of a magnitude not seen in Europe since World War II. In addition to violence between the warring factions, the region was plagued by ethnic cleansing, detention camps, refugees, killing, systemic rape, and other atrocities committed by all sides. The UN's initial security involvement in Croatia, with close to

UNPROFOR soldiers in Stari Vitez, Yugoslavia. (UN Photo 186716/J. Isaac)

14,000 peacekeepers, achieved some objectives such as implementing the cease-fire between Croatia and the Yugoslav Federation. The UNPROFOR mandate was expanded to neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina in part to alleviate the human suffering and ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance to Muslims and Croats under siege from Serbia and Serbian irregulars.

The 1,500 UN soldiers initially assigned to the Sarajevo area quickly proved inadequate. The Security Council later authorized adding 8,000 more soldiers to protect humanitarian convoys and to escort detainees in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United Nations also asked NATO to enforce a no-fly zone for Serbian aircraft. In an approach reminiscent of the voluntary financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus, the Secretary-General insisted that these additional humanitarian soldiers be provided at no cost to the world organization, and NATO countries responded affirmatively. Later, U.S. airdrops of food to isolated and ravaged Muslim communities were seen mostly as a symbolic gesture by the Clinton administration, but they helped save lives. These efforts were insufficient to halt the bloodshed or inhibit the carving up of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Serbs and Croats.

After months of efforts by the UN special envoy, former U.S. secretary of state Cyrus Vance, and the European Community's mediator, former British foreign minister David Owen, a tenuous plan to create a "Swiss-like" set of ten semiautonomous ethnic enclaves within Bosnia and Herzegovina was finally agreed upon by the belligerents. NATO was approached to help make sure that the agreement—however unacceptable to critics who argued that the arrangements rewarded Serbian aggression—would stick.

The Vance-Owen plan was undermined almost immediately by renewed Serbian and Croatian military offensives. When former Norwegian foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg took over from Vance in May 1993, it was clear that Bosnia would be partitioned. Serbian war efforts had left Serbia in control of 70 percent of the territory, and Croatia held another 20 percent. The Bosnian Muslims were left with what were ironically called UN safe areas. These were anything but safe, as these areas were systematically attacked.

The situation in the Balkans deteriorated and demonstrated that the United Nations also can provide the means for governments to pretend to do something without really doing very much. There was a shift from Chapter VI to Chapter VII operations, but without the necessary political will to make the shift work. The half measures in Bosnia can be considered worse than no action at all. Given their traditional operating procedures and constraints, UN soldiers were not strong enough to deter the Serbs. But they deterred the international community of states from more assertive political and military intervention under Chapter VII because the troops, along with humanitarian workers, were vulnerable targets. Although assistance to refugees saved lives, it also helped foster ethnic cleansing by cooperating in the forced movement of unwanted populations. Airdrops of food made it seem as if people salved consciences while massive and unspeakable human rights abuses continued unabated. Thus, inadequate UN military and humanitarian action constituted a powerful palliative.[23] Then high commissioner for refugees Sadako Ogata articulated what was all too clear: "There are no humanitarian solutions to humanitarian problems."[24] She, and others like the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), called for political solutions to the root causes of human suffering in the Balkans.

The initial UN response was followed by a steadily growing number of additional UN troops that, although mainly from NATO countries, were equally feeble. No-fly zones were imposed but not fully enforced; other forms of saber rattling, including low-altitude sorties over Serbian positions and warnings about possible retaliatory air strikes, were tried; and the Security Council passed what *The Economist* called "the confetti of paper resolutions."[25] As Lawrence Freedman observed, the Security Council "experimented with almost every available form of coercion short of war."[26] UN token measures did little to halt Serbian irredentism and consolidation of territory in either Croatia or Bosnia; nor did these measures prevent the initial expansion of Croatian claims in Bosnia. The UN mandatory arms embargo instituted in September 1991 had benefited primarily the Serbs, who controlled the bulk of the military hardware of the former Yugoslav army. Given their traditional operating procedures and constraints—not to mention their small numbers and inadequate equipment—UN soldiers were powerless to deter the Serbs. The vulnerability of UN "protectors" was regularly invoked by Europeans as a rationale against more forceful military measures.

The key dynamic once again involved calculation outside the UN, which then affected decisions taken inside the Security Council. Powerful Western

states, especially the United States, did not see in the early 1990s that their traditional vital national interests were at stake. Moreover, they feared "sticky" involvement, as in Southeast Asia in the past and as in Somalia and Rwanda then unfolding. Russia, for its part, viewed the Balkans through the lens of Slavic solidarity rather than more general concern for nonaggression and human rights. China was distant and detached.

The idea of "safe areas" brought derision because, with only slight hyperbole, one could say that the least safe places in the Balkans were under UN control. The ultimate ignominy arrived in summer 1995 when two of these enclaves in eastern Bosnia were overrun by Bosnian Serbs. Srebrenica, a Muslim enclave, was the scene of the largest massacre in Europe since 1945 where some 7,000–8,000 men and boys were systematically executed. Srebrenica had been designated a UN safe haven after the UN brokered an agreement between Muslims and Serbs to disarm the enclave in return for UN protection against Serb forces. The agreement provided a modicum of safety for a time, but as the political and military situation in Bosnia deteriorated, the Serbs moved against the "safe haven." It should also be noted that Bosnian Muslim fighters used Srebrenica as a base for staging attacks on Serb forces outside. The outgunned UN peacekeeping unit withdrew from Srebrenica (after the death of one Dutch soldier) leaving its inhabitants vulnerable to the advancing Serb forces, whose known tactics included mass execution, systematic rape, and forced expulsion. Shortly before this horrific incident, Serbs had chained UN blue helmets to strategic targets and thereby prevented NATO air raids.[27] In any case, Srebrenica became a conversation stopper in UN circles.

UN peacekeepers in Croatia were unable to implement their mandate because they received no cooperation from the Croats or Krajina Serbs. In Bosnia, UN forces were under Chapter VII but lacked the capability to apply coercive force across a wide front. Shortly before resigning in January 1994 from a soldier's nightmare as UN commander in Bosnia, Lt. Gen. Francis Briquemont lamented the disparity between rhetoric and reality: "There is a fantastic gap between the resolutions of the Security Council, the will to execute those resolutions, and the means available to commanders in the field."[28]

The international unwillingness to react militarily in the former Yugoslavia until August 1995 provides a case study of what not to do. This inaction left many of the inhabitants of the region mistrustful of the United Nations and lent a new and disgraceful connotation to the word "peacekeeping." Bound by the traditional rules of engagement (fire only in self-defense and only after being fired upon), UN troops never fought a single battle with any of the factions in Bosnia that routinely disrupted relief convoys. The rules of engagement led to the appeasement of local forces rather than to the enforcement of UN mandates.

A much heavier dose of NATO bombing and U.S. arm-twisting proved necessary to compel the belligerents, sequestered at Ohio's Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in November 1995, to attempt to reach a political settlement. The Dayton

peace agreements laid the groundwork for military deployment by almost 60,000 NATO soldiers, one-third from the United States, in the International Force (IFOR). Although the numbers of soldiers in the successive NATO operations diminished over time, still many observers wondered why UN peacekeepers—poorly equipped and without a mandate—were deployed when there was no peace to keep and why NATO war-fighters appeared when there was. Observers usually point to the "Somalia syndrome" as the turning point in soured public attitudes toward the world organization (a case that we will come to next). But Richard Holbrooke, the former U.S. assistant secretary of state who became UN ambassador in 1999 and is generally credited with having engineered the Dayton accords, suggests, "The damage that Bosnia did to the U.N. was incalculable."[29]

The Dayton Peace Accord led to the deployment of 60,000 NATO-led peacekeepers and the creation of a police force that served to stabilize Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, such a large military deployment is accompanied by additional problems. Bosnia-Herzegovina has become the center of human trafficking into Western Europe and the locus of a very active sex industry. UN officials have been accused of corruption, facilitating the trafficking, and looking the other way regarding the behavior of many peacekeepers. The sexual behavior of peacekeepers has become one of the more serious problems facing current UN peacekeeping efforts.[30] In fact, a trio of former staff members exposed stunning details of several operations.[31]

Somalia provided another complicated challenge for UN involvement in internal wars and a breakdown in governance, or "complex emergencies." Like Bosnia, Somalia was an example of violent fragmentation, yet, unlike Bosnia, one without an ethnic logic. In Somalia, a single ethnic group sharing the same religion, history, and language split into heavily armed clans. Somalia had no government in any meaningful sense, and one-third of the population risked death from starvation because the violence prevented humanitarian aid workers from reaching the needy.

