56. See Fen Hampson and Charles Peddy, "The United Nations and Human Security," in *Oxford Handbook on the United Nations*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2007).

57. Ken Conca, "Greening the UN: Environmental Organizations and the UN System," in *NGOs, the UN, and Global Governance*, ed. Thomas G. Weiss and Leon Gordenker (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 114–115.

58. UNDP, *Human Development 1993*, 2.

59. See S. Neil MacFarlane and Yuen Foong-Khong, *A Critical History of Human Security* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); and Roland Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of International Liberalism," *International Security* 22 (Fall 1997): 54–89.

60. UNDP, *Human Development 1993*, 2.

CHAPTER 10

The UN, Development, and Globalization

GLOBALIZATION, OF COURSE, is not new a phenomenon. Yet the forces and processes associated with it, as well as opportunities and challenges, are ever more apparent in a post–September 11 world. While globalization yields many benefits, especially to those in wealthier countries, it has brought with it a scale of inequality unprecedented in human history. Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected on this problem in his report *"We the Peoples": The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century*, in which he wrote: "The benefits of globalization are plain to see: faster economic growth, higher living standards, accelerated innovation and diffusion of technology and management skills, new economic opportunities for individuals and countries alike." Yet these benefits are distributed very unequally and inequitably. They are "highly concentrated among a relatively small number of countries and are spread unevenly within them."[1]

The impact of globalization varies dramatically from region to region and case to case. As underscored in an earlier report by Annan, the "actual experience of globalization, to a great degree, varied with the level of development at which a country experienced it."[2] In some cases, where national economies were well positioned in terms of capacity and economic orientation, rapid economic growth has ensued. Elsewhere the result has been much less positive, contributing to increased poverty, inequality, marginalization, and human insecurity. In some places globalization may actually undermine many of the development efforts by UN agencies.

The Millennium Declaration identified challenges related to globalization as the key issue confronting the international community of states. UN member states accordingly pledged to act "to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people."[3] At the same time, philosopher and critic Thomas Pogge tells us that they were trying to weasel out of what they had agreed on. He has shown that over time rich states have moved to reduce, not substantially increase, their financial commitments in this regard. This is despite the fact that just a small degree of redistribution could lead to achievement of the MDGs.[4]

But what is globalization? What is the relationship between globalization processes and global governance? How should we assess the UN system's responses to it? How does globalization affect the MDGs and the recurring tension between states and market-driven efforts to promote sustainable human development and security? Answers to these questions are at the center of this chapter.

GLOBALIZATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

A cottage industry has developed for books on "globalization" and "global governance."[5] Supporters extol the virtues of globalization while critics traverse the planet in protest against it. On one hand, the concept is a useful tool for understanding contemporary world affairs. On the other hand, globalization has no widely accepted definition. At its core globalization refers to the movement of goods, services, ideas, and people across national borders. In this sense it is related to internationalization, interconnectedness, interdependence.[6] At the turn of the twentieth century, global transactions in foreign exchange markets had reached a level nearly eighty times larger than world trade. The growth in foreign direct investment and portfolio capital flows in developing countries has also outpaced international trade. The expansion of global markets and production and other aspects of the worldwide diffusion of capitalism, however, is only one dimension of the social transformations involved in globalization.

Ngaire Woods suggests that three core elements of globalization exist: the expansion of markets, challenges to the state and institutions, and the rise of new social and political movements.[7] While the economic core entails the proliferation of production, trade, and financial activity spurred by technological change and governmental deregulation, the second core element focuses on the emergence of a new form of global politics enabled and necessitated by the first. Also, Woods argues that society and culture themselves are being transformed, which brings reactions, resistance, and even rebellions.

Jan Aart Scholte, an observer of global social transformation, identifies production, governance, and culture as main areas underlying the globalization debates. To these, he adds a fourth: modernity and postmodernity. He adds at least five broad definitions of the globalization concept.[8] First, globalization is often treated as being synonymous with internationalization—the spread of cross-border relations and activities—and growing interdependence. Second, the concept is frequently used to imply the opening up or liberalization of intersocietal relations. In this context, the removal of governmental restrictions on trade and other social exchanges is seen to be yielding a more borderless world. Writers from this orientation often talk of the decline of the state and the rise to predominance of civil society and the private corporate world. As portrayed in Table 10.1, they point to the differential in sheer size

TABLE 10.1 Economic Comparison of National Governmental Expenditures and Selected Corporate Earnings

Rank	Company /Country	Revenues ($ millions)/ Budget Expenditures
1	United States	1,703,000.0
2	Germany	825,000.0
3	Japan	718,000.0
4	United Kingdom	540,000.0
5	Italy	517,000.0
6	France	240,000.0
7	Wal-Mart Stores	219,812.0
8	China	191,800.0
9	Exxon Mobil	191,581.0
10	General Motors	177,260.0
11	BP	174,218.0
12	Ford Motor	162,412.0
13	Canada	161,400.0
14	Mexico	140,000.0
15	Enron	138,718.0
16	Daimler Chrysler	136,897.3
17	Royal Dutch/Shell Group	135,211.0
18	Netherlands	134,000.0
19	General Electric	125,913.0
20	Toyota Motor	120,814.4
21	Citigroup	112,022.0
22	Sweden	110,000.0
23	Spain	109,000.0
24	Belgium	106,000.0
25	Mitsubishi	105,813.9
26	Mitsui	101,205.6
27	ChevronTexaco	99,699.0
28	Korea, South	95,700.0
29	Total Fina Elf	94,311.9
30	Nippon Telegraph & Telephone	93,424.8
31	Brazil	91,600.0
32	Itochu	91,176.6
33	Allianz	85,929.2
34	Intl. Business Machines	85,866.0
35	Australia	84,100.0
36	ING Group	82,999.1
37	Volkswagen	79,287.3
38	India	78,200.0
39	Siemens	77,358.9
40	Sumitomo	77,140.1
41	Altria Group	72,944.0
42	Marubeni	71,756.6
43	Turkey	69,100.0
44	Verizon Communications	67,190.0
45	Deutsche Bank	66,839.9
46	E. ON	66,453.0
47	U.S. Postal Service	65,834.0
48	AXA	65,579.9
49	Credit Suisse	64,204.5

TABLE 10.1 (*continued*)

