UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNGOMAP	United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFEM	United Nations Development Fund for Women
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIIMOG	United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UNITAF	Unified Task Force (in Somalia)
UNMIH	United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOVIC	United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission
UNOMSIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force (in the former Yugoslavia)
UNSMIH	United Nations Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WACAP	World Alliance of Cities Against Poverty
WCRP	World Climate Research Programme
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMD	weapon of mass destruction
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

The most casual observer of the international scene can see that the problem of world order has not been solved.

—Inis L. Claude Jr., *Swords into Plowshares*

As the twentieth century began, global multilateral relations and universal international organizations were in their infancy. Experiments with international unions, conference diplomacy, and the expansion of multilateral relations beyond Europe remained fledgling. As the decades unfolded, so did universal multilateralism, albeit on the European state-system model. Challenged by the increasing lethality of warfare and the associated evolving norm of the illegality of aggressive war, the first great experiment with collective security—the League of Nations—was launched.

This experiment failed, primarily because states did not adjust their policies to meet the logic of the League. Even Woodrow Wilson was, in fact, not a "Wilsonian." He refused to commit the United States to protecting the Christian Armenians who had been brutalized in the Ottoman Empire up to and during World War I. This was the type of daily commitment abroad that would be necessary for the League to work as intended.[1]

After the second great European war of the century became a global conflict, national governmental leaders once again began to search for a way to prevent global conflicts from happening anew. Under the leadership of officials from the United States and Great Britain, a second great experiment in universal international organization was launched. This time, however, the collective security agreement was seen as part of a more comprehensive global arrangement in which the guarantees of collective security were linked to a series of international institutions aimed at promoting and fostering the social and economic conditions necessary for peace to prevail. Many of the social and economic elements of the postwar world order were, in fact, agreed on before the formal adoption of the UN Charter on June 26, 1945—literally shortly after the defeat of the Third Reich in Germany while ashes were still smoldering in Europe and before the

surrender of Japan. The UN system was born plural and decentralized and was never intended to approximate a centralized unitary system.

At the same time, the UN system was born from pragmatism. A great war against fascism and irrationalism had just been fought and won; the price of a third great war during the twentieth century was simply viewed as too great—the nuclear era had begun. The UN founders saw the UN as the harnessing of great power for the management of pressing problems. This is hardly wild-eyed idealism or utopianism run amok. It bears emphasizing that even the UN's socioeconomic agencies were seen not as part of altruism but as an indirect attack on war. Franklin Delano Roosevelt believed strongly that the origins of World War II lay in the economic and social misery of the 1920s. In his view, it was those conditions that had given rise to aggressive fascism in Europe. So even as the Second World War continued, the FDR administration began planning for a broad UN system that would include the World Bank and other economic and social agencies.[2]

Given that the primary purpose of the UN was to deal with international peace and security, most observers no doubt think in terms of a traditional management of the use of force rather than an indirect approach to peace through economic and social development. In viewing the record of the former concern, one can say that the modern history of the United Nations illustrates the trials and tribulations of collective security in the post–World War II era. UN officials managed more than 20,000 troops in the old Belgian Congo in the 1960s (later Zaire and more recently once again the Congo). Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld died while coping with that crisis, which almost caused the collapse of the world organization. UN diplomatic and military personnel were deeply involved in Middle Eastern politics since the late 1940s in Palestine but especially in the 1956 Suez crisis and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

At times, the United Nations was placed on the back burner. For much of the 1970s and even more in the 1980s, major states bypassed the world organization on international security issues. Some developing countries continued to look upon the UN as central to world politics, but both the United States and the Soviet Union mostly favored action outside it. Circles of opinion in Washington, both public and private, were particularly harsh in their criticisms of the organization in the 1980s. The first administration of Ronald Reagan, and related think tanks like the Heritage Foundation, manifested a deep distrust of multilateral diplomacy. One Reagan official, Charles Lichenstein, assigned to the UN, spoke publicly of "waving . . . a fond farewell as [the UN] sailed into the sunset."[3] Several U.S. allies also shied away from an organization whose "automatic" voting majorities had shifted over the decades from being controlled by the United States to being dominated by developing countries. They, like the United States, appeared at times to despair of an organization whose resolutions were not followed by commitment to action.

A marked change came over the organization in the wake of the collapse of European communism from 1985 to 1991. Mikhail Gorbachev, then the first sec-

retary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, called upon the UN in a September 1987 article in Pravda to play a more central role in world politics as a cornerstone of global security. Then boldly, more boldly than any previous leader of a superpower, Gorbachev embraced the UN and its collective security mechanism as a cornerstone of Soviet security policy. The Reagan administration, the most unilateralist in modern American political history until that point, responded cautiously. Nonetheless, by the end of the George H. W. Bush administration in 1993, the United States had used the UN to a great extent in dealing with such major issues as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, although earlier it had bypassed the UN on other matters such as the invasion of Panama in 1989. By the mid-1990s, the UN was back again on the front pages and in the headlines—and on CNN as well.

Many developing states constituting the Global South were cautious as the Soviet Union (and subsequently Russia) and the United States—"two elephants," to paraphrase a popularly used analogy during that period—and their three Security Council permanent-member counterparts danced the dance of consensus, which led to an unprecedented use of the Security Council as a global security mechanism. In the years immediately after the Cold War, UN peacekeeping and enforcement activities underwent a tremendous surge. From 1988 to 1993, substantially more UN military operations—over twenty new operations—were launched than during the entire first four decades of the world organization. Great euphoria reigned in pro-internationalist circles in the United States just as great concern reigned in many smaller member states of the world organization.

The roller-coaster ride continued as the UN's peacekeeping and peace enforcement profile once again changed. The scope of the Security Council's business slowed greatly after the 1988–1993 period.[4] In the next five years, until December 1998, sixteen peacekeeping operations were authorized. However, that number is misleading because seven were offshoots of previous missions. Of the remaining new operations, only the third UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) was of significant size (with 6,500 troops) and duration. Both the total number of UN blue helmets and the peacekeeping budget fell by two-thirds from 1994 to 1998, reflecting disillusionment with the results from controversial involvement in Somalia, Rwanda, and the Balkans.