The Security Council at the end of August 1992 authorized 3,000 to 4,000 UN soldiers (UNOSOM I) to protect the delivery of humanitarian assistance under Chapter VII. While the council made formal reference to Chapter VII, quiet diplomacy obtained the consent of the leading clans for deployment of UN force. That force was directed initially not against clan leaders but against bandits interfering with relief. The most important delivery point for relief was not a UN agency, but rather the private International Committee of the Red Cross.

In December 1992 President George H. W. Bush moved vigorously to propose a U.S.-led humanitarian intervention. Within days of the passage of Security Council resolution 794, the first of what would become over 27,000 U.S. troops arrived to provide a modicum of security to help sustain civilians. They were augmented by 10,000 soldiers from twenty-two other countries. This effort was labeled Operation Restore Hope from the American side, or the Unified Task Force (UNITAF), an acronym that reflected the Security Council's authorization

Somalian children receiving food in 1992. (UN Photo 146504/J. Isaac)

to use force to ensure the delivery of humanitarian relief. UNITAF was always under U.S. operational command. With virtually no casualties, humanitarian space was created and modest disarming of local bandits began.

UNITAF ceased operations in April 1993, when the second phase of the UN Operation in Somalia began as authorized by Security Council resolution 814. The Secretary-General, for the second time, directly commanded a military force deployed under Chapter VII. The Security Council authorized UNOSOM II under Chapter VII to use whatever force was necessary to disarm Somali warlords who refused to surrender their arms and to ensure access to suffering civilians. At its maximum strength, some 20,000 soldiers and 8,000 logistical troops from thirty-three countries were deployed.

As in Cambodia, almost 3,000 civilian officials were expected to take over the administration of a country, only this time a country that was totally without a functioning government. Significantly, the United States initially remained on the ground with logistics troops for the first time under the command of a UN general—who was an officer from a NATO country, Turkey. Another 1,300 soldiers, including 400 Army Rangers, were held in reserve as a "rapid-reaction force" in boats offshore. These U.S. units were under strictly U.S. command.

In retaliation against attacks on UN peacekeepers and aid personnel, U.S. Cobra helicopter gunships were called in by the UN command in June and July 1993 against the armed supporters of one of the main belligerents, General Mohammed Aideed. These attacks were followed by the arrival of U.S. Army Rangers later in the summer. These violent flare-ups put the UN in the awkward

position of retaliation, which elicited more violence. The assassination of foreign journalists and aid workers and further attacks on U.S. troops—including the ugly scene in October 1993 when the body of a dead Ranger was dragged by crowds through the streets of Mogadishu in front of television cameras—further inflamed the situation.

The shift from Chapter VI to Chapter VII, and along with it a significant expansion of objectives from humanitarian relief to coercive nation- and state-building, constituted one set of problems. The absence of political commitment and staying power was yet another. The approval of presidential decision directive 25 in May 1994 marked the official end to the Clinton administration's attitude of assertive multilateralism. This phrase became a liability to the Democrats in American domestic politics, as Republicans attacked a supposed U.S. subservience to the United Nations. The Clinton administration had left itself open to this attack by misrepresenting the situation in Somalia, trying to blame UN officials for the decisions made by U.S. military personnel. Given the virtual necessity for U.S. participation in major multilateral military operations, the unseemly images of eighteen dead troops in October 1993 were considerably more costly than the tragic loss of these individuals. The "Somalia syndrome" was linked to its predecessor, the "Vietnam syndrome," as a call for caution and military multilateralism was put in abeyance.

The U.S. military involvement in the Horn of Africa is criticized on numerous grounds. First, the military was obsessed with the capturing of Aideed, which resembled a "Wild West" hunt, complete with a wanted poster. Hunting a single individual in a foreign and unforgiving land can be demoralizing for troops. Second, the United States was slow to engage in disarmament and nation-building. A striking disequilibrium between the military and humanitarian components existed as the costs of Operation Restore Hope alone, at $1 billion, amounted to three times the U.S. total aid contribution to Somalia since independence. Seven months of UNOSOM II in 1993 were estimated to cost $1.5 billion, of which the lowest estimate for humanitarian aid was 0.7 percent of the total and the highest, 10 percent.[32] Also, as UN objectives expanded, resources were actually reduced.

When the last UN soldiers pulled out of Somalia in March 1995, the impact of military and humanitarian help was unclear. Three years and some $4 billion had left the warring parties better armed, rested, and poised to resume civil war. But the worst of starvation had been brought under control. In 2006 Somalia still remained without a viable national government, although concerted diplomatic efforts continued to improve the situation.

An even worse horror story had developed simultaneously in East Africa, where long-standing social tensions in Rwanda led to the genocide of perhaps 800,000 of Rwanda's Tutsi minority and some Hutu sympathizers by the government manipulating the Hutu majority. UN peacekeeping forces (UNAMIR) had actually been on the scene during this time. UNAMIR had been present in Kigali

for about eight months, to facilitate the Arusha Peace Accords between Rwandan Hutu and Tutsi elements when the genocide commenced on April 6, 1994. The Security Council reduced these UN military forces a few days later, at the behest of Belgium, after a small number of Belgian peacekeepers had been abused and killed. This reduction came in spite of the previous request of the Canadian commander of the blue helmets for an augmented force and a warning that genocide was planned by Hutu extremists. As the UN withdrew, the Hutu extremists committed genocide unimpeded, even slaughtering the Tutsis under UN protection. As the scale of the killings became more widely known, the Security Council wrestled with whether the killings constituted genocide. Members refrained from calling it genocide because such a designation might have a corresponding legal obligation to act. Ironically, Rwanda was seated on the Security Council as one of the nonpermanent members, and sadly, no other members asked Rwanda to explain itself or the killings. The genocide ended as the rebel Tutsi army invaded from neighboring Burundi and overthrew the Hutu government.

The Security Council now found itself "gravely concerned" as two million persons were displaced within Rwanda, while another two million refugees, mostly Hutus, fled into neighboring states. The council authorized two standalone initiatives. First, it issued resolution 929 under Chapter VII authorizing the French-led Opération Turquoise from June to August to stabilize the southwestern part of the country. One effect was that the French used their presence to protect their Hutu allies and their families (who were now refugees in dire need of international assistance) from the invading Tutsi army, despite Hutu participation in the genocide. Second, the UN authorized a massive two-month logistics effort through the U.S. Operation Support Hope in July and August to provide relief to the Hutu Refugees in the Goma region in Zaire. Numerous national contingents also deployed to this region in support of the assistance efforts by the UNHCR. Fostering a secure environment—a task in which the military has the clear, comparative advantage—was the least visible operation. The military's cautious standard operating procedures accompanied by the widespread concerns among governments about a possible quagmire paralyzed international military responses for two months while as many as 10 percent of Rwanda's population were murdered. Arguably, Opération Turquoise prevented another refugee crisis of the record-setting magnitude of the one in May in Goma, Zaire, where almost a million Rwandan refugees appeared virtually overnight. The first crisis was accompanied by a cholera epidemic that is estimated to have killed between 50,000 and 80,000 people.[33] Ironically, these efforts also served to aid and protect the perpetrators of the genocide and their families.