Rank	*Company /Country*	*Revenues ($ millions)/ Budget Expenditures*
50	Hitachi	63,931.2
51	Nippon Life Insurance	63,827.2
52	American Intl. Group	62,402.0
53	Carrefour	62,224.6
54	American Electric Power	61,257.0
55	Sony	60,608.0
56	Royal Ahold	59,633.9
57	Duke Energy	59,503.0
58	AT&T	59,142.0
59	Honda Motor	58,882.0
60	Boeing	58,198.0
61	Norway	57,600.0
62	El Paso	57,475.0
63	BNP Paribas	55,044.4
64	Matsushita Electric Industrial	54,997.1
65	Austria	54,000.0
66	Saudi Arabia	54,000.0
67	Home Depot	53,553.0
68	Bank of America Corp.	52,641.0
69	Aviva	52,317.6
70	Poland	52,300.0
71	Fiat	51,944.2
72	Assicurazioni Generali	51,394.3
73	Vivendi Universal	51,365.7
74	Denmark	51,300.0
75	Fannie Mae	50,803.0
76	Rwe	50,663.8
77	J. P. Morgan Chase	50,429.0
78	Nestlé	50,192.4
79	Kroger	50,098.0
80	McKesson	50,006.0
81	Nissan Motor	49,555.2
82	UBS	48,503.4
83	State Power	48,374.5
84	Argentina	48,000.0
85	Portugal	48,000.0
86	Cardinal Health	47,947.6
87	Merck	47,715.7
88	Greece	47,600.0
89	State Farm Insurance	46,705.2
90	HSBC Holding PLC	46,424.0
91	Peugeot	46,264.1
92	PDVSA	46,250.0
93	CenterPoint Energy	46,225.8
94	Unilever	46,130.6
95	SBC Communications	45,908.0
96	Hewlett-Packard	45,226.0
97	ENI	44,636.9
98	Metro	44,346.8
99	Morgan Stanley	43,727.0
100	Nisho Iwai	43,703.0

and hence the inferred influence and power of most national governments that are dwarfed by private firms.

The third view holds that globalization is profoundly changing the face of world politics and the nature of human social interaction and existence. The nature, structure, geographical pattern, and magnitude of world trade and investment, for example, are in transformation, and these changes have had an especially hard impact on poor developing countries in terms of growth, poverty, and income inequality. Economic liberalization has fostered the diffusion of multinational production networks, capital mobility, and new technologies, which has tended in many cases to place downward pressures on wages and working conditions and otherwise make labor in developing societies increasingly susceptible to global forces. The development of financial markets and institutions, along with the tremendous growth in foreign direct investment, short-term portfolio investment, and other transnational capital flows in developing regions, has dramatically transformed the political economic climate there.[9]

The fourth take on globalization concentrates on the worldwide syntheses of values and cultures. This view is not neutral, as it equates globalization with the Westernization or even Americanization of the world's cultures. "Following this idea globalization is a dynamic whereby the social structures of modernity (capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, bureaucratism, etc.) are spread the world over, normally destroying preexisting cultures and local self-determination in the process."[10] Scholte refers to these conceptualizations as "redundant."

The fifth conceptualization is the idea that globalization focuses on the reconfiguration of social space beyond traditional conceptions of territorial boundaries. Like David Held and collaborators, Scholte structures his interpretations and understandings of processes of globalization on the basis of this fifth conceptualization.[11] We too concentrate here on those processes that reconfigure and transform the organization of social relations and transactions in social space and in the minds of social actors.

This reconfiguration finds current concepts and conventional language insufficient to portray their intended meanings, resulting in a stultifying vocabulary. Words like "globality," "deterritorialization," "supraterritorial relations,"[12] "unbundled territoriality,"[13] and "hyper-globalism"[14] are offered as central organizing concepts. Turgid language or not, the intent is to portray a set or sets of social processes that are transforming both the world and how human beings think about it and behave within it. As stressed by Manuel Castells, Ankie Hoogvelt, and others, at the core of this transformation is the ascendancy of "real time virtual reality" over physical time and space.[15] They argue that the distinguishing characteristic of contemporary globalization is not to be found in the widening—that is the global geographic spread—of human social relations of production, consumption, and so on, but rather in the deepening and intensification of "capitalist integration" and global consciousness. Some talk of global villages, others about the emergence of global civil society, and still others about a global informational network society.[16]

This kind of theorizing provides a context within which to frame and understand issues and challenges of global governance and assess the work of international institutions in fulfilling their mandates in promoting human security and sustainable human development. Perhaps more than any other analyst, James Mittelman provides concrete insight in this regard. In his discussion of "captors" and "captives" of globalization, he considers the dialectic of inclusion and exclusion that results from the complex forces and tensions at play.[17] He suggests that to create adequate governance responses, three very "vexing" aspects must be dealt with: control, autonomy, and agency. In other words, we need to understand not only globalization processes themselves but also how different communities respond to them and benefit or suffer deprivations from them. Globalization is a contested process in which there is no predetermined outcome. At the same time, however, control and power structures are very uneven, and that fact greatly influences outcomes. Participants' needs, values, and interests all play critical roles.

As Kofi Annan indicated in the report cited above, a central challenge facing the UN is to find ways to use the opportunities inherent in globalization to help people everywhere better cope with its undesirable side effects. He listed opportunities related to increased access to new-age information and communications technology, greater public exposure to and awareness of their interdependence and vulnerabilities, and "real-time" social exchanges. The strategy for implementing the MDGs illustrates both the opportunities and the challenges presented by globalization for achieving sustainable human development and security.

THE MDG STRATEGY

As discussed in Chapter 9, international gatherings beginning in the 1990s have resulted in a largely consensual strategy for assessing progress toward dealing with the negative impacts of globalization and eradicating poverty. These gatherings also reflected the tension between states that favored a more authoritative and regulative approach to promoting development and those that sought to harness market forces to this end. The consensual strategy is organized around eight main development goals, the MDGs, and eighteen related targets. Each target has a specific time frame and aim and one or more indicators to be monitored to assess movement toward achievement. These Millennium Development Goals are spelled out in Table 10.2.