In 1999, change set in again, effectively more than doubling the number of personnel involved in UN security operations. Major new missions were launched in Sierra Leone (6,260 military troops and observers), East Timor (9,150 troops and observers), and Kosovo (approximately 4,500 UN and partner organization personnel and civilian police). But the numbers of operations and personnel tell only part of the story. The missions in Kosovo, East Timor, and another new operation, the UN Observer Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), represented a qualitatively different kind of exceedingly complex and multidimensional operation. They are mandated the tasks of creating viable political and social institutions . . .

infrastructures, strengthening the rule of law as well as protecting human rights, and demobilizing former combatants and reintegrating them into society. Greatly expanding on earlier multidimensional operations, especially in El Salvador and Cambodia, the new efforts aimed at reconstituting viable states, an ambitious effort that critics referred to as "neocolonialism" but that one observer, Jarat Chopra, has dubbed "peace-maintenance."[5] Still others referred to "nation-building" or "state-building," while some military establishments talked of "post-combat reconstruction."

This intense involvement in post-conflict situations took a new form following the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001. The overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan led to a new type of UN involvement, a so-called light footprint by the UN so that Afghans played a prominent role rather than foreigners. In postwar Iraq in 2003, the UN made almost no footprint for a time. After the nonauthorized combat to remove the government of Saddam Hussein, the Security Council approved the administrative control by the United States and the United Kingdom.

Indeed, the administration of George W. Bush quickly surpassed the vitriol of the Reagan administration in terms of its criticism of the United Nations and willingness to resort to unilateralism. *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*,[6] unveiled by the president in September 2002, colored discussions about using force. Many regarded the new doctrine, with its emphasis on preventive intervention, as a threat to the principle of nonintervention.

The administration pursued a variety of other unilateral measures in other spheres, from "unsigning" the statute on the International Criminal Court to opting out of the antiballistic missile treaty to treating with disdain efforts to mitigate global warming through the Kyoto Protocol. The administration seemed oblivious to what Joseph Nye calls the "paradox of American power"[7]—the inability of the world's strongest state to secure some of its major goals alone. Bush's rampant unilateralism prompted a former Reagan official, the conservative economist Clyde Prestowitz, to label the United States a "rogue nation."[8]

Unless Washington is prepared to bend on occasion, governments are unlikely to sign on when their help is needed for U.S. priorities. As in a poker game, a player should not want to win every hand, because then the other players will drop out. As well as pursuing elections, weapons inspections, and a host of other tasks in Iraq, other obvious examples where U.S. interests would be fostered more through cooperation than going-it-alone include fighting terrorism (intelligence sharing and anti-money laundering efforts), confronting the global specter of infectious diseases (HIV/AIDS, Ebola, and SARS), and the monitoring of human rights and supporting criminal tribunals. Humanitarian intervention is a quintessentially multilateral task because of the desirability of both collective approval and cost sharing. Ironically, as John Ikenberry aptly notes in echoing Nye, "There are limits on American imperial pretensions even in a unipolar era."[9]

At the same time, as discussed in Parts Two and Three of this book, the UN's roles in promoting humanitarian affairs and human rights along with sustainable human development have continued to evolve. The Human Development Reports of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) indicate that the world may be losing, not gaining, ground toward the objective of promoting sustainable human development. UNDP reports, for example, highlighted two disturbing findings:

- Economic growth has been failing over much of the past fifteen years in about 100 countries, which contain almost a third of the world's people. And the links between growth and human development are failing for people in many countries with lopsided development—with either good growth but little human development, or good human development but little or no growth.[10]

- In seventy of those countries, average incomes in 1993 were less than they were in 1980. In forty-three of those countries, average incomes were less than they had been in 1970. If the communications revolution is an engine of growth, the fact that the poorest 20 percent of the globe's countries contain only 0.2 percent of Internet users is startling. Clearly, the four development decades of the United Nations have not met with complete successes. Many poor countries have become ever more marginalized in the world economy, and global inequality continues to increase substantially.[11]

But these statistics tell only part of the story. Even in the peacekeeping arena, the character of UN operations has been changing. Fewer than 20 percent of the UN missions launched since 1988, for example, have been in response to interstate conflict, the type for which the founders of the world organization had planned. The majority of UN operations have been primarily intrastate. Security Council responses to domestic armed conflicts in the post–Cold War era fundamentally called into question antiquated notions of the inviolability and absolute character of state sovereignty as well as the sanctity of the notion of noninterference in the internal affairs of states. After all, once human rights became codified in international law, the state's treatment of "its" citizens was no longer a matter of purely domestic jurisdiction shielded by state sovereignty.

So, world politics has been in constant change leading to ups and downs in UN responses to major issues. These ups and downs are mostly dependent on the policies of member states. Overall, the UN continues to be centrally involved in many if not most important situations—notwithstanding certain circles of ultranationalist opinion in the United States. And on some issues, whether human rights in the Darfur region of Sudan or ecological protection via the Kyoto Protocol, other states like China and Russia and India may also not be supportive of an important role for the UN.

THE LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY

When the Peace of Westphalia essentially ended European religious wars in 1648, powerful political circles accepted that the world should be divided into territorial states. Before that time, dynastic empires, city-states, feudalistic orders, clans and tribes, churches, and a variety of other arrangements organized persons into groupings for personal identity and problem solving. From about the middle of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth, the territorial state emerged, first in Europe and then elsewhere, as the basic unit of social organization that commanded primary loyalty and was responsible for order, and eventually for justice and prosperity, within a state's territorial boundaries. European rulers found the institution of the state useful and perpetuated its image; then politically aware persons outside the West adopted the notion of the state to resist domination by European states.

However, other groupings persisted. In nineteenth-century Europe, Napoleon sought to substitute a French empire for several states, and European colonialism persisted in Africa until the 1970s. Despite these exceptions and the persistence of clan, ethnic, and religious identities, most of those exercising power increasingly promoted the perception that the basic political-legal unit of world affairs was the state: an administrative apparatus with a monopoly on the legitimate use of force over a specific geographical area, with a stable (non-nomadic) population. Frequently, the territorial state is referred to as the "nation-state." This label is not totally false, but it can be misleading because nations and states are not the same. A nation is a people (a group of persons professing solidarity on the basis of language, religion, history, or some other bonding element) linked to a state. Legally speaking, where there is a state there is a nation, but there may be several peoples within a state. For example, in Switzerland (officially the Helvetian Confederation), by legal definition there is the Swiss nation, but in social reality there are four peoples linked to that state: the Swiss-Germans, the Swiss-French, the Swiss-Italians, and the Swiss-Romanisch. The confusing notion of a multinational state also has arisen along with a divided nation (East and West Germany between 1945 and 1989, and North and South Korea today) and states with irredentist claims (Serbia).