Massive amounts of food, clothing, medicine, shelter, and water were delivered. Outside armed forces thus made essential contributions by using their unexcelled logistical and organizational resources, but only after the genocide had occurred. Rapid military action in April proved totally unfeasible, but the costs of the genocide, massive displacement, and a ruined economy (including decades of wasted development assistance and outside investment) were borne almost immediately afterward by the same governments that had refused to respond militarily a few weeks earlier.

The role of the media in provoking international responses continues to be controversial.[34] Rwanda illustrates probably better than the other cases that such coverage may be necessary for humanitarian assistance even if it is insufficient for timely and robust military action. Even when humanitarian assistance does arrive it can continue to exacerbate the problem. The refugee camps established by the UNHCR in Goma and elsewhere after the genocide were taken over by the Hutu extremists who had found sanctuary there and used them as military bases to launch attacks against Tutsis in Rwanda. The inability of the UN to control the refugee camps and the repeated attacks by Hutu extremists from the Congo prompted Rwanda to invade the Congo, sparking an African "World War" involving nine nations and more that 3.5 million deaths.[35]

The UN's response to the Rwandan genocide stands as one of its greatest acknowledged failures, just as previous development efforts are now acknowledged to have exacerbated tensions.[36] Several years later, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who had been in charge of the UN's peacekeeping department in New York during the crisis, felt compelled during a visit to Kigali to confess, "We must and we do acknowledge that the world failed Rwanda at that time of evil. The international community and the United Nations could not muster the political will to confront it."[37] In a later statement he continued, "There was a United Nations force in the country at the time, but it was neither mandated nor equipped for the kind of forceful action which would have been needed to prevent or halt the genocide. On behalf of the United Nations, I acknowledge this failure and express my deep remorse."[38] It was Kofi Annan who had "buried" the cable from the Canadian commander, General Roméo Dallaire, asking for a proactive role to head off the 1994 genocide.[39]

Meanwhile in the Caribbean, nine months after the United Nations had overseen the first democratic elections in Haiti, the populist priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide was overthrown by a military junta led by General Raoul Cédras. The inclusion of Haiti in our discussion is of interest for a number of reasons. Although Haiti had not really endured a civil war, it had all the attributes of a failed state—in particular, political instability, widespread poverty, massive migration, and human rights abuses. It also became the target of international coercive actions—that is, both nonforcible and forcible sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter similar to those in the other war-torn countries analyzed earlier. Moreover, the basis for outside intervention was the restoration of a democratically elected government; this precedent has widespread potential implications because of its relevance for other countries in crisis.

Multilateral military forces were essential to the solution that ultimately resulted in late 1994. First, however, came the embarrassing performance of the initial UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH I), including the ignominious retreat by

the USS *Harlan County*, which carried unarmed American and Canadian military observers, in September 1993 following a rowdy demonstration on the docks in Port-au-Prince. In September 1994, the first soldiers of the UN-authorized and U.S.-led Multinational Force (MNF) landed in Haiti on the basis of Security Council resolution 940. What Pentagon wordsmiths labeled Operation Uphold Democracy grew quickly to 21,000 troops—almost all American except for 1,000 police and soldiers from twenty-nine countries, mostly from the eastern Caribbean. This operation ensured the departure of the illegal military regime and the restoration of the elected government.

Most important for this analysis, the MNF used overwhelming military force—although there was only a single military person killed in action and the local population was almost universally supportive—to accomplish two important tasks with clear humanitarian impacts. First and most immediately, the MNF brought an end to the punishing economic sanctions that had crippled the local economy and penalized Haiti's most vulnerable groups because the programs of humanitarian and development agencies were paralyzed. Second, the MNF established a secure and stable environment that stemmed the tide of asylum seekers, facilitated the rather expeditious repatriation of about 370,000 of them, and immediately stopped the worst human rights abuses.

The United States provided about $1 billion for troops—of which only one-fifth was over and above what normal Department of Defense expenditures would have been had the troops been at their home base—and another $325 million on assistance in the first half year, only a small part of which was administered by American soldiers directly. Once the MNF achieved its goals, it was entrusted at the end of March 1995 with the next UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH II). The 6,000 soldiers from over a dozen countries had an annual budget of about $350 million. The continued involvement of a substantial number of U.S. Special Forces (2,500) and an American force commander for the UN follow-on operation demonstrated concretely Washington's commitment through the end of February 1996. UNMIH was extended for four additional months at about half its former size (without American soldiers) before it was replaced by the even smaller UN Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH) in July for a period of twelve months. A small UN presence was continued for the remainder of the decade, working with the government of Haiti to professionalize the Haitian National Police. These latter periods of UN involvement were characterized by Canadian financial, political, and military leadership.

Haiti provides a relatively straightforward and positive balance sheet—at least in the short term. The longer-term evaluation was a very different matter. A decade after the initial intervention and in spite of subsequent stabilization missions, Haiti was still characterized by political instability, violence, kidnapping, and widespread poverty. The United Nations returned to the island nation in 2004, in response to armed conflict between Aristide and his opponents, who after taking control of the northern part of the country threatened to march on the capital, Port-au-Prince. With Aristide's flight into exile in Africa in February 2004, and following the interim president's request, the Security Council authorized a Multinational Force led by the United States, which was followed up by the 7,500-strong UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Armed gangs, probably working in tandem with certain political factions, actually killed some blue helmets. Under the stress of the action, their Brazilian commander apparently took his own life.

As of 2006, the stabilization mission has done little to improve the police and judiciary and nothing to alter the fundamental economic situation. The disparity in the distribution of wealth and power between a tiny elite and the vast majority of the population made Haiti one of the world's most polarized societies; this inequality had led to the rise and fall of Aristide.

As in other military interventions, the perception that the interests of key states were threatened spurred leadership and risk-taking. The geography of the crisis brought into prominence not just the United States but also Canada and several Caribbean countries. Washington was and is particularly anxious to end the perceived "flood" of boat people upsetting the demographics and politics of places like south Florida and Louisiana. The success of the military deployment was dramatic, notwithstanding that it was authorized to restore democracy rather than respond to a complex emergency. Both the U.S. Congress and the Pentagon were initially lukewarm about what turned out to be a successful operation in the short term. The effective use of military force and the resulting humanitarian benefits have led some observers to question the chronology and logic of the UN Charter's calling for nonforcible economic sanctions *before* forcible military action.

A swifter military intervention undoubtedly would have proved more humanitarian than a tightening of the screws through economic sanctions. It would have accomplished the major goal of replacing the de facto regime with the constitutional authorities but would have avoided the massive suffering and dislocations from sanctions. "Sanctions, as is generally recognized, are a blunt instrument," wrote Boutros-Ghali. "They raise the ethical question of whether suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups in the target country is a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders whose behaviour is unlikely to be affected by the plight of their subjects."[40]

The most significant feature of the international responses just discussed has been the willingness to address, rather than ignore, fundamental problems within the borders of war-torn states—at least at times. As the UN Development Programme calculated, eighty-two armed conflicts broke out in the first half-decade following the collapse of the Berlin Wall, and seventy-nine were intrastate wars; in fact, two of the three remaining ones (Nagorno-Karabakh and Bosnia) also could legitimately have been categorized as civil wars.[41] But trying to put a lid on civil wars is not the same as a persistent effort to deal with their root causes. As regards Haiti, the administration of George W. Bush became preoccupied with

Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and Palestine, and so Washington's interest in UN involvement in Haiti drifted.