Seven of the eight main goals focus on substantive objectives. The eighth MDG deals with creating the capacity to achieve the other seven. Cumulatively, the MDGs can be seen as both mutually reinforcing and intertwined. Eradicating extreme poverty, for example, would most likely drastically reduce infant mortality, improve maternal health, and better ensure environmental sustainability. Similarly, achieving universal primary education, promoting gender

TABLE 10.2 Millennium Development Goals and Targets

Goal 1:	*Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger*
Target 1	Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day
Target 2	Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger
Goal 2:	*Achieve universal primary education*
Target 3	Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling
Goal 3:	*Promote gender equality and empower women*
Target 4	Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005, and to all levels of education no later than 2015
Goal 4:	*Reduce child mortality*
Target 5	Reduce by two-thirds, between 1990 and 2015, the under-five mortality rate
Goal 5:	*Improve maternal health*
Target 6	Reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio
Goal 6:	*Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases*
Target 7	Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS
Target 8	Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases
Goal 7:	*Ensure environmental sustainability*
Target 9	Integrate the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programs and reverse the loss of environmental resources
Target 10	Halve, by 2015, the proportion of people without sustainable access to safe drinking water
Target 11	By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers
Goal 8:	*Develop a global partnership for development*
Target 12	Develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system [Includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction—both nationally and internationally]
Target 13	Address the Special Needs of the Least Developed Countries [Includes: tariff and quota free access for LDC exports; enhanced program of debt relief for HIPC and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA for countries committed to poverty reduction]
Target 14	Address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing states (through the Program of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States and the outcome of the 22nd special session of the General Assembly)
Target 15	Deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in the long term
Target 16	In cooperation with developing countries, develop and implement strategies for decent and productive work for youth
Target 17	In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies, provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries
Target 18	In cooperation with the private sector, make available the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications

Source: http://www.milleniumproject.org/html/dev_goals.shtm.

equality, empowering women, and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases would undoubtedly move forward progress toward eradicating poverty.

A UN system-wide strategy has been designed for mobilizing support and monitoring progress toward achieving the MDGs. The strategy has four main components: Millennium Project, Millennium Campaign, Millennium Reports, and country-level monitoring and operational country-level activities. The Millennium Project seeks to mobilize scholars from around the world and focus their collective wisdom and research efforts on achieving the MDGs. The purpose of this initiative was to help member states and agencies develop implementation strategies for accomplishing the MDGs. It endeavors to identify priorities, implementation strategies, and financing means. The project was directed by Columbia University's Jeffrey Sachs, who served as special adviser to the Secretary-General. Ten expert task forces were set up to carry out the needed research and report their findings to the Secretary-General and the UNDP administrator. Each task force focused on a specific set of MDG targets. Part of the process was the *Human Development Report 2003* that focused on the MDGs.[18] Also, the campaign seeks to promote and reinforce cooperation among UN agencies, the IMF/World Bank, and the WTO.

The final summary report by Sachs's team, *Investing in Development*, was published in March 2005 as background for the World Summit and noted that the development aid system is still not MDG-based and lacks a coherent approach to poverty. The ten accompanying reports provided statistical backup in some depth for the argument. While some low-level coordination has taken place, the IMF, the World Bank, and the regional development banks are still not well linked to UN agencies for local projects.[19]

Two advisory groups have been established to assist in implementing the project. The first is the UN Experts Group, consisting of senior representatives from UN agencies to ensure that the ten task forces have access to and fully utilize the relevant knowledge, experience, and capacities of the UN system. The second is an International Advisory Panel of experts in the respective areas of concern. The Millennium Campaign was designed to mobilize support for the MDGs. This entailed coaching member states to comply with the commitments already made and convincing them that greater consistency across trade, finance, education, health, development, and other ministries is crucial to MDG success. At least one positive outcome of the campaign at the 2005 World Summit was to garner U.S. support for MDGs.

Millennium Reports (MDGRs) constitute the third pillar of the strategy. The reports are in essence individual country report cards. Country-level monitoring entails collecting and analyzing data on progress toward achieving individual MDGs. UN country teams assist countries in designing and implementing policies necessary for successful progress. As of December 2005, eighty-five countries had completed MDGRs. In 2005, only about three dozen countries were on track for meeting the 2015 MDGs.[20]



A "booby trap" mine. Returning Kosovars in 1999 had to live in fear of being injured or killed by land mines as they worked in the fields and collected firewood for winter. (Photo/R. Chalasni)

The UN's Non-governmental Liaison Service said, "The Millennium Development Goals, over a relatively short period of time, have gained tremendous currency, primarily in development circles but increasingly in related trade and finance circles. Many actors are now counting on the goals . . . to galvanize disparate and sometimes competing development agendas and are imagining how they might become a powerful political tool to hold governments and international institutions accountable."[21] The MDGs provide a unique framework for examining the work of the UN system in response to globalization.

IMPLEMENTING THE MDGS

In proclaiming 1996 to be the International Year for the Eradication of Poverty—and for 1997–2006 to be the First United Nations Decade for the same—the General Assembly acknowledged that "poverty is a complex and multi-dimensional problem with origins in both the national and international domains, and that its eradication in all countries, in particular in developing countries, has become one of the priority development objectives for the

1990s."[22] Member states at the 1995 World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen described the goal of eradicating poverty "as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind."[23] Poverty eradication lies at the core of the MDGs.

Poverty rates have declined in most regions since 1990, with the notable exceptions of Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. In Latin America and the Caribbean, there has been little change. China is distinctive in having made tremendous strides during the 1990s in reducing the number of extremely poor. This Chinese success correlates highly with its unprecedented economic growth during the same time period, which has accelerated in the twenty-first century. A number of other East Asian and Pacific countries made impressive gains too—cutting by half the number of extremely poor in the region as a whole.[24]

With China excluded, however, the absolute number of people in the developing world living on less than $1 a day has increased, not decreased, over this same period. South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa share the dubious distinction of being home to the absolute largest number of poor. The greatest concern is Sub-Saharan Africa, where HIV/AIDS, armed conflict, domestic unrest, malnutrition, and slow economic growth inhibit almost any meaningful progress. During the United Nations Decade for the Eradication of Poverty, the poverty rate rose, not fell, from 45 percent to 46 percent. In thirty-three countries in Africa, average per-capita GDP per day would not even buy a cup of coffee at the staff café at UN headquarters in New York.[25]

Hunger and malnutrition are highly correlated with poverty. In the mid-1990s at the World Food Summit in Rome, world leaders pledged their "political will and . . . common and national commitment to achieving food security for all and to an ongoing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of undernourished people to half their present level no later than 2015." The goal seemed achievable given the marked reduction in the number of chronically hungry people in the world in the preceding two-and-a-half decades. Indeed, over the last several decades, most regions of the world have experienced significant reductions in the proportion of underweight children. During the decade ending in 2002, the proportion of undernourished people declined from 20 percent to 17 percent. But then a sharp reversal occurred in the late 1990s, and by 2002 the number of hungry had risen sharply to 852 million (from 791 million five years earlier) with 815 million in developing countries and 28 million in countries in transition. It was in this context that the MDGs were articulated in 2000, and the target of halving, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people suffering from hunger was established. It should be noted that the first MDG target for hunger is actually less than the World Food Summit target.