STATE SOVEREIGNTY

The emergence of the territorial state was accompanied by the notion that the state was sovereign. Accordingly, the sovereignty of all other social groupings was legally subordinated to the sovereignty of the state. Political and legal theorists argued that sovereignty resided in territorial states' rulers and they had ultimate authority to make policy within a state's borders. Those who negotiated the two treaties making up the Peace of Westphalia wanted to stop the religious wars that had brought so much destruction to Europe. They specified that whoever ruled

a certain territory could determine the religion of that territory. Europeans further developed the ideas about state sovereignty; Jean Bodin, a sixteenth-century French jurist, thought the notion of sovereignty a useful argument on behalf of the monarchs of new states who were trying to suppress the power of feudal officials contesting the power of the emerging state rulers.

State sovereignty was thus an idea that arose in a particular place at a particular time. But it came to be widely accepted as European political influence spread around the world. The argument was about legal rights, but it was intended to affect power. All states were said to be sovereign equals, regardless of their actual "power"—meaning capability to control outcomes. They had the right to control policy within their jurisdictions even if they did not have the power to do it. Framed in the language of the abstract state, sovereignty enhanced the power of those persons making up the government that represented the state.

Sovereignty arose as an idea designed to produce order, to stop violence between and within states over religious questions. But did state sovereignty become, on balance, an idea that guaranteed international disorder? Was it necessary to think of relations between and among states as anarchical—not in the sense of chaos but in the sense of interactions among equal sovereigns recognizing no higher rules and organizations?

The original versions of state sovereignty, coming as they did out of a Europe that was nominally Christian, emphasized external limits on monarchs by virtue of the "higher" norms of natural law. These monarchs were the highest secular authorities, but they still were inferior to an external set of rules—at least from the viewpoint of political and religious theorists. But as Europe became more and more secular—which is to say, as the Catholic Church in Rome gave up its pretenses at territorial empire and increasingly emphasized the spiritual domain, at least in church dogma—the presumed restraints of natural law theory fell away. Thus the notion of state sovereignty came to represent absolute secular authority.

Political duplicity was part of all of this. The more powerful states, while agreeing that all states were equally sovereign, repeatedly violated the national jurisdiction of the weaker states. As we noted earlier, Stephen Krasner has pointed to the evolution and entrenchment of state sovereignty in international relations as a reflection of hypocrisy.[12]

State sovereignty, originally designed to produce order and to buttress central authority within the state, led to negative external consequences, the main one being that central authority over global society and interstate relations was undermined. All territorial states came to be seen as equal in the sense of having ultimate authority to prescribe what "should be" in their jurisdictions. No outside rules and organizations were held to be superior to the state. Only those rules consented to, and only those organizations voluntarily accepted, could exist in interstate relations with the logic of the Westphalian system of world politics.[13] Thus states were legally free to make war, violate human rights, neglect the welfare of citizens, and damage the ecology.

Interstate relations were conceived of as part of what political scientists often characterize as "anarchy."[14] Individuals existed and were grouped into nations. Nations were governed by states. States had governments. Sovereignty was an attribute of states, but it was exercised by governments. What was frequently called national sovereignty was actually state sovereignty. Whether the citizens of a nation were sovereign referred to whether the state derived its legitimacy ultimately from popular will. This latter issue was, for a long time, considered an interior or domestic question for the state; foreign actors had no authority to pronounce on it. This view, too, has been undergoing change. The Organization of American States (OAS) has declared that the presence or absence of democracy within a member state is a question rightly falling within the concerns of that international organization.

This notion of state sovereignty is a political-legal prism. It is a fact only in the sense that if it is accepted, it becomes part of the dominant psychology of an era—the same way that slavery was accepted as a routine of the natural order in a previous era. Such a notion is not a physical fact, like energy or a doorknob. Since state sovereignty is not a material fact or a necessity but rather an intellectual or social construct about who should have ultimate authority to make policy, there can be reasonable differences of opinion about it. As a construct, state sovereignty as a notion has evolved over time to mean different things in different eras.

Indeed, differences—reasonable and otherwise—exist about who should govern in international society and world politics. Should the state, through its government, have the ultimate and absolute right to govern—regardless of other considerations? Should regional intergovernmental organizations like the European Union (EU) have the ultimate say about proper policy within a state? Should local communities? Should the United Nations? Does the answer depend on what policy question one is addressing? Does the answer depend on how much suffering or destruction is occurring? Should state entities be given the first chance at managing a problem, but not ultimate authority if they fail to resolve it?

These very questions are being raised at the United Nations at the beginning of the twenty-first century. For example, by 1992 the state had disintegrated in the geographical area known as Somalia, which is to say that the governing system for the territory did not function. With no effective government to represent the state, should the UN be the organization ultimately responsible for ending disorder and starvation and helping to reestablish the state? If disputes within a state—such as was the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina and between Bosnia and Herzegovina and a smaller Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)—lead to mass murder, mass migration, and mass misery, should the UN be ultimately responsible? Or, as was the controversial case in Kosovo, should another multilateral organization—to wit, NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization)—override claims to sovereignty by Serbia if the Security Council is paralyzed? If states fail to take proper action in relation to major violations of international law (genocide, major war

crimes, crimes against humanity), should the International Criminal Court (ICC) have the right to prosecute and convict the individuals responsible?

Governments act in the name of states to determine how to manage certain transnational problems. On occasion they have agreed to let an international organization have the ultimate say as to what should be done. For example, more than forty states in the Council of Europe have created the European Convention on Human Rights. Under this treaty, the European Court of Human Rights has the ultimate say as to the correct interpretation of the convention, and the court regularly issues judgments to states concerning the legality of their policies. If one starts, as do European governments, with the notion that their states are sovereign, then these states have used their sovereignty to create international bodies that restrict the authority of the state. Among these states, the protection of human rights on a transnational basis is valued more highly than state independence. States have used their freedom to make policies that reduce their freedom. Initial sovereignty, linked to territory, has been used to restrict that sovereignty by means of an international body acting primarily on the basis of nonterritorial considerations.