Having gone from famine to feast in the mid-1990s, the United Nations had a bad case of institutional indigestion. The climate had changed so much that Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was obliged to write a follow-up, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,* to his earlier document. In this January 1995 report he noted, "This increased volume of activity would have strained the Organization even if the nature of the activity had remained unchanged."[42] This observation would become common knowledge spelled out in the so-called Brahimi report, named after its chair, Lakhdar Brahimi.[43]

EVER-EVOLVING SECURITY OPERATIONS: KOSOVO, EAST TIMOR, AND SIERRA LEONE

The UN's security activities, however, did not remain unchanged. In the face of new challenges the approaches of the past were found lacking if not totally inadequate. Yet the demand for action was as great as ever. The Balkans erupted once again into full-scale war and ethnic turmoil in Kosovo. What was hoped to be the beginning of a UN-supervised peaceful transition to independence from Indonesia for the people in East Timor turned into a bloody campaign of violence. In Africa, internal conflicts raged in numerous countries including Sierra Leone and in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where the horrors in Rwanda had spilled over into open war involving more than a half dozen external actors (often referred to as the first African World War). In addition, the Security Council held sessions in 1999 on the situations in Western Sahara, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Central African Republic, Georgia, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Iraq and Kuwait, Haiti, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Libya.

In the face of these crises the critical question confronting the UN was how to respond effectively when demand so clearly outstripped supply. The answer to this question emerged on a case-by-case basis, yet with each new response seemingly informed by and building on the last. The following discussion illustrates the evolution in "traditional" UN peacekeeping and of more robust peace operations.

The Continuing Crisis in the Balkans

The pursuit of the 1991 Gulf War and the creation of safe havens for Kurds are illustrations of what we referred to in Chapter 1 as military "subcontracting," as was IFOR and SFOR (the Implementation Force and the Stabilization Force, respectively, in the former Yugoslavia); a more controversial example is Somalia. As mentioned earlier, the growing relevance of military intervention by major powers in regions of their traditional interests had become obvious in mid-1994.

However controversial the results, the gap between UN capacities and demands for action led almost inevitably to calls for action by various states with the blessing of the larger community of states through either the explicit or the implicit approval of the Security Council.[44]

The NATO action in Kosovo in spring 1999 is a dramatic case in point. Depending on how one reads the script of diplomatic code embedded in Security Council resolutions, the action by NATO could be argued to represent a breach of international law or to have been launched with the implicit approval of the council. The Independent Commission on Kosovo, composed largely of human rights proponents, called it "illegal but legitimate"—that is, without the Security Council's blessing but justified in human terms.[45] The secretary-general of NATO, Javier Solana, of course, chose the latter interpretation of Security Council resolution 1199. On the other hand, both Russia and China condemned the action as illegal.[46] Russia weakened its own position and made a tactical blunder by introducing a resolution criticizing the NATO bombing and asking that it be halted. The resolution's defeat by a wide margin (12–3) enhanced the status of NATO's action. In any case, Secretary-General Annan drew considerable criticism for his speech at the opening of the General Assembly in September 1999. Although he wished the Security Council had been able to give explicit approval to the bombing, he nonetheless could not condone idleness in the face of Serb atrocities.[47]

Diplomacy had failed to change Serbian policy. Time and again Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević demonstrated his blatant disregard for negotiated agreements. In late January 1999, U.S. officials shifted away from a diplomatic approach and threatened military action. The Secretary-General had apparently arrived at a similar conclusion. In a statement before NATO leaders in Brussels, he indicated that indeed force might be necessary. In doing so, he praised past UN-NATO collaboration in Bosnia and suggested that a NATO-led mission under UN auspices might well be what was needed. He concluded:

> The bloody wars of the last decade have left us with no illusions about the difficulty of halting internal conflicts by reason or by force particularly against the wishes of the government of a sovereign state. Nor have they left us with any illusions about the need to use force, when all other means have failed. We may be reaching that limit, once again, in the former Yugoslavia.[48]

But neither NATO nor the UN was willing to give up totally on diplomacy. The so-called contact group—the United States, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the United Kingdom—hosted a peace conference in Rambouillet, France, in February 1999, which sought to broker a solution between Yugoslavia and an Albanian Kosovar delegation. But Belgrade was unwilling to yield on key points, and the talks floundered. The situation in Kosovo deteriorated even further.

On March 24, NATO began a seventy-seven-day aerial bombardment of Serbian targets. Soon after the bombing started, Serbian security forces launched an

all-out campaign to exorcise Kosovo of its predominant ethnic-Albanian population. Within weeks a huge segment of Kosovo's 1.8 million ethnic Albanians had been displaced from their houses and villages. That is, initially the intervention accelerated flight and humanitarian suffering. However, as the NATO intervention progressed, air strikes intensified until finally, in the context of a Russian mediated settlement, Milošević agreed on June 3 to an immediate and verifiable end to the violence and repression and to the withdrawal of all Serbian security forces.

Other aspects of the agreement included the deployment under UN auspices of an effective international civilian and security presence with substantial NATO participation, the establishment of an interim administration, safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and a substantially self-governing Kosovo.

On June 10, 1999, the council, in a 14–0–1 vote (China abstained), adopted resolution 1244 authorizing an international civil and security presence in Kosovo under UN auspices. NATO's "humanitarian war" had been unusual to say the least, and many aid agencies had trouble pronouncing those two words together, and choked trying to say "humanitarian bombing."[49] But this new UN peace mission, the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), was unprecedented in its nature and scope. NATO authorized 49,000 troops to maintain security, and UNMIK was to assume authority over all the territory and people of Kosovo, including judicial, legislative, and executive powers. It was to move the region toward self-governance; perform all normal civilian administrative functions; provide humanitarian relief, including the safe return of refugees and displaced persons; maintain law and order and establish the rule of law; promote human rights; assist in reconstructing basic social and economic infrastructure; and facilitate the development of a democratic political order.

The mission was pathbreaking in integrating several non-UN international organizations under a unified UN leadership. It was organized around four substantive pillars: civil administration (UN-led); humanitarian affairs (UNHCR-led); reconstruction (European Union–led); and democratic institution-building (OSCE-led). The scope was mind-boggling. Civil administration, for example, was to be comprehensive, including health, education, energy and public utilities, post and telecommunications, judicial, legal, public finance, trade, science, agriculture, environment, and democratization. Over 800,000 people had to be repatriated. Over 120,000 houses had been damaged or destroyed. Schools needed to be reestablished; food, medical aid, and other humanitarian assistance provided; electrical power, sanitation, and clean water restored; land mines cleared and security ensured; and so on.

Although the initial UNMIK mandate was twelve months, the return of life in Kosovo to any semblance of normality will be a long time in coming. The notion of helping to create a liberal democracy in an area that had never known it seemed particularly optimistic. The jury is still out in 2006, but military forces have been reduced, elections held, and the rebuilding of a society begun. Serious



Members of UNTAET's Portuguese contingent are accompanied by a group of local children as they conduct a security patrol in the Becora district of Dili. (UN/DPI Photo/E. Debebe)

problems remain regarding continued ethnic violence, the status of the Serb minority, widespread unemployment, the thriving sex trade, and the future political leadership of the mostly Albanian province. While not a pretty picture, the alternative was even more violent ethnic cleansing, civil war, and possibly genocide. Until the legal status of the territory is clarified and broadly accepted, one cannot expect the investment necessary to deal with chronic unemployment.

Turmoil in East Timor

After over a decade and a half of UN-mediated efforts to resolve the issue of the status of East Timor, an agreement was reached on May 5, 1999, between Indonesia and Portugal (the last colonial power) regarding a process to determine the future of that long-troubled territory. The two states agreed that the UN Secretary-General would be responsible for organizing and conducting a popular consultation to determine whether the people of East Timor would accept or reject a special autonomous status within the unitary Republic of Indonesia. A rejection of such special status would mean that the UN would be responsible for administering the territory during the transition to independence. The June Security Council resolution 1246 established the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) with the mandate of conducting such a consultation. After several postponements the popular vote was held on August 30, and the special autonomy status option was overwhelmingly rejected in favor of independence.