Nonetheless, as of 2002 the MDG hunger target was being met in only 3 percent of the countries and only 46 percent were on track. Of the remaining 51 percent, about half (24 percent of the total) were lagging far behind. In most developing countries undernourishment has increased, with more than 30 percent of the population in more than 70 developing countries being undernourished.[26] In terms of rate of reduction, the situation has gotten worse recently, not better.

Sub-Saharan Africa is the region where the situation is worst, with chronic hunger and undernourishment coupled with persistent humanitarian crises. In 2006, for example, an estimated 11 million people were at risk in the Horn of Africa, especially in drought-stricken Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia. At the same time in East Africa food crises existed in war-torn Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda; and in West Africa, shortages threatened 10 million people despite an improved harvest.

Hunger and malnutrition are correlated with the other MDGs, and in this context a brief examination of UN efforts to implement the MDGs with regard to education, women, and transnational public health is insightful and demonstrates the UN's relevance to improving the lives of billions of people. These issue-areas help set the stage for the following discussion of a wider global partnership. These interrelated problems require creative and hopefully coordinated efforts to eradicate poverty and hunger. In articulating the MDGs, the eradication of extreme poverty and hunger was placed at the top of the list, and achieving universal primary education was placed second, as it represents a most instrumental means to achieve MDG 1.

Education

A major initiative was launched in Jomtien, Thailand, in 1990 at the UNESCO-sponsored "Conference on Education for All." During the decade of the 1990s, literacy rates of those aged fifteen to twenty-four increased in all regions of the developing world. Yet since 1990, many developing and least developed countries have suffered reversals or further declines toward the education-for-all goal. At the World Education Forum in Dakar in 2000, over 1,000 participants from every walk of life adopted a Framework for Action, which reiterated the international commitment to achieve education for all. Governments were called on to make quality education a priority item in their development planning and financing.[27] In the MDG process, the education target (MDG 2) is to ensure that by 2015 "children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary education."

The record to date, however, indicates lackluster results toward achieving MDG 2. Developing-country primary-school completion rates average 81 percent. Substantial progress has been made in many developing countries, and in several regions—Asian countries of the CIS, East Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North Africa—most countries are on track for achieving this goal. Also, there has been progress toward reducing gender disparities in many regions. Yet 121 million children are being left behind. A disproportionate number of these are in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Oceania, West Asia, and European

CIS countries. Sub-Saharan Africa comes in at the bottom of the list with completion rates hovering around 50 percent, followed by South Asia which stands at around 70 percent. Well over half of the children out of school are girls.[28]

On balance, we are far off target for meeting this—perhaps what should be the most achievable of all—MDG. Only 37 of more than 150 developing countries have achieved universal primary education, and only another 32 are likely to achieve the goal by 2015 at present trends. At least 86 countries are at risk of missing the 2015 mark, and 27 are seriously off track. In some countries, completion rates have actually fallen in recent years.[29]

As one might expect, the poorest elements of the population, those living in rural areas, ethnic minorities, the disabled, and children living in conflict or postconflict situations are disproportionately excluded. The education-income gap is greatest in South Asia, where in India, for example, there is a ten-year difference between the poorest (with a median completion rate of zero years) and the richest (ten-year median rate) segments. In Central and Western Africa, the median grade completion level for the poorest 40 percent of population is *zero*. Not surprisingly, poverty aggravates gender disparities and also dropout rates.

At the 2005 World Summit, the UN reaffirmed this commitment "that all children have access to and complete free and compulsory primary education of good quality, to eliminate gender inequality and imbalance and to renew efforts to improve girls' education."[30] Moreover, member states committed themselves to support national efforts to implement the Education for All initiatives. But lofty words have been heard before; time will tell whether words will translate to meaningful action.

Population growth plays a major role in facilitating or constraining a country's ability to move ahead. In certain regions, such as East Asia and the Pacific, where the school-age population is projected to decline by some 22 million in the next decade, providing universal education is not as daunting as in other developing regions. On the other hand, in Sub-Saharan Africa the primary-school-age population is projected to grow by over 34 million, adding yet additional stress to already overburdened educational infrastructures.[31] Accordingly, Sub-Saharan Africa lags well behind the other regions. A large part of that region is unlikely to come anywhere close to reaching the MDG education goal.

To spearhead the drive for universal literacy, the General Assembly has declared the decade 2003–2012 as "The UN Literacy Decade." This UN-systemwide effort, coordinated by UNESCO, focuses on extending literacy to all who are not currently literate—children and adults alike. Thus, the poorest and marginalized population segments are key targets for the campaign, which is being conducted under the banner of "Literacy for All: Voice for All, Learning for All." Creating sustainable local "literacy environments" is a primary objective of the initiative.[32]

The International Plan of Action for the Literacy Decade outlines six primary avenues of effort. First, policy change is required in most countries to provide a

framework for increased local participation in literacy programs. Second, literacy programs need to be flexible, use appropriate and culturally relevant materials, respect the needs of learners, and use appropriate languages. Third, due attention needs to be paid to capacity building and training literacy facilitators. Fourth, policies and policy actions need to be grounded in sound empirical research. Fifth, broad-based community participation is required to build a sense of community "ownership" over the literacy programs. Finally, effective indicators of progress are needed, as are enhanced systems for monitoring and evaluation.

Various UN agencies have been attempting to bolster the global effort to achieve MDG 2. For example, there is a UN system-wide initiative, the United Nations Girls' Education Initiative, to assist governments to eliminate gender disparities. The ILO has placed special focus on promoting free and universally accessible education. Member states are being called upon to enforce compulsory schooling up to a minimum age for employment. The FAO and UNESCO have spearheaded a partnership—Education for Rural People—with other international agencies, governments, and civil society to reduce rural-urban disparities and improve the quality of rural education. UNESCO, UNICEF, the WHO, the World Bank, and Education International have launched a program: Focusing Resources on Effective School Health.