This European situation was not typical of interstate relations in the 1990s and is not likely to change in the foreseeable future. A few other examples of what is called "supranational" authority in world politics are apparent. Although much noise arises in the United States about the right of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) dispute panels to dictate policy to states, this authority is modest. States ultimately make the ultimate decision whether to apply sanctions for violations of WTO rules. Power, especially economic power, affects the efficacy of sanction authorized under WTO rules. So when the WTO's Dispute Settlement Board (DSB) rules that U.S. policy violates WTO rules, sometimes the United States changes its policy, sometimes it does not, and sometimes Washington engages in protracted negotiations with other states that make it difficult to decide whether the United States is complying or not with the DSB ruling.

Most states, especially the newer ones that have achieved formal independence as a result of rapid decolonization since the 1950s, value state sovereignty more than supranational cooperation to improve security, protect human rights, or pursue sustainable development. Indeed, several older states also highly value state sovereignty. Edward Luck has pointed to American "exceptionalism" and traditional skepticism about inroads on its authority within the UN that is every bit as ferocious as any Third World state.[15] Or as Richard Haass puts it, "Americans have traditionally guarded their sovereignty with more than a little ferocity."[16] China, too, argues that only the state, not outside parties, can determine what is best for the Chinese people, whether in the realm of security, human rights, or sustainable human development.

In short, considerable international cooperation exists but usually falls short of being supranational and of giving an international organization the legal right to override state independence. The United States, for example, has neither ratified

the InterAmerican Convention on Human Rights nor accepted the jurisdiction and authority of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights.

Nevertheless, as the peoples and states of the world become more interconnected materially and morally, demands increase for more effective international management. As persons become not just interconnected but interdependent (meaning that their relations become sensitive), demands increase for international management at the expense of state sovereignty. Americans are interconnected with Hondurans concerning trade in bananas, but Americans can do without Honduran bananas and not become very upset. Americans were interdependent with Kuwaitis concerning trade in oil; this relationship was sensitive because its alteration would have caused a major disruption in American society. Because of interdependence involving sensitive relations, some issues that were formerly considered domestic or inconsequential have come to be redefined as international or significant because of the strength of transnational concern—of either a material or a moral nature. Still, even in the context of interdependence, most states are reluctant to transfer supranational authority to an international organization, not excluding the UN. And even when the Security Council appears to be exercising supranational authority, it is state representatives who most often make the key decisions, as we explain further below.

The Security Council determined that human rights repression in Iraq in 1991 threatened international peace and security; that the breakdown of order within Somalia in 1992 was a proper area for UN enforcement action, and that the humanitarian situation in Bosnia from 1992 was such that all states and other actors were entitled to use "all measures necessary" to provide humanitarian assistance. Situations similar to these used to be considered within the domestic jurisdiction of states. But the situations inside Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia—and more recently in Rwanda, Haiti, Albania, Kosovo, and East Timor—came to be redefined as proper international concerns, subject to action by the United Nations and other external actors. In these cases the principle of state sovereignty yielded to a transnational demand for the effective treatment of pressing humanitarian problems.

Indeed, the "responsibility to protect" civilians emerged as a mainstream concern.[17] Hence the demand is growing for global governance; not in the sense of a unified world government, but in the sense of effective transnational management of pressing problems—in this case, of humanitarian disasters.[18] Yet in all the cases mentioned above, state authorities remained the most important, even if meeting in the Security Council or other international bodies. Even in these cases, the dominant pattern showed little desire by major states to let an independent UN official like the Secretary-General make the key decisions about use of force or other important responses.[19] Legally speaking, the Security Council or NATO may have taken a decision to use force or levy sanctions over matters essentially inside a state, but in political reality it was certain member states taking that decision and backing it with resources.

In many parts of the world, existing states are under pressure from within because a variety of groups—usually loosely called "ethnic," although they often are based on religious, linguistic, or other cultural characteristics—demand some form of sovereignty and self-determination. Many demands, cause problems, but conflict is particularly pronounced when self-determination takes the form of a demand for a people's right to construct a new state. In these cases, the idea of accepting the territorial state as the basic unit of world politics is not at issue, at least in principle. What is at issue, and unfortunately fought over frequently, is which states and nations should be recognized.

At one point, for example, Georgia was an internal province of the state known as the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR); at another time it became a national state. Since Georgian independence, some Ossetians have not been content to be a people within Georgia but wish to be a nation with their own state. Not far away, another former Soviet province, Chechnya, became part of another successor state, Russia, and began a bloody war to be recognized as more than autonomous after making a declaration of independent statehood. The issue is not whether to have territorial states but whether the state that is sovereign over a particular population or geographical area should be the former USSR, Georgia, or Ossetia in the first case and the former USSR, Russia, or Chechnya in the second.

The state may be simultaneously under attack from several quarters. The managers of transnational corporations have a global vision, doing what is best for their firms without much thought about state boundaries. They are bolstered by the globalization of finance capital and the meshing of the perspectives of corporate executives, regardless of nationality.[20] Yet, state sovereignty persists in the perceptions of most political elites. It is reaffirmed in principle at each annual meeting of the UN General Assembly. But state sovereignty, linked to the power and independence of those who govern in the name of the state, is not the only value in world politics. Other values can challenge state sovereignty and include enhanced security, human rights, and sustainable human development.