News of the outcome stirred pro-integration forces backed by armed militias to violence. Within a matter of weeks nearly a half million East Timorese were displaced from their homes and villages. Indonesian military troops and police were either unwilling or unable to restore order, and the security situation deteriorated. On September 15 the Security Council, in resolution 1264, authorized the creation of a multilateral force to restore order and protect and support UNAMET and welcomed member states to lead, organize, and contribute troops to such a force. Sitting in the wings ready to act, an Australian-led force began arriving in East Timor less than a week later. Numerous arms had been twisted in Jakarta so that Indonesia "requested" the coalition force. In less than a month general order was restored, and the Indonesian People's Consultative Assembly voted on October 19 to formally recognize the results of the popular consultation. The following week the Security Council unanimously approved resolution 1272, establishing the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

As in the case of UNMIK, the nature and scope of the UNTAET mission was exceedingly ambitious and wide-ranging.[50] As in the case in Cambodia, a country with substantial interests and motivation (in this case, Australia, not Japan) took the military lead. It was empowered to exercise all legislative and executive powers and judicial authority; establish an effective civil administration; assist in the development of civil and social services; provide security and maintain law and order; ensure the coordination and delivery of humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, and development assistance; promote sustainable development; and build the foundation for a stable liberal democracy. To carry out this mandate, authorization was given for a military component of 8,950 troops and 200 observers and a civilian police component of up to 1,640 personnel. As 1999 drew to a close, the security situation in East Timor was stable, and by spring 2000 the peacekeeping transition from INTERFET to UNTAET had been completed and the processes of reconstruction and state-building were under way. Any evaluation of such an effort at UN "trusteeship" must await the passage of time. In mid-2006, skeptics' fears were confirmed with the explosion of violence in Dili and the hurried return of Australian soldiers to keep peace.

Reestablishing Stability in Sierra Leone

The year 1999 brought both great sorrow and hope to the people of Sierra Leone, who were reeling from over eight years of civil war. The bloody civil conflict that had intensified during 1998 turned even bloodier in January 1999, when rebel forces once again captured the capital, Freetown, and launched a four-day spree of killing and destruction. Judges, journalists, human rights workers, government officials, civil servants, churches, hospitals, prisons, UN offices, and others were targets of the rebel alliance, comprising forces of the former junta and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Over 6,000 were killed, and about 20 percent of the total stock of dwellings was destroyed. The UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which had been established in June 1998, was evacuated.

Fighting continued throughout the spring and early summer, uprooting more than a million people, about 450,000 of whom fled to neighboring Guinea. The issue remained on the Security Council agenda, and the council kept extending UNOMSIL's mandate several months at a time. Finally, on July 7, 1999, a peace agreement, called the Lomé Peace Agreement, was negotiated between the government and the RUF. The Security Council responded positively to this move and on August 20 adopted unanimously resolution 1260, extending and expanding the UNOMSIL mandate. The UN presence was further expanded in October when the council adopted resolution 1270, creating a new mission, the UN Mission for Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which was mandated the tasks of: establishing a presence at key locations throughout the country in order to assist the government of Sierra Leone in implementing the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of rebel troops; ensuring the security and freedom of movement of UN personnel; monitoring adherence to the cease-fire agreement of May 18; encouraging the parties to create confidence-building mechanisms and support their functioning; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian assistance; supporting the operations of UN civilian officials, including the special representative of the Secretary-General and his staff, human rights officers, and civil affairs officers; and providing support, as requested, for the elections, which are to be held in accordance with the present constitution of Sierra Leone.

Although not as broad-ranging or complex as the new missions in Kosovo and East Timor, a new mandate for a force of 6,000 soldiers (from Nigeria, Kenya, and Guinea) was authorized under Chapter VII with the authority to use force if necessary to protect UN personnel and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence. The situation in Sierra Leone became generally stable but tense as 45,000 former combatants remained armed and in control of the diamond mines. But, once again, it was likely that the lives of civilians in Sierra Leone would have been even worse without the UN's help. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, however, required even more thought in finding a bottom line. The massive suffering there—an estimated 4 million people, or four Rwandas, have died since 1998 largely from the famine and disease accompanying armed conflict[51]—took place in spite of the presence of MONUC.

CONCLUSION

What are the lessons for the United Nations that emerge from security operations after the Cold War? These operations represent a qualitatively different kind of peace mission from the world organization's previous experiments. Although earlier efforts in Cambodia and El Salvador were ambitious, those discussed are of a different magnitude. They are exceedingly complex and multidisciplinary. They represent attempts to create or re-create civil order and respect for the rule of law where governance and stability have either broken down or been nonexistent. They entail reconstructing the social and economic

Secretary-General Kofi Annan holds the Nobel Peace Prize awarded in December 2000 to the United Nations and to him, as the organization's Secretary-General. (UN/DPI Photo by S. Bermeniev)

infrastructure, building democratic political institutions, providing humanitarian assistance, and much more. This task expansion changed the character of the humanitarian agencies and led to much soul-searching.[52]

As stated earlier, "learning by doing" seems the order of the day. Not to act seems to many unthinkable, but how precisely to act remains uncertain. These kinds of challenges are what lie ahead for UN peacekeepers in the twenty-first century. Hence we can conceive of traditional peacekeeping and complex peacekeeping, both operating under Chapter VI of the Charter. The former involves primarily neutral interposition to supervise cease-fire lines and other military demarcations. The latter involves a complex range of tasks mostly intended to move postconflict or failed states toward a liberal democratic order.[53] In places like the Balkans, the UN has attempted no less than to change an illiberal region into a liberal one—on a stable, permanent basis.

Observers continue to debate the extent to which the dynamics of contemporary civil wars are new,[54] but the two dominant norms of world politics during the Cold War—namely, that borders were sacrosanct and that secession was unthinkable—no longer generate the enthusiasm that they once did, even among states. At the same time, an almost visceral respect for nonintervention in the internal affairs of states has made way for a more subtle interpretation, according to which on occasion the rights of individuals take

precedence over the rights of repressive governments and the sovereign states that they represent.

Until early in 1993, the dominant perception of outside intervention under UN auspices was largely positive. Rolling back Iraq's aggression against Kuwait along with the dramatic life-saving activities by the U.S.-led coalitions in northern Iraq and initially in Somalia had led to high hopes. In spite of the lack of resolve in Bosnia, it seemed possible that we were entering an era when governments and insurgents would no longer be allowed to commit abuses with impunity. Some analysts even worried then about "the new interventionists."[55] The new emphasis on protecting persons inside states led to a focus on human security. This new focus coexisted alongside the older notion of traditional interstate military security.[56]

An interesting lens through which to examine normative and operational change emerges from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). The commission's report, *The Responsibility to Protect,* and an accompanying volume of supporting research with the same title were presented in mid-December 2001 to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.[57]

The report provides a snapshot of issues surrounding nonconsensual international military action to foster values, and the commission responded to two sets of events. The first were several moral pleas in 1999 from the future (in 2001) Nobel Laureate UN Secretary-General Annan. As hinted earlier, he argued that human rights concerns transcended claims of sovereignty, a theme that he put forward more delicately a year later at the Millennium Summit.[58] The reaction was loud, bitter, and predictable, especially from China, Russia, and much of the Third World. "Intervention"—for whatever reasons, including humanitarian—was a taboo.[59]

The second set of events concerned the divergent reactions—or rather, the nonreactions—by the Security Council to Rwanda and Kosovo. In 1994 intervention was too little and too late to halt or even slow the murder of what may have been as many as 800,000 people in the Great Lakes region of Africa. In 1999 the formidable NATO finessed the council and waged war for the first time in Kosovo. But many observers saw the bombing campaign as being too much and too early, perhaps creating as much human suffering as it relieved. In both cases, the Security Council was not in a position to act expeditiously and authorize the use of deadly force to protect vulnerable populations.