UN agencies, individually and collectively, can only do so much. Real and sustainable progress depends on commitment and follow-through at the national and international levels. Here the picture is not very bright. As highlighted above, the international community of states has repeatedly set and failed to attain goals for providing universal primary education. In the context of the conferences at Jontien and Dakar, the Education for All Fast Track Initiative was launched in 2002 in an attempt to mobilize additional external funding for concrete educational development programs. It is a compact between donors and developing countries that requires recipient governments to commit to far-reaching reforms of their educational systems in line with MDG 2, and in turn, donors pledged to provide the necessary funding. A dozen developing countries submitted and negotiated such plans to accommodate donors' demands. However, the donors reneged, and reciprocal funding has never materialized. Again, talk was cheap, and there appears not to have been good-faith commitment by the rich to help the poor.

Women in Development

Poor women are the most marginalized of social groups who do not benefit from globalization. MDG 3 focuses on gender inequality and empowering women for development. While promoting gender equality is an important objective in itself, enhancing the status of women in society is also important for a variety of reasons. Reducing gender differences in education may lead to other positive effects, such as increased creation of sustainable livelihoods and increases in productivity, improved maternal health, reduced fertility rates, and higher primary school retention. As Malloch Brown has argued, "Empowering women is not just one of the goals; it plays a critical role in the achievement of the other seven as well." He continued, "Women are the poorest of the poor: disproportionately, women lack access to land, water, and sources of energy; women lack access to education and other social services; and too often women are absent from decision-making, not only at the national, regional, or local level, but even within their own families."[33]

The main target specified for this goal is to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 2005 and in all levels of education no later than 2015. A large number of countries appear to be on track; however, the current rate of increase is not sufficient to reach the earlier target date. Gender inequality in school enrollment continues to be especially problematic in parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. The World Bank's Millennium Goal website points out that "differences persist everywhere in legal rights, labor market opportunities, and the ability to participate in public life and decision making."[34]

A May 2003 UNIFEM report, *Progress of the World's Women 2002: Gender Equality and the Millennium Development Goals*, discloses that "although women have progressed relatively slowly in the last two years in the areas of education, literacy and employment, there have been encouraging signs of improvement in women's legislative representation." The report points out that this MDG indicator is the only gender inequality indicator that is not linked to poverty and disparities between rich and poor countries. "The United States, France and Japan, where women's share of parliamentary seats are 12 percent, 11.8 percent and 10 percent respectively, lag behind 13 developing countries in sub-Saharan Africa, which is experiencing the greatest regional poverty in the world. In South Africa and Mozambique, women's share of seats is 30 percent, while Rwanda and Uganda have 25.7 percent and 24.7 percent respectively."[35]

Underlying the UN's work in this area for the past two and a half decades has been the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The convention binds acceding states to several important obligations. State parties agree to incorporate the principles of equality of men and women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory laws, and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination against women; establish tribunals and other public institutions to ensure the effective protection of women against discrimination; and ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations, or enterprises.[36] Although the United States is a signatory, it has never ratified it. Some 170 other countries have ratified the convention.

UN member states' collective commitment to the rights of women was reinforced at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, twenty years after the issue was officially and visibly placed on the international agenda at a first global conference on women in Mexico City. The UN's Commission on Human Rights has been another important forum for promoting women's rights. A focal point of the 2003 commission proceedings was an open debate on

"integration of the human rights of women and a gender perspective." Commission members addressed a number of critical issues, including eradicating violence against women.[37]

UNIFEM plays a key advocacy role in promoting women's rights and the implementation of the convention against the discrimination of women. UNIFEM is committed to working to eliminate violence against women and girls, such as, "trafficking in persons." Here women and girls are most vulnerable to systematic exploitation. Article 3, paragraph (a) of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons defines the legal concept as follows:

> . . . the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude, or the removal of organs.[38]

While trafficking in persons is not new, trafficking especially in women and girls is the fastest-growing area of organized crime.[39] In 2000, the General Assembly adopted the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the associated Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea or Air and the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children. As of December 2005, 147 member states had signed the convention, and 97 had ratified the Protocol.[40] In 2002 the CHR announced the "establishment of the Intergovernmental Organization Contact Group on Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling, under the coordination of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and cochaired by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the International Labour Organization. This brings together representatives of the major Geneva-based intergovernmental organizations working on trafficking, as well as relevant nongovernmental organizations, for collaboration and cooperation on the issue of trafficking.[41] The issue was also the focal point of the UN Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice in Vienna in May 2003.

Beyond legal norms and diplomatic statements, however, the UN has had to confront this issue of trafficking in its own field operations. Some military and civilian personnel in UN peace operations and other missions related to conflict (for example, civilian police) have been involved in certain aspects of the organized traffic in women, as in the Balkans. The Secretary-General has implemented a zero-tolerance policy, and, as already noted, the climate itself led to the much publicized departure of the UN's most senior refugee official, Ruud Lubbers, under allegations of sexual harassment. However, since trafficking in women is so closely tied to a legal or quasi-legal sex industry, it becomes difficult to discern between permissible and impermissible behavior.

Transnational Public Health

Three MDGs deal with various health-related topics: reducing child mortality; improving maternal health; and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases. In addition, one of the targets for the eighth MDG calls for a global partnership with pharmaceutical companies to provide access to affordable, essential drugs in developing countries. All of these health-related goals are mutually reinforcing and are highly associated with the overall goal of poverty reduction. Disease and poor health provide a drag on economic growth and development. HIV/AIDS is particularly acute in this regard and threatens to undermine the development efforts of the entire Sub-Saharan African region.

The issue of the role of child mortality in development is a complex one, and reducing infant and child mortality is problematic because of the lack of adequate medical treatment and immunization, unsafe drinking water, poor sanitation, civil strife, endemic disease, and malnutrition. Approximately 70 percent of child deaths are associated with some combination of disease and/or malnutrition. "Rapid improvements before 1990 gave hope that mortality rates of children under five could be cut by two-thirds in the following 25 years. But progress slowed almost everywhere in the 1990s, and in parts of Africa infant mortality rates increased."[42] The situation with regard to progress toward achieving the MDG child mortality goal is bleak. Only thirty-six developing countries are on target for reducing under-five child mortality to a third of its 1990 level by 2015. More children die from disease and malnutrition than the total number of adults who die from the three great endemic killer diseases: HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. Moreover, funding for child health care has declined in recent years.