World politics consists, in large part, of managing the contradictions between conceptions of state sovereignty, on the one hand, and the desire for improved security, human rights, and sustainable human development, on the other. These contradictions are not the only ones in world politics, and managing them is not the only pressing need, but they constitute a fault line that permeates much debate at the United Nations. Sovereignty versus other considerations is one of the leading issues—if not the leading issue—in changing world politics at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Some time ago Lawrence Finkelstein observed that 'although the picture is blurred and in many places hard to decipher, there has been movement away from the decentralized system of respect for sovereignty and toward a more centralized system of decision that in some respects approaches being international governance.'[21] Most of the time, the UN is very much part of this trend while remaining far short of a global government

CHANGING RAISONS D'ÉTAT

Those who rule in the name of the state, basing their views on the principle of state sovereignty, have claimed the right to determine what norms and actions are needed in the national interest. What English speakers call "national interests" is perhaps better captured by what French speakers call *raisons d'état* (reasons of state). Whether those who rule are primarily concerned about the interests of the nation, meaning the people, or the interests of the state, meaning the government of the state, or their own interests is fair to ask. Nomenclature aside, individuals acting in the name of a state display a variety of interests. State interests may, because of necessity, come down on the side of state power and independence. From a self-interested point of view, this may be rational. If we assume an anarchical international society without effective governing arrangements, it may seem rational to protect the independent power of the state. That power can then be used to secure "good things" for it.

Whether states—at least some of them, some of the time—may be coming to see their interests in fundamentally different ways is a provocative question. The growing interconnectedness and interdependence among governments and peoples are causing at least some states sometimes to seek more effective management of transnational problems at the expense of state separateness. The belief that democratic states have a long-run interest in multilateralism was christened "good international citizenship" by Gareth Evans, Australia's foreign minister in the early 1990s.[23] A similarly broad vision often underpins Canada's human security agenda.[23] No single national government, for example, is able unilaterally to solve the problem of the thinning ozone layer. In regard to this issue, states can secure their long-term interests in a healthy environment only through multilateral action. Such situations can lead to the adoption of shared norms, such as the Montreal Protocol, or to concrete action by an international organization such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The result can create important legal and organizational restrictions on states.

States remain sovereign as an abstract principle, at least in the eyes of those who rule. But the operational application of sovereignty is another matter. Perceptions of *raisons d'état* cause state actors sometimes to subordinate state authority and independence to multilateral norms and procedures, especially when it is in the perceived national interest to do so.[24] In order to manage problems, state officials may increasingly agree to important principles, rules, and decision-making procedures featuring a cluster of different actors.

The notion of an international regime has come into vogue as a way of describing this reality. An international regime is a set of principles, rules, and procedures for "governing," or managing, an issue. The norms (principles and rules) can be legal, diplomatic, informal, or even tacit. The procedures frequently include nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) as well as states. World politics is frequently characterized by a network of dif-

ferent actors, all focusing on the same problem. Not infrequently, several parts of the UN system are involved in this network approach to problem solving.

It is worthwhile to take the example of forced migration, and the international refugee regime more specifically. The norms of managing refugee problems derive both from international law and from UN General Assembly resolutions as well as from daily practice. The various actors involved in trying to apply these norms in concrete situations are states, NGOs such as the American Refugee Committee, and different parts of the UN system such as the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). States have determined that it is in their interest to coordinate policies to manage refugee problems, and they have constructed norms and organizations to pursue this goal. At the same time, the most numerous victims displaced by wars are internally displaced persons (IDPs), who in 2005 outnumbered refugees by 2.5:1 but for whom states have not yet agreed to a convention or established a dedicated UN agency. This is partly because IDPs remain inside states, thus presenting clear challenges to state authority and control when outside actors seek to help them.

This application of *raisons d'état* may stem from moral or practical concerns—or most likely from some combination of the two. In the case of Cuban refugees, for instance, U.S. officials may want the UN to help because they are human beings victimized by communism, and because the United States wants to keep Fidel Castro from dumping mental patients and other undesirables on U.S. shores. Both viewpoints lead to use of the UNHCR to screen and interview Cuban immigrants to determine if individuals have either a well-founded fear of persecution or mental health problems and a criminal background.

Many states appear to be "learning" a new concept of *raisons d'état*—one that is conducive to an expansion in the authority, resources, and tasks of the United Nations. Given the impact of communications and other technologies, states may be in the process of learning that their own interests would be better served by greater international cooperation. Many state leaders learned from World War I that there was a need for the League of Nations to institute a cooling-off period so that states would not rush blindly into hugely destructive wars. State actors learned from World War II that a stronger world organization was needed, one with a security council that had the authority to make binding decisions to oppose calculated aggression and cope with other threats to the peace. Some state leaders subsequently *learned* and promoted the notion that peacekeeping was needed to respond to security crises during the Cold War so that armed disputes could be managed without triggering another world war. Similarly, even the most powerful states have learned that even they cannot "go it alone" in securing their broad security interests.

States progressively adjusted their policies on security affairs, based on perceptions of interests, in ways that increased the importance of international organizations. The process was not a zero-sum game in which the state lost and the United Nations won. Rather, states won in the sense of achievi...

against armed attacks on them, and the UN won in the sense of being given more authority and tasks than the League of Nations once had.

For about a century leading up to 1919, traditional international law considered resorting to war to be within the sovereign competence of states.[25] If state officials perceived that their interests justified force, it was used. But increasingly state authorities, not ivory-tower academics or pacifists, have agreed that changing patterns of warfare require international attempts to avoid or constrain force. Interest in peace and security has been combined with an interest in state authority, power, and independence. The result is international norms and organizations that continue to depend on state authority and power even as those norms and organizations try to restrain illegal uses or threats of force.

State actors originally thought that their best interests were served by absolute sovereignty and complete freedom in the choice of policy. Many if not most learned that this was a dangerous and frequently destructive situation. From the viewpoint of their own interests, limiting the recourse to and the process of force was highly desirable. That led to the part of international law called *jus ad bellum* (law regulating recourse to war) and also *jus in bello* (law regulating the process of war). International laws and organizations were developed to contribute to state welfare even as they limited state freedom.[26]

Central questions now are: How far are state actors willing to go in this process of international cooperation? How far can they be nudged by IGOs, NGOs, and public opinion? Are state actors willing to do more than create modern versions of the League of Nations—international organizations without the authority and resources to play decisive roles in world politics? Are they willing to cede significant authority and resources, as in the European Union, so that international organizations can act somewhat apart from state control in ways that really make a difference across borders? Can the UN be more than a debating society and a set of passive procedures?

THE UNITED NATIONS:
ACTOR OR INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK?