The role of humanitarian concerns in justifying outside military force may have been the most salient new dimension of UN security operations in the 1990s. The ICISS and its report encapsulated two developments that are discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of this book, and which we discuss briefly here. First, it reformulates the conceptual basis for humanitarian intervention. It calls for moving away from the rights of interveners toward the rights of victims and the obligations of outsiders to act. The responsibility to protect includes action not only to intervene when large-scale loss of life occurs but also to prevent armed conflicts and to help mend societies.

Second, the ICISS proposes a new international default setting—a modified just-war doctrine for future interventions to sustain humanitarian values or human rights. As a result of the Cold War, the Security Council was largely missing in action regarding humanitarian matters. There was a tabula rasa—no resolution mentioned the humanitarian aspects of any conflict from 1945 until the Six-Day War of 1967.[60] The first mention of the ICRC was not until 1978. And in the 1970s and 1980s, "the Security Council gave humanitarian aspects of armed conflict limited priority . . . but the early nineteen-nineties can be seen as a watershed."[61] During the first half of the decade, twice as many resolutions were passed as during the first forty-five years of UN history. They contained repeated references, in the context of Chapter VII, to humanitarian crises amounting to threats to international peace and security, and repeated demands for parties to have respect for the principles of international humanitarian law.

The ICISS, like the authors of this text, reiterates the central role of the Security Council, reformed and enlarged or not, and urges it to act. But if it does not, humanitarians and victims are left where the Secretary-General himself was in September 1999 when he queried his diplomatic audience about their reactions had there been a state or a group of states willing to act in April 1994 even without a Security Council imprimatur. "Should such a coalition have stood aside," he asked rhetorically, "and allowed the horror to unfold?"[62] The answer by any of the 800,000 dead Rwandans would be clear even if in UN circles it remains cloudy.

In short, enthusiasm for UN helping hands must be tempered with the realities of UN operations. There certainly is no evidence of a diminishing number of complex emergencies within which the military might help quell ethnic violence, create humanitarian space, and protect fundamental human rights. One is not obliged to agree with Robert Kaplan's apocalyptic visions[63] to recognize a distressing fragmentation of societies that may require outside military intervention if minorities are not to be subjugated or annihilated—which of course is also an option, although states are loath to admit as much publicly. And as long as these threats to human security exist, a role for the United Nations will be debated, given the weaknesses of regional options and the reluctance of any one state to become the world's policeman.

However, coercive military intervention necessitates a revision of conventional wisdom regarding the lack of consent for Chapter VII operations. By definition, intervention does not require "consent" from the warring parties, but it does from the domestic constituencies of troop-contributing countries and from affected local populations.

Thus a progression of three steps underlies this lesson. First, intervention must be preceded by establishing and maintaining the consent of the publics that send their sons and daughters into hostile environments. For example, Americans were prepared for possible casualties prior to Washington's involvement on the ground in Kuwait and Iraq, but they were not prepared, nor was

their consent sought, in the Somalia case. Second, although consent by definition is not forthcoming from local belligerents for Chapter VII, the consent of local populations must be sought and nurtured. Somalia illustrates the neglect by third-party intervenors of local populations manipulated easily by belligerents into believing that those who come to assist them are contributing to their pain. Third and finally, with legitimacy established for possible deaths in action of soldiers and for the presence of "outsiders," there should be no compromises made in robustly making all requisite military efforts to establish quickly a secure environment.

Without a commitment to satisfying all three steps, then no intervention should be attempted. The "messiness" of intervention comes from both lack of legitimacy and lack of efficiency, which the first lesson addresses. A well-planned, systematic response is required, but only after consent has been garnered from local populations in both troop-contributing states and the area of conflict. Outsiders need to reestablish security quickly and credibly in part of a disputed territory even if subsequently additional reinforcements are sent or another strategy evolves. This is the opposite of a slowly-turning-the-screws approach in the hopes that either political will or a meaningful strategy will appear over time. If there is no clarity about mission and little commitment to equipping the UN to act responsibly, "then the U.N. and the world at large," in John Ruggie's words, "are better off by lowering the organization's military profile and not muddling in the strategic calculus of states."[64]

And what about the UN as something of an independent variable, the semi-independent actor staffed with a semi-autonomous civil service? Without putting too fine a point on it, we maintain that the history of security operations after the Cold War indicates that the United Nations is incapable of exercising command and control over combat operations. The capacity to plan, support, and command peacekeeping, let alone peace-enforcement, missions is scarcely greater now than during the Cold War. And this situation will not change in the foreseeable future.

States have made modest improvements to augment the UN Secretariat's anemic military expertise and intelligence capacities—for example, a round-the-clock situation room and satellite telephones—and still others are feasible and desirable. The Canadians and Dutch were joined by twenty-two other countries as "the friends of rapid reaction," and they proposed in 1996 a mobile military headquarters capable of fielding command teams within hours of a Security Council decision. Seven states (Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and Sweden) signed an agreement to set up a 4,000-member UN Standby High Readiness Brigade, which could be used by the Security Council for peacekeeping or preventive operations. Although its existence would perhaps be helpful in exercising a restraining effect on combatants, the real problem is the reluctance of states to move quickly and to authorize forces large enough to do the job. This reality became perfectly clear when Canada offered to lead a

Burning Kuwaiti oil wells with a destroyed Iraqi tank in the foreground. (UN Photo 158181/J. Isaac)

UN effort in eastern Zaire in autumn 1995, and no one volunteered. In short there is no chance that states will empower the world organization with the wherewithal to contradict Michael Mandelbaum's harsh judgment that "the U.N. itself can no more conduct military operations on a large scale on its own than a trade association of hospitals can conduct heart surgery."[65]

Taking advantage of experience over the 1990s and the demonstrated need for change, Secretary-General Annan appointed a high-level international panel to examine critically the UN's handling of peace operations. Led by Lakhdar Brahimi—a former Algerian foreign minister and experienced UN troubleshooter who ended up afterward as the special representative in Afghanistan to follow up the Bonn agreements—the panel found a great deal to criticize, as shown in its August 2000 report. The blunt language focused on getting states to

take their responsibilities seriously, on creating clear mandates and reasonable goals, and on providing well-trained and equipped troops. None of the prescriptions offered would surprise the readers of these pages, nor would the absence of consensus that has followed and the accompanying lack of implementation.

There are two reasons for arguing that the United Nations as actor should distance itself from actually exercising coercion. First, states are unwilling to provide the Secretary-General with the necessary tools for Chapter VII. Standby troops and funds, independent intelligence, and appropriate systems for command and control along with professional personnel are simply not forthcoming. There is simply no question of independent action.

Second, and perhaps more important, the strength of the office of the Secretary-General lies in its neutrality, which is derived from the lack of vested interests. Giandomenico Picco, a former senior official who negotiated the release of hostages in Lebanon, has argued persuasively that "transforming the institution of the Secretary-General into a pale imitation of a state" in order "to mange the use of force may well be a suicidal embrace."[66] When the security situation has somewhat stabilized, the Secretary-General must be prepared to facilitate the administration of collapsed states, but after the warring parties themselves are exhausted or cleansed from a territory or following a humanitarian intervention. Proceeding in these ways requires separating military intervention from civilian administration in order to break a cycle of violence and to create both a respite and the preconditions for a return of an interim government. Moreover, in order to maintain credibility as a third party, the United Nations—insofar as it is separate from states—should refrain from taking sides. Fen Hampson concluded his comprehensive study on the UN's negotiating the end to five ethnic conflicts with the suggestion, "Enforcement is therefore best left to others."[67] The Security Council should still authorize enforcement on selected occasions, but such efforts should be subcontracted to regional arrangements or coalitions of the willing.