At its May 2003 annual meeting, the World Health Assembly adopted a new strategic initiative to deal with child and youth health care. The WHO's governing body thus identifies and targets seven priority areas for the future: maternal health, nutrition, prevention of communicable diseases, injuries, physical environment, psychosocial development and mental health, and children in difficult circumstances. In the context of this new strategy, WHO family and community health executive director Tomris Turmen offers that "the improvement of child and adolescent health should be the easiest of the Millennium Development Goals to achieve. . . . The strategy shows the way."[43] However, fulfilling the strategy and achieving the goal require enhanced resources and commitment.

Goal no. 5 is improving maternal health care. The target set for this goal is to reduce by three-quarters, between 1990 and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio. Nearly all maternal-related deaths occur in developing countries. Most such deaths are preventable. Inadequate delivery services and prenatal and postnatal care as well as unsafe abortions account for a large number of such deaths. In the context of high-income countries the answer seems simple: adequate pre- and postnatal maternal health care, family planning, skilled birth attendants, clean birthing facilities with adequate and safe blood supplies, and prevention of unsafe abortions. Unfortunately, in poor countries such luxuries simply are often not available, especially to the poor. Progress toward achieving the MDG target for maternal health is mixed and in parts of Asia and nearly all of Sub-Saharan Africa, very disappointing.

Adequately measuring and assessing maternal mortality is difficult. Most countries do not have good vital registration systems, and underreporting is acute in situations where a skilled health attendant is absent. The proportion of births attended by skilled health personnel is used as an important indicator because of the high correlation between maternal mortality and the absence of skilled personnel. Also, in Sub-Saharan Africa, maternal mortality is linked to HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other endemic diseases—or MDG 6.

HIV/AIDS is currently the most devastating health pandemic of our time—or, for that matter, any time in history—that challenges international cooperation.[44] HIV/AIDS has become the fourth-largest cause of death in the world. The MDG target related to AIDS is to have halted and begun to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS by 2015. Yet this task seems daunting, especially in Africa and other low-income countries.

Over 40 million individuals have been infected with HIV, and more than 8,000 people a day die from AIDS-related conditions. In 2004, there were almost 5 million newly infected persons and 3.1 million HIV-related deaths. The number of people living with HIV/AIDS is increasing in every region. As illustrated in Table 10.3, the impact of the pandemic varies dramatically from region to region, and the disease burden is borne very unequally, with Sub-Saharan Africa being the region that suffers the most severe impact. In 2005, this area accounted for approximately 10 percent of the world's population but over 60 percent of all the people living with HIV/AIDS.

This region is home to three-quarters of the world's annual HIV/AIDS-related deaths. Nearly two-thirds of all persons living with HIV and two-thirds of new infections reside in Sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa has the single largest number of infected persons: 5.3 million. In Swaziland, more than 40 percent of pregnant women test positive for HIV. But there is not just one AIDS epidemic in Africa, there are many, both across and within subregions and countries.

One report laments that "[i]n four southern African countries, national adult HIV prevalence has risen higher than thought possible, exceeding 30%: Botswana (38.8%), Lesotho (31%), Swaziland (33.4%) and Zimbabwe (33.7%)."[45] As might be expected, Sub-Saharan Africa has suffered significant setbacks in life expectancy. In nearly two dozen countries, life expectancy has fallen over the last decade and a half. In six—Botswana, Burundi, Namibia, Rwanda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—the decline has been more than seven years. In Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, and Swaziland life expectancy is now less

TABLE 10.3 Regional HIV and AIDS Statistics and Features, 2003 and 2005

	Adults and Children Living with HIV	*Adults and Children Newly Infected with HIV*	*Adult Prevalence (%)*	*Adult and Child Deaths Due to AIDS*
Sub-Saharan Africa				
2005	25.8 million	3.2 million	7.2	2.4 million
	[23.8–28.9 million]	[2.8–3.9 million]	[6.6–8.0]	[2.1–2.7 million]
2003	24.9 million	3.0 million	7.3	2.1 million
	[23.0–27.9 million]	[2.7–3.7 million]	[6.7–8.1]	[1.9–2.4 million]
North Africa and Middle East				
2005	510,000	67,000	0.2	58,000
	[230,000–1.4 million]	[35,000–200,000]	[0.1–0.7]	[25,000–145,000]
2003	500,000	62,000	0.2	55,000
	[200,000–1.4 million]	[31,000–200,000]	[0.1–0.7]	[22,000–140,000]
South and South-East Asia				
2005	7.4 million	990,000	0.7	480,000
	[4.5–11.0 million]	[480,000–2.4 million]	[0.4–1.0]	[290,000–740,000]
2003	6.5 million	840,000	0.6	390,000
	[4.0–9.7 million]	[410,000–2.0 million]	[0.4–0.9]	[240,000–590,000]
East Asia				
2005	870,000	140,000	0.1	41,000
	[440,000–1.4 million]	[42,000–390,000]	[0.05–0.2]	[20,000–68,000]
2003	690,000	100,000	0.1	22,000
	[350,000–1.1 million]	[33,000–300,000]	[0.04–0.1]	[11,000–37,000]
Oceania				
2005	74,000	8,200	0.5	3600
	[45,000–120,000]	[2,400–25,000]	[0.2–0.7]	[1,700–8,200]
2003	63,000	8,900	0.4	2,000
	[38,000–99,000]	[2,600–27,000]	[0.2–0.6]	[910–4,900]
Latin America				
2005	1.8 million	200,000	0.6	66,000
	[1.4–2.4 million]	[130,000–360,000]	[0.5–0.8]	[52,000–86,000]
2003	1.6 million	170,000	0.6	59,000
	[1.2–2.1 million]	[120,000–310,000]	[0.4–0.8]	[46,000–77,000]