Many journalists and not a few other observers use phrases like "the UN failed" (to stop ethnic cleansing in the Balkans) or "the UN was successful" (in checking Iraqi aggression against Kuwait). This phraseology obscures a complex reality. The UN is most fundamentally an intergovernmental organization in which key decisions are made by governments representing states. The UN Charter may say initially, "We the peoples," but the members of the UN are states. This is what we call the "first UN."

However, the UN is also a broad and complex system of policymaking and administration in which some decisions are made by individuals who are not instructed by states. The Secretary-General and the international civil service constitute the "second UN." On occasion, NGOs, NGOs and independent experts and

commissions are active and sometimes influential in their interactions with the intergovernmental system; and they could even be considered a "third UN."[27]

Indeed, an increasing number of observers such as Kersten Martens find this area a fruitful research agenda, and both scholars and practitioners are increasingly preoccupied with nonstate involvement in world politics.[28] It is no longer disputed that NGOs play a prominent role on the world stage and that we are unable to fully understand contemporary international relations without looking at these nonstate actors. What is insufficiently known is that their rate of growth has surpassed intergovernmental organizations. In 2004, international NGOs had grown to 6,600 while IGOs had shrunk to 238 (down from a peak of over 300 at the outset of the 1980s),[29] which means that over a quarter of a century "the ratio of NGOs to IGOs stood at 15:1, whereas today the relation is 28:1."[30]

When it is said that the Security Council decided to authorize force in Somalia or the Balkans, in reality representatives of fifteen states made the decision, acting as the Security Council according to the UN Charter. This first UN may have been influenced by reports from the UN Secretary-General and his staff, and this second UN in theory and often in practice is independent from state control and is responsible only to the Charter.[31] Nevertheless, state representatives decide. Moreover, to the extent that UN decisions involve force or economic resources, or considerable diplomatic pressure, these elements of UN action are, in effect, borrowed from member states. The same applies to the General Assembly and other official UN bodies made up of states. States make most of the important decisions taken in the name of the United Nations, however much they may be influenced, pressured, or educated by independent UN personnel or NGOs.

But authority—and influence flowing from it—may be delegated by intergovernmental bodies to independent UN personnel. And the Charter confers some independent authority on the Secretary-General, who may address the Security Council and makes an annual report on the UN's work to the General Assembly, focusing attention on certain problems and solutions. Moreover, certain UN organs are made up of independent persons, not state officials—for example, the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, now the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. UN agencies have independent secretariats. Within the broad system, UN personnel may come to exercise some influence as independent actors not controlled by states. Their authority is not supranational, but their influence may be significant. Hence, they cannot tell states how to act, but they may be able to induce states to behave in certain ways.

Another example could help illustrate how the second UN can take on a life of its own. Member states created the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, funded it, and authorized it to deliver humanitarian assistance. In the Balkans in the 1993 crisis and throughout the 1990s, Sadako Ogata, then the high commissioner, was able to direct great attention to the situation in Bosnia by ordering a suspension of that humanitarian assistance on her own accord ...

succeeded in altering priorities, at least temporarily. She compelled the UN Secretary-General, state officials, and other policymakers to address the problem of interference with humanitarian assistance.[32]

The United Nations is primarily an institutional framework through which member states may pursue or channel their foreign policies. The UN Charter is the closest thing that we have to a global constitution. When state actors comply

A view of the United Nations headquarters in Manhattan as seen from the southwest. The headquarters site covers approximately sixteen acres, from 42nd to 48th Streets between First Avenue and the East River. (UN Photo 165054/L)

with the Charter and use UN procedures, their policies acquire the legitimacy that stems from international law. They also acquire the legitimacy that stems from collective political approval. Normally, policies that are seen as legal and collectively approved are more likely than not to be successful. The weight of collective political approval may induce recalcitrant political authorities to accept a UN policy or program. It is better to have UN approval than otherwise. Indeed, the importance of the United Nations and other intergovernmental organizations is often missed in thinking too statically about the nature of international law. "To the extent international lawyers or others acknowledge that IOs [international organizations] have an impact on what is regarded as 'real' international law—usually defined narrowly to embrace only norms governing states in their relations," writes José Alvarez, "we continue to pour an increasingly rich normative output into old bottles labeled 'treaty,' 'custom,' (or much more rarely) 'general principles.'"[33]

The question of legitimacy in world politics is a complicated matter. In Iraq in 2003, as in Kosovo in 1999, or for that matter in Grenada in 1982, the United States used military force in another state without Security Council approval. It sought to create legitimacy for its action by obtaining collective support. Regarding Kosovo, for example, legitimacy was enhanced because the nineteen liberal democracies, representing all of NATO's member states at the time, responded to gross violations of human rights by unanimously approving the use of force. Legitimacy in the first use of force is a subjective matter. What may not be fully legal in international law may still be legitimate in moral or political terms, which in fact was the characterization by an independent group of human rights experts who studied the case.[34] Hence, the safest ground on which to rest military action is prior approval by the Security Council, but in exceptional circumstances ignoring UN Charter Article 42—hence, acting "illegally" according to the law of the UN constitution—may be justified.

In the pages that follow we speak mostly of decisions at the United Nations. We write of politics at or through the UN. We are careful to distinguish the first UN, as framework, from the second UN, as actor. Most of the time the former rather than the latter situation obtains. Nevertheless, at times "the UN" is phraseology that refers to important behavior by independent persons representing the world organization. For example, in El Salvador in the early 1990s, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and his representatives, especially his personal representative, Alvaro de Soto, played crucial roles in ameliorating the civil war. In places like El Salvador, the world organization's staff members have greatly affected decisions in the field and at headquarters concerning UN peacekeeping, mediation, and observation. While state foreign policy was important in El Salvador, both within the UN framework (for instance, via U.S. votes in the Security Council in favor of human rights and peace) and outside the UN system (for instance, U.S. unilateral commitments regarding foreign assistance), national reconciliation in El Salvador

outside the UN, by state-controlled decisions within the UN, and by the independent actions of UN personnel. Moreover, the role of nongovernmental actors in El Salvador should not be minimized, including the decisions by the armed opposition (the Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, or the FMLN), by local NGOs (churches and people's groups), and by external human rights and aid agencies. This tapestry of decision-making both circumscribes and energizes the United Nations, a theme that permeates this book.