The failure to distinguish between the military operations that the United Nations Secretariat can manage (traditional and even slightly muscular peacekeeping) and those that it cannot and should not (enforcement) has led to obfuscation. The latter are problematic under any circumstances, but they have given governments that are unable and unwilling to act decisively the opportunity to treat the United Nations as scapegoat. One is reminded of the third UN Secretary-General, U Thant, who commented wryly, "It is not surprising that the organization should often be blamed for failing to solve problems that have already been found to be insoluble by governments."[68]

With Richard Holbrooke of the United States presiding in the Security Council in January 2000, the focus was on Africa's woes. Everyone agreed that a peacekeeping force in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) was desirable. Yet, with what is somewhat hyperbolically called "Africa's World War," the initial force of some 5,000 soldiers was way too small when there was no

peace to keep. Subsequent increases in troop levels alongside continued chaos in the Congo only confirmed the accuracy of the original skepticism. The UN field presence there remains largely symbolic, because the physical size of the country and its political challenges compound the lack of political will in New York and elsewhere to make a greater practical impact.

At the same time, a positive development within the UN has been the ability, on occasion, to call a spade a spade. The UN Secretary-General's 1999 report on Srebrenica and the Ingmar Carlsson report on Rwanda contained plenty of blame to go around and were followed by another remarkably frank document—about the failings of sanctions against Angola—by a group under Robert Fowler.[69] To conclude on a central theme, it is important to hold states accountable for a lack of political will but also important to hold senior UN officials' feet to the fire because they are capable of choices, of doing the right or the wrong thing. State political will, or the lack thereof, matters. But UN officials matter as well.

NOTES

1. For a discussion of this historical period, see Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, "Moscow's U.N. Policy," *Foreign Policy* no. 79 (1990): 94–112. For a series of essays about the initial impact of these changes, see Thomas G. Weiss and Meryl A. Kessler, eds., *Third World Security in the Post–Cold War Era* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1991); Thomas G. Weiss and James G. Blight, eds., *The Suffering Grass: Superpowers and Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and the Caribbean* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1992); and G. R. Berridge, *Return to the UN* (London: Macmillan, 1991).

2. Many observers credit first lady Nancy Reagan for encouraging this policy shift, as she did not wish her husband to go down in history as the president who destroyed the UN.

3. When the Soviet Union dissolved, Russia was its successor state. As such, it assumed the permanent seat on the Security Council beginning in 1991.

4. An indication of the growing importance of this phenomenon is found in a new annual publication from the Center on International Cooperation. An overview of all UN operations—including costs, mandates, troop levels—can be found in Ian Johnstone, ed., *Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2006* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2006).

5. See Tom J. Farer, ed., *Beyond Sovereignty: Collectively Defending Democracy in the Americas* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996). For an overview of complex or second-generation peacekeeping, involving especially human rights roles, see David P. Forsythe, "Human Rights and International Security: United Nations Field Operations Redux," in *The Role of the Nation-State in the 21st Century: Human Rights, International Organizations and Foreign Policy*, ed. Monique Castermans-Holleman, Fried van Hoof, and Jacqueline Smiths (The Hague: Kluwer, 1998), 265–276.

6. See Mats R. Berdal, *Disarmament and Demobilisation After Civil Wars* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

7. Washington's shift to forcible liberation occurred just after U.S. congressional elections. The Senate approved of the new strategy by only five votes, which almost led to a constitutional crisis in the United States over "war powers."

8. For a discussion of the legitimacy of the Persian Gulf War, see Oscar Schachter, "United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict," and Burns H. Weston, "Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy," both in *American Journal of International Law* 85, no. 3 (1991).

9. For a series of skeptical views, see essays by Stephen Lewis, Clovis Maksoud, and Robert C. Johansen, "The United Nations After the Gulf War," *World Policy Journal* 8, no. 3 (1991): 539–574.

10. For discussions of the Gramscian notion of hegemonic power compared to dominant power, see Robert J. Lieber, ed., *Eagle Rules: Foreign Policy and American Primary in the Twenty-First Century* (Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 2002), chapter 1.

11. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping* (New York: UN, 1992), para. 43.

12. This controversial subject was launched by the French government, especially by Mario Bettati and Bernard Kouchner, *Le Devoir d'ingérence* (Paris: DeNoël, 1987).

13. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001). For a view about the dangers from such an approach, see Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

14. Michael Reisman and Myres S. McDougal, "Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos," in *Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations*, ed. Richard Lillich (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1973), 168.

15. See David Cortright and George A. Lopez, eds., *Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peacebuilding in a Post–Cold War World?* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995); and *The Sanctions Decade; and Sanctions and the Search for Security* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002). Previous research had concentrated largely upon the utility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool of the United States. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, and Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: Supplemental Case Histories* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), which updated *Economic Sanctions in Pursuit of Foreign Policy Goals* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1983). See also David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985); Theodore Goldi and Robert Shuey, *U.S. Economic Sanctions Imposed Against Specific Countries: 1979 to the Present* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1992); and Lisa Martin, *Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). For a discussion of the humanitarian consequences, see David Cortright, George A. Lopez, Larry Minear, and Thomas G. Weiss, *Political Gain and Civilian Pain: The Humanitarian Impact of Economic Sanctions* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1997).

16. For a discussion of these issues, see Larry Minear and Thomas G. Weiss, "Groping and Coping in the Gulf Crisis: Discerning the Shape of a New Humanitarian Order," *World Policy Journal* 9, no. 4 (1992): 755–777.

17. In many ways, the call to make provisions for vulnerable populations in the wake of sanctions is analogous to efforts to mitigate structural adjustment policies. For a discussion, see Richard Jolly and Ralph van der Hoeven, eds., "Adjustment with a Human Face—Record and Relevance," *World Development* (special issue) 19, no. 12 (1991). For general discussions of this issue, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, "The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions," in *Enforcing Restraint: Collective Intervention in Internal Conflicts*, ed. Damrosch (New York:

Council on Foreign Relations, 1993), 274–315; and Patrick Clawson, "Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement, and Prelude to Further Action," *Ethics and International Affairs* 7 (1993): 17–37.

18. See Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," *Ethics and International Affairs* 6 (1992): 95–117; and David J. Scheffer, "Toward a Modern Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," *University of Toledo Law Review* 23, no. 2 (1992): 253–293.

19. See *Financing an Effective United Nations* (New York: Ford Foundation, 1993), a report of an expert group chaired by Paul Volker and Shijuro Ogata.

20. See "Last of the Big Time Spenders: U.S. Military Budget Still the World's Largest, and Growing," Center for Defense Information Table on "Fiscal Year 2004 Budget" available at www.cdi.org/budget/2004/world-military-spending.cfm. This information is based on data from the U.S. Department of Defense and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

21. See Stephen R. Rather, *The New UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); and Michael W. Doyle, Ian Johnstone, and Robert C. Orr, eds., *Keeping the Peace: Multidimensional UN Operations in Cambodia and El Salvador* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

22. For a discussion of these possibilities before the UN's involvement in the former Soviet bloc, see Thomas G. Weiss and Kurt M. Campbell, "The United Nations and Eastern Europe," *World Policy Journal* 7, no. 3 (1990): 575–592. For another treatment, see Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Prospects for Containing Conflict in the Former Second World," *Security Studies* 4, no. 3 (1995): 552–583.

23. See Richard H. Ullman, *The World and Yugoslavia's Wars* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), 59–96. For a comparative look at this period, see William J. Durch, *UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997). See also James S. Sutterlin, *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Security: A Challenge to be Met* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1995); Muthia Alagappa and Takashi Inoguchi, eds., *International Security Management and the United Nations* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998); Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes, eds., *Beyond Traditional Peacekeeping* (London: Macmillan, 1995); and Olara A. Otunnu and Michael W. Doyle, eds., foreword by Nelson Mandela, *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

24. Sadako Ogata, *The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s* (New York: Norton, 2005), 25.

25. "In Bosnia's Fog," *The Economist*, April 23, 1994, 16.