TABLE 10.3 *(continued)*

	Adults and Children Living with HIV	*Adults and Children Newly Infected with HIV*	*Adult Prevalence (%)*	*Adult and Child Deaths Due to AIDS*
Caribbean				
2005	300,000	30,000	1.6	24,000
	[200,000–510,000]	[17,000–71,000]	[1.1–2.7]	[16,000–40,000]
2003	300,000	29,000	1.6	24,000
	[200,000–510,000]	[17,000–68,000]	[1.1–2.7]	[16,000–40,000]
Eastern Europe and Central Asia				
2005	1.6 million	270,000	0.9	62,000
	[999,000–2.3 million]	[140,000–610,000]	[0.6–1.3]	[39,000–91,000]
2003	1.2 million	270,000	0.7	36,000
	[740,000–1.8 million]	[120,000–680,000]	[0.4–1.0]	[24,000–52,000]
Western and Central Europe				
2005	720,000	22,000	0.3	12,000
	[570,000–890,000]	[15,000–39,000]	[0.2–0.4]	[<15,000]
2003	700,000	20,000	0.3	12,000
	[550,000–870,000]	[13,000–37,000]	[0.2–0.4]	[<15,000]
North America				
2005	1.2 million	43,000	0.7	18,000
	[650,000–1.8 million]	[15,000–120,000]	[0.4–1.1]	[9,000–30,000]
2003	1.1 million	43,000	0.7	18,000
	[570,000–1.8 million]	[15,000–120,000]	[0.3–1.1]	[9,000–30,000]
Total				
2005	40.3 million	4.9 million	1.1	3.1 million
	[36.7–45.3 million]	[4.3–6.6 million]	[1.0–1.3]	[2.8–3.6 million]
2003	37.5 million	4.6 million	1.1	2.8 million
	[34.0–41.9 million]	[4.0–6.0 million]	[1.0–1.2]	[2.5–3.1 million]

Source: UNAIDS/WHO, *AIDS Epidemic Update December 2005*, 3. Note: Bracketed figures refer to the best available information on the ranges of estimates within which the actual figures lie.

than forty years. Instead of a theoretical average life expectancy of sixty-two years in the absence of HIV/AIDS, Sub-Saharan Africa's is only forty-seven years.[46] In the face of this overwhelming health crisis, Africa is experiencing a profound shortage of personnel in the health care sector.[47]

The relationship between HIV/AIDS and humanitarian crises in Africa is particularly acute as extremely high levels of HIV coexist with a severe food crisis. Over 14 million persons are on the verge of starvation in six southern African countries, including Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe, where adult HIV prevalence exceeds 30 percent. "Long-standing, severe epidemics are plunging millions of people deeper into destitution and desperation as their labour power weakens, incomes dwindle, assets shrink and households disintegrate."[48]

The situation in Africa clearly illustrates how the implications of AIDS for development go far beyond economic factors. One of the most significant impacts has been on educational systems. In the most highly infected countries, "HIV/AIDS kills teachers faster than they can be trained, makes orphans of students, and threatens to derail efforts . . . to get all boys and girls into primary school by 2015." HIV prevalence among teachers, for example, is 30 percent in Malawi, 20 percent in Zambia, and 12 percent in South Africa. Moreover, AIDS has resulted in a widening gender gap. In addition to being more susceptible to infection than boys, girls are more prone to dropping out of school to care for sick family members.[49]

The fastest-growing AIDS epidemic continues to be in Eastern Europe—especially the Russian Federation, Estonia, Ukraine, and Latvia—and Central Asia. In Russia, new infections have been almost doubling every year since 1998. It is estimated that 2 to 3 percent of Russian adults between fifteen and forty-nine are HIV-positive and that by 2010 the number of infected adults in this productive cohort may rise to between 6 to 11 percent. Nicholas Eberstadt of the American Enterprise Institute has suggested that, even with conservative assumptions about future HIV-prevalence rates, life expectancy in Russia in 2025 could be lower than it was in the 1950s.[50]

The situation in Russia is illustrative of the so-called second wave of the global pandemic that is rapidly penetrating Eurasia. East and South/Southeast Asia are also part of this second wave. These regions are now home to 7.1 million infected persons. Between 2002 and 2004, the number of persons living with HIV/AIDS increased nearly 50 percent in East Asia, where China's growing epidemic led the way. India now ranks second, only to South Africa, in the number of persons living with HIV/AIDS with 3.97 million.[51] At the current rate of increase—about 40 percent a year—the number of HIV-infected people in China and India alone could reach 40 million by the end of the current decade. This is a staggering figure given that the entire world total now stands at 40 million.

A 2003 report by the Global HIV Prevention Working Group, *Access to HIV Prevention: Closing the Gap*, suggested that 29 million of the 45 million persons who are expected to be newly infected between now and 2010 could be saved if

adequate preventive strategies were increased dramatically.[52] The group is calling for a "combination prevention approach" that is using a variety of proven strategies. Among other things, the report detailed the substantial HIV-funding gap in the context of future needs.

The Sachs Millennium Project report and the HLP report on *Threats, Challenges and Change* both stressed the need to commit the resources required to deal effectively and quickly with AIDS. Nearly all the AIDS-related recommendations in these reports found their way into the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly on *Progress Made in the Implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS*. One of the Secretary-General's key recommendations focused on the need to mobilize the financial resources required to fund a comprehensive response to the pandemic. He argued that an estimated additional $18 billion above what was currently pledged would be required to fund HIV/AIDS worldwide efforts over the next three years, including treatment, care, and prevention.

In his State of the Union Address in 2003, President Bush announced launching the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) to provide $15 billion over five years. Congress responded positively to the President's Emergency Plan, yet the White House consistently underrequested the level of funding needed to fulfill the promise. Also, even if fully funded, all but $1 billion of the $15 billion pledged is to be spent on bilateral programs in only fifteen targeted countries. Of the $1 billion pledged for the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (a health funding partnership between governments, civil society, the private sector, and affected communities), only 20 percent may be used for HIV prevention and of that amount, a minimum of one-third must be spent on abstinence education—specifically stressing condom use. Again, the issue of real commitment raises its ugly head. On the other hand, however, elements of civil society, and most especially the Gates Foundation, have demonstrated what effective commitment looks like.