One of the more interesting questions in the new millennium is whether the growing demand for UN management of transnational problems will lead to greater or reduced willingness by member states to confer authority on the world organization's personnel and to transfer the resources necessary to resolve problems effectively. The options and processes are complex. In Somalia in mid-1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali publicly pressured states to demonstrate the same concern for suffering there as they were showing for the "white-man's war" in the Balkans. Key states responded by using the Security Council to authorize all necessary means (including force) for the creation of a secure environment for the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Somalia. That use of force was effectively controlled first by the United States—which was more or less deputized by the Security Council. But that use of force in Somalia progressively became a more international force. Then, it was transformed into the first enforcement action truly controlled by UN personnel. To understand accurately "the UN" in Somalia, it is necessary over time to distinguish independent UN personnel, decisions made by states in the name of the UN, and decisions made by states outside the UN.

Moreover, state decisions outside the United Nations affect what "the UN" is allowed to do, or how UN procedures and symbols are employed. President George H. W. Bush's decision in late 1992 to commit U.S. ground troops in Somalia was the key to what followed. Only when that decision had been made in the White House could the Security Council proceed to authorize force and then actually facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance. However much the U.S. president may have been influenced by the Secretary-General or by reports from the communications media, it was a state decision outside the UN that constituted, for a given time span, the independent variable explaining what happened. In this sense the UN became the dependent variable—that is, the factor that came into play once President Bush decided to move forward.

In terms of a fundamental generalization, political factors outside the UN are primary and factors inside the UN are secondary. The end of the Cold War, indeed the end of the Soviet Union, primarily explained the renaissance of UN security activities that began in the late 1980s. The Security Council did not end the Cold War. Rather, the end of the Cold War allowed the Security Council to act with renewed consensus, commitment, and vigor.

Once allowed to act, UN personnel and organs may independently influence states and other actors. What was once a secondary factor, dependent on state

approval, may come to be a primary factor in the ongoing process to make and implement policies. Once member states decided to create an environmental program, UNEP came to exert some relatively independent influence—both in cleaning up the Mediterranean Sea and in coordinating scientific evidence about the need to protect the ozone layer.

State decisions about power and policy constitute the primary force driving events at the UN. When important states show a convergence in policy, "the UN" may be allowed to act. Without that political agreement, all parts of the UN system will be severely restricted in what they can accomplish. This was the case in 1945, and the end of the Cold War has not altered this in any fundamental way.

UN POLITICS

In the exercise of power needed to make and implement policies through the United Nations, states naturally seek allies. Academic and diplomatic observers have been prone to adopt generalizations about different political alliances, coalitions, or blocs within the United Nations. The countries of the West—that is, the Western industrialized democracies that are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), sometimes joined by Israel—frequently have been grouped as the First World. The "developing countries," basically all of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, have been examined under the rubric of the Third World, the South, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), or the Group of 77 (or G-77, for the original constellation of seventy-seven states, which has now grown to some 130 members). The "socialist countries," when the Soviet Union and its bloc existed, were also called the East and the Second World. The West and the East, in a curious bit of mathematical geography, were added together to constitute the North, or the developed countries, in juxtaposition to the South, or the developing countries.

Although these distinctions roughly correspond to the bulk of voting patterns during the Cold War, they have become less useful over time. Not only has the bloc of European socialist states and the Soviet Union ceased to exist, but also some of this terminology was in fact never accurate: Cuba was hardly non-aligned, and the socialist countries were not nearly as economically developed as the West, with some at levels comparable to the Third World.

The end of the Cold War has allowed scholars, and especially diplomats, to begin to look more objectively at various kinds of coalitions within the United Nations, although many of the labels from the former era remain. For example, it is now quite common to point out that developing countries consist of a series of cross-cutting alignments reflecting the heterogeneous character of their economies and ideologies.[35] In the past, it was politically more correct to speak of the Third World as if it were homogeneous, with little hesitation in group...

Only on a few issues—like emphasizing the importance of the General Assembly, where each state has one vote—do developing countries show common interests. In such instances, and in some other international forums, the North-South divide continues to be salient. Frequently developing countries subdivide according to the issue before the UN: between radicals and moderates, between Islamic and non-Islamic, between those in the region and outside, between maritime and landlocked, between those achieving significant economic growth and otherwise. Even within the Western group, there have always been numerous differences, which have come more to the fore with the abrupt disappearance of East-West tensions. Divisions among and within all groups over the pursuit of war against Iraq in 2003 were a clear example of this phenomenon.

Given the changing nature of world politics and ongoing learning processes that can shape views toward state sovereignty and *raisons d'état*, new alignments and coalitions should be anticipated. Indeed, as world politics changes, so does the United Nations. In 1991 the General Assembly, whose majority of developing countries normally reflects concern for traditional notions of state sovereignty, voted by consensus to condemn the military coup in (briefly) democratic Haiti. Subsequently, many of these same countries supported the imposition of economic sanctions—first at the regional level through the Organization of American States and afterward through the UN—and eventually military enforcement action authorized by the Security Council to restore the elected government. The nature of government as democratic or authoritarian, a subject that had mostly been considered a domestic affair protected by the principle of state sovereignty, came to be seen by all states as a legitimate subject for diplomatic action through the UN.

In the following pages we inquire more systematically into changing world politics, and what it portends for the United Nations as the world organization gropes with the twenty-first century's most pressing challenges of insecurity, abuses of human rights, and lack of sustainable human development. These three issues encompass the central challenges to improving the human condition and hence the central tests for international organization.

Part One of this book introduces the evolving efforts of the United Nations to combat threats to international peace and security. Because it is impossible to understand the nature of international cooperation without a grasp of the Charter's provisions for pacific settlement of disputes, enforcement, and regional arrangements, we first cover the theory of collective security in Chapter 1. Chapter 2 deals with UN security efforts during the Cold War and then turns to economic sanctions and the creation of the peacekeeping function. Although not mentioned in the Charter, peacekeeping is a distinctive contribution of the UN and has been its main activity in the security field for some forty years. In Chapter 3, "UN Security Operations After the Cold War," we explain the renaissance in UN activities, including peacekeeping, enforcement, and a series of other actions in such troubled regions as Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, Somalia,

Rwanda, and Haiti. Chapter 4, "The Challenges of the Twenty-First Century," contains a discussion of the political dynamics at work and suggestions about changes in the UN to make it better able to address security challenges in the twenty-first century, including terrorism.