26. Lawrence Freedman, "Why the West Failed," *Foreign Policy* 97 (1994–1995): 59.

27. For a report from an official inquiry, see Netherlands Institute for War Documentation, *Srebenica, a 'Safe' Area: Reconstruction, Background, Consequences, and Analyses of the Fall of a Safe Area* (Amsterdam: Boom Publishers, 2002), also available at www.srebenica.nl/en/. See further, from a growing literature, Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime* (London: Penguin, 1996), and David Rohde, *Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998).

28. "U.N. Bosnia Commander Wants More Troops, Fewer Resolutions," *The New York Times*, December 31, 1993.

29. Quoted by Alison Mitchell, "Clinton's About-Face," *The New York Times*, September 24. 1996. For a discussion of the impact of Somalia, see Tom J. Farer, "Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase," *Human Rights Quarterly* 18, no. 1 (1996): 1–22; and Thomas G. Weiss, "Overcoming the Somalia Syndrome—'Operation Rekindle Hope'?" *Global Governance* 1, no. 2 (1995): 171–187.

30. UN General Assembly, "A Comprehensive Strategy to Eliminate Future Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations," UN document A/59/710, March 24, 2005.

31. See Kenneth Cain, Heidi Postlewait, and Andrew Thomson, *Emergency Sex and Other Desperate Measures: A True Story from Hell on Earth* (New York: Hyperion, 2004).

32. See Debarati G. Sapir and Hedwig Deconinck, "The Paradox of Humanitarian Assistance and Military Intervention in Somalia," in *The United Nations and Civil Wars*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 168.

33. See Larry Minear and Philippe Guillot, *Soldiers to the Rescue: Humanitarian Lessons from Rwanda* (Paris: OECD, 1996); Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995); Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwandan Experience*, 5 vols. (Copenhagen: Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, March 1995).

34. For discussions of this phenomenon in relationship to this crisis, see Robert I. Rotberg and Thomas G. Weiss, eds., *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996); Larry Minear, Colin Scott, and Thomas G. Weiss, *The News Media, Civil War, and Humanitarian Action* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Charles C. Moskos and Thomas E. Ricks, *Reporting War When There Is No War* (Chicago: McCormick Tribune Foundation, 1996); Edward Girardet, ed., *Somalia, Rwanda, and Beyond: The Role of the International Media in Wars and Humanitarian Crises* (Dublin: Crosslines Communications, 1995); Johanna Newman, *Lights, Camera, War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996); Nik Gowing, *Real-Time Television Coverage of Armed Conflicts and Diplomatic Crises* (Cambridge, UK: Harvard Shorenstein Center, 1994) and *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention* (New York: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997); and Warren P. Stroble, *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997).

35. Sadako Ogata, head of the UN refugee office, asked the Security Council to control the Hutu militia in the refugee camps, but the state members of the council lacked the necessary fortitude for a proper response. Ogata then contracted with Zaire, as it then was, to provide some security in the camps, but this proved less than an ideal solution. See *Turbulent Decade*, chapter 3.

36. See Peter Uvin, *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda* (West Hartford, Conn.: Kumarian, 1998).

37. Kofi Annan, Address to the Parliament of Rwanda, Kigali, May 7, 1998, document SG/SM/6552.

38. Kofi Annan, "Statement on Receiving the Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda," United Nations, New York, December 16, 1999.

39. For his own recollections, see Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (Toronto: Brent Beardsley, 2004). See further Michael N. Barnett, *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell

University Press, 2002). Barnett faults the culture of the UN bureaucracy in New York for not responding better to the clear signs of genocide evident for a long time in Rwanda. For the UN's own hard-hitting report, see http://www.un.org/News/ossg/rwanda_report.htm.

40. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement to An Agenda for Peace,* document A/50/60-S/1995, January 5, 1995, para. 70, reprinted in *An Agenda for Peace 1995* (New York: United Nations, 1995) along with the 1992 *An Agenda for Peace.* Paragraph numbers are the same in the original.

41. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 47.

42. Boutros-Ghali, *Supplement,* para. 77.

43. *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,* UN document A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000. For a discussion, see David M. Malone and Ramesh Thakur, "UN Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned?" *Global Governance* 7, no. 1 (2001): 11–17.

44. See Thomas G. Weiss, ed., *Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and Service-Providing NGOs* (London: Macmillan, 1998); and William B. Tow, *Subregional Security Cooperation in the Third World* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990).

45. Independent Commission on Kosovo, *Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

46. *Financial Times,* October 8, 1998.

47. Kofi A. Annan, "Secretary-General's Speech to the 54th Session of the General Assembly," September 20, 1999. This and other speeches on humanitarian intervention are published in *The Question of Intervention: Statements by the Secretary-General* (New York: UN, 1999).

48. UN Press Release SG/SM/6878, January 28, 1999.

49. Adam Roberts, "NATO's 'Humanitarian War' in Kosovo," *Survival* 41, no. 3 (1999): 102–123.

50. See Michael G. Smith with Moreen Dee, *Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

51. Data compiled by the International Rescue Committee available at http://www.theirc.org/mortality/

52. See Michael Barnett, "Humanitarianism Transformed," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 4 (2005): 723–740; and Janice Stein, "Humanitarianism as Political Fusion," *Perspectives on Politics* 3, no. 4 (2005): 740–744.

53. Forsythe, "Human Rights and International Security."

54. See Mohammed Ayoob, "The New-Old Disorder in the Third World," in *Collective Security in a Changing World,* ed. Thomas G. Weiss (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 13–30.

55. Stephen John Stedman, "The New Interventionists," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 1 (1993): 1–16. For an exhaustive review of the literature, see Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, *Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1996). See also John Harriss, ed., *The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention* (London: Pinter, 1995); James Mayall, ed., *The New Interventionism: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, and Somalia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); and Jan Neederveen Pieterse, ed., *World Orders in the Making: Humanitarian Intervention and Beyond* (London: Macmillan, 1998).

56. See Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001). See also S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong-Khong, *Human Security and the UN: A Critical History* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006).

57. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Report* (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001). See also *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, and Background* (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001), primary authors Thomas G. Weiss and Don Hubert. For a scholarly review of the implications, see Adam Roberts, "The Price of Protection," *Survival* 44, no. 4 (2002–2003): 157–161; and Joelle Tanguy, "Redefining Sovereignty and Intervention," *Ethics & International Affairs* 17, no. 1 (2003): 141–148.

58. Annan, *Question,* and *"We, the Peoples": The United Nations in the 21st Century* (New York: UN, 2000). For a discussion of the controversy surrounding the speech in September 1999, see Thomas G. Weiss, "The Politics of Humanitarian Ideas," *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 1 (2000): 11–23.

59. For an overview, see Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and International Society," *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (2001): 225–230; and Jackson, *The Global Covenant.*

60. Christine Bourloyannis, "The Security Council of the United Nations and the Implementation of International Humanitarian Law," *Denver Journal of International Law and Policy* 20, no. 3 (1993): 43.

61. Th. A. van Baarda, "The Involvement of the Security Council in Maintaining International Law," *Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights* 12, no. 1 (1994): 140.

62. Annan, *Question,* 39.

63. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly* 273, no. 2 (1994): 44–76, and *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996).

64. John Gerard Ruggie, *The United Nations and the Collective Use of Force: Whither? or Whether?* (New York: United Nations Association of the USA, 1996), 1.

65. Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," *Foreign Policy* no. 95 (1994): 11.

66. Giandomenico Picco, "The U.N. and the Use of Force," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 5 (1994): 15. See also his *Man Without a Gun* (New York: Random House, 1999).

67. Fen Osler Hampson, *Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Settlements Succeed or Fail* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996), 226. See also William I. Zartman, *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995).

68. U Thant, *View from the U.N.* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1978), 32.

69. Annan, *Report on the Fall of Srebrenica,* document A54/549, November 15, 1999; *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda,* document S/1999/1257, December 15, 1999; and *Report of the Panel of Experts on Violations of Security Council Sanctions Against UNITA,* document S/2000/203, March 10, 2000.