Part Two introduces UN efforts to protect human rights and humanitarian values in conflicts. Chapter 5 briefly traces the origins of international action on human rights, indicating what the UN contributed to principles on human rights. Chapter 6 focuses on UN activity to help implement the human rights principles that member states have formally accepted or that constitute emerging norms, including the responsibility to protect. Finally, there is a balance sheet in Chapter 7 on UN developments in the field of human rights, exploring some of the dynamics that drive events and what they portend for the future.

Part Three introduces efforts by the United Nations to build sustainable human development. Chapter 8 examines the evolution of international attempts to build a humane capitalist world order and explores the progression of various theoretical frameworks for promoting development. Chapter 9 focuses on UN institutions and activity to build sustainable human security and presents some information about how the UN is structured for economic and environmental policymaking. In Chapter 10, we explore the role of the United Nations in promoting development and human security in the context of the forces and tensions of globalization. Our concluding chapter is about "Learning from Change."

NOTES

1. On Wilson not being a Wilsonian, see the various works of the Wilson scholar Lloyd Ambrosius, for example, his *Wilsonianism: Woodrow Wilson and His Legacy in American Foreign Relations* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002). In Ambrosius's view, Wilson saw the League as a global Monroe Doctrine, as American hegemony writ large, but without the need for disagreeable daily involvement. Ambrosius stresses the contradictions in Wilsonian thought.

2. Doris Kearns Goodwin, *No Ordinary Time: Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1994); and Cass R. Sunstein, *The Second Bill of Rights: FDR's Unfinished Revolution and Why We Need It More Than Ever* (New York: Basic Books, 2004).

3. Quoted in Robert Gregg, *About Face? The United States and the United Nations* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 68.

4. For an overview, see David M. Malone, ed., *The UN Security Council: From Cold War to the 21st Century* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004).

5. Jarat Chopra, *Peace-Maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority* (London: Routledge, 1999).

6. *National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, September 2002, available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/secstrat/htm, March 1, 2004.

7. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "U.S. Power and Strategy After Iraq," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 82, no. 4 (2003): 60–73.

8. Clyde Prestowitz, *Rogue Nation: American Unilateralism and the Failure of Good Intentions* (New York: Basic Books, 2003).

9. G. John Ikenberry, "Illusions of Empire: Defining the New American Order," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 83, no. 2 (2004): 154.

10. United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1996* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1.

11. UNDP, *Human Development Report 2002* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 10–11.

12. See also Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, ed., *State Sovereignty as Social Construct* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

13. In the history of international relations, and despite the notion of the sovereign equality of states, all sorts of unequal relations have existed and have even been formally approved sometimes. In this sense the unequal relations in the UN, such as the five permanent members of the Security Council possessing the veto, follow many examples of inequality—despite the centrality of sovereignty. See the chapter by Jack Donnelly in David P. Forsythe, Patrice C. McMahon, and Andy Wedeman, eds., *American Foreign Policy in a Globalized World* (New York: Routledge, 2006).

14. A more recent treatment of Hedley Bull's argument is Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

15. Edward Luck, *Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919–1999* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999).

16. Richard N. Haass, *The Opportunity: America's Moment to Alter History's Course* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005), 41.

17. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001). See also J. L. Holzgrefe and Robert O. Keohane, eds., *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

18. For a discussion, see Thomas G. Weiss, *Military-Civilian Interactions: Humanitarian Crises and the Responsibility to Protect*, 2nd edition (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

19. In later pages we will show the extent of independent policymaking by UN officials with regard to places like the Balkans and Somalia.

20. For collections of essays on these topics, see Rorden Wilkinson and Steve Hughes, eds., *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 2002); and Gary P. Sampson, ed., *The Role of the World Trade Organization in Global Governance* (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2001).

21. Lawrence S. Finkelstein, ed., *Politics in the United Nations System* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), 30.

22. See Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, "Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy," *International Affairs* 74, no. 4 (1998): 847–870.

23. Lloyd Axworthy, "Human Security and Global Governance," *Global Governance* 7, no. 1 (2001): 19–23. See further Edward Newman and Oliver P. Richmond, ed., *The United Nations and Human Security* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); and Rob McRae and Don Hubert, eds., *Human Security and the New Diplomacy: Protecting People, Promoting Peace* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001).

24. On the subject of whether UN and other officials for international organizations can get states to change their perceptions of national interest, see especially Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, *Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004).

25. For an insightful and readable overview, see Stephen C. Neff, *War and the Law of Nations: A General History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

26. See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, eds., *Documents on the Laws of War*, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

27. For a discussion, see Thomas G. Weiss, Tatiana Carayannis, Louis Emmerij, and Richard Jolly, *UN Voices: The Struggle for Development and Social Justice* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005), chapters 9–11.

28. Kerstin Martens, *NGOs and the United Nations: Institutionalization, Professionalization and Adaptation* (Houndmills, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 2.

29. Union of International Associations, *Yearbook of International Organizations*, vol. 40 (Brussels: UIA, 2004).

30. Martens, *NGOs and the United Nations*, 2.

31. During the early and middle part of the Cold War, members of the UN Secretariat from the USSR, and perhaps its allies, were widely seen as taking orders from, and reporting back to, Moscow. Since the end of the Cold War, the independence of the UN Secretariat has generally increased.

32. Sadako Ogata, *The Turbulent Decade: Confronting the Refugee Crises of the 1990s* (New York: Norton, 2005), chapter 2. While she was able to get states to momentarily direct their attention to the barriers to effective relief in the Balkans, she was unable to get states to deal more systematically and decisively with the obstructions thrown up by local fighting parties.

33. José E. Alvarez, *International Organizations as Law-makers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), x. See also J. Martin Rochester, *Between Peril and Promise: The Politics of International Law* (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006).

34. Independent International Commission on Kosovo, *Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, Lessons Learned* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

35. See Yeon Kim and Bruce Russett, "The New Politics of Voting Alignments in the United Nations General Assembly," *International Organization* 50, no. 4 (1996): 629–652. See also Evan Luard, *A History of the United Nations: The Years of Western Domination* (London: Macmillan, 1982).