The second target set for MDG 6 is to have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases. Malaria is the most prevalent tropical disease in the world with between 350 and 500 million cases in 2004. It results in over a million deaths a year. Although malaria is found in over 100 countries, approximately 90 percent of the cases are located in Sub-Saharan Africa with other pockets of prevalence in tropical climates. The death rate from malaria in Sub-Saharan Africa is truly staggering. About 90 percent of those deaths are young children under the age of five—nearly 800 per 100,000 children. This statistic is even more staggering when one considers that malaria deaths of young children in the region nearly doubled between 1990 and 1998 in comparison to the previous decade. Northern Africa has the second-highest death rate, at forty-seven, followed by western Asia at twenty-six per 100,000.[53] But again, the core of the disease resides in Sub-Saharan Africa, where malaria accounts for over one-fifth of all child deaths and places a tremendous strain on health-care facilities and systems.[54] No region is on track for achieving the target of halting or reversing the spread of malaria by 2015.

One-third of the world's population—over two billion people—is infected with tuberculosis (TB). Luckily, most such individuals, especially in more affluent countries, will never develop active TB. The developing world is home to about 90 percent of all active cases. And, in terms of impact, TB is the single most devastating disease among adults in the developing world, and Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are the most affected regions. TB and HIV/AIDS are highly associated diseases. In Sub-Saharan Africa, three-quarters of those infected with HIV/AIDS develop active TB. No region is on track for achieving the MDG target for TB. It is estimated that between 2000 and 2010 nearly a billion new infections will have occurred. Of those billion new infections, about 200 million persons will become sick and 35 million of those will die.[55]

On the other hand, one of the success stories in international health has been the battle against polio. Only a few small pockets of the disease persist. Ninety-nine percent of all remaining cases are located in three countries—India, Nigeria, and Pakistan—with most of the remaining 1 percent of cases located in just four additional countries. WHO, UNICEF, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, and Rotary International announced a new Global Polio Eradication Initiative in 2003. This program will focus its efforts in these seven most affected countries and in six others where there exists significant risk of reinfection.[56]

New on the scene in 2003 was SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome), a powerful reminder, if one was needed, how globalization can spread disease as easily as tourists and financial flows. In fact, SARS was the first new major communicable disease to emerge in the twenty-first century. Although SARS has been around for some time, the first SARS case was identified in February 2003 in Hanoi, Vietnam. The disease is suspected to have originated in China except it was identified as an atypical respiratory disease. The WHO was quick to act and mid-March issued a global alert about mysterious cases of a severe atypical pneumonia with unknown etiology. Two days later, Canadian health authorities reported two deaths from a similar phenomenon. The following day, WHO elevated its alert as cases were being reported in Singapore and elsewhere. Within weeks the situation worsened in Hong Kong, and mainland China and WHO took the unprecedented step of issuing travel advisories for Beijing, Hong Kong, Guangdong Province, Shanxi Province, and Toronto.

The global response to SARS illustrates how effective international cooperation can be in response to a crisis and how important international organizations and their leadership can be. In this case, the WHO under the leadership of Gro Harlem Brundtland did not hesitate to confront both a great power (China) and a traditional organizational supporter (Canada). The level of cooperation was unprecedented. While not yet fully contained everywhere, the potential rapid spread of the lethal disease (an estimated 8–10 percent of cases) does appear to have been checked.[57] WHO is currently leading the world's response to

the avian influenza, which, if it mutates so that is can be passed from human to human, threatens to be a worldwide pandemic that could kill tens of millions of people because about half of those infected to date have died.

A GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP FOR DEVELOPMENT

New forms of cooperation and partnerships are needed among states, markets, the private sector, voluntary and civic organizations, local communities, and other stakeholders. This was noted especially regarding human rights and humanitarian affairs, where the role of NGOs and transnational corporations was discussed. The effort to forge new partnerships for sustainable human development or human security has taken a variety of forms and complexions. In general there has been a move to strengthen UN agencies' direct involvement with diverse elements of society, including NGOs, the private sector, and many other types of civil society organizations. Similar efforts have also been made in the Bretton Woods institutions. UN cooperation with other actors varies from issue to issue, with some examples of close cooperation and some examples of the opposite.

Business in General

UN partnership activities with for-profit actors—most especially through the Global Compact that we introduced briefly in the previous chapter—have involved innovative thinking and actions. The compact brings together the Executive Office of the Secretary-General in collaboration with the International Labour Organization, OHCHR, UNEP, UNDP, and the Fund for International Partnerships. It seeks to engage the private sector constructively in helping to make globalization work for all the world's peoples. Partners to the compact are asked to embrace nine principles drawn from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ILO's Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development. It engages a wide diversity of partners, including international business associations, national business associations, workers' organizations, and NGOs.

The main assumption underlying the Global Compact is that development cannot occur exclusively through governmental, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations, nor can it be based on unbridled market forces alone. Creating local, national, and international enabling environments is essential, and a broad-based partnership involving all relevant "stakeholders" thus seems desirable.

However, bringing the private sector into the United Nations has brought with it some concerns and opposition. Many governments still hang tenaciously to the tenets of sovereignty and resent actions by multilateral agencies that do not respect the sanctity of that norm. Other governments, including China as the most notable and economically successful example, have come to embrace this notion of multistakeholder partnerships.

Squamish Nation canoe at the Qatuwas Festival, a gathering of Pacific Rim indigenous people. (UN/DPI Photo 186590/J. Isaac)

Trade and Finance

The first target under MDG 8 is to "develop further an open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system." This goal inherently includes a commitment to good governance, development, and poverty reduction—both nationally and internationally. However, one of the major problems confronting the UN system almost since its inception has been that the management of trade and finance has seldom, if ever, functioned as the broad and coherent system that appears on paper. As stressed many times above, the United Nations system is but one of a group of interrelated international institutions designed to work toward achieving a set of common ends related to promoting and ensuring international peace, security, and human well-being. Thus, the UN system was designed to function as a norm- and rule-based system of institutions. A liberal, open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory trading and financial system served as the foundation of this new order. The Cold War and other factors, such as rich-country distrust of majority voting, intervened to frustrate the grand design. As the Cold War wound down and neoliberal economic ideas prevailed, political space opened for the further globalization of the capitalist world economy. For half a century, trade and financial liberalization had primarily affected the governments of advanced market economies. Now, pressure for change arose as global inequalities grew and extreme poverty persisted in large pockets around the globe. The North and South at least professed that the time had come to move toward a more equitable capitalist world order.

In recent years and in spite of significant inertia, the Washington-based IFIs, the WTO, and the UN system have come closer together. Progress could hardly be made in meeting such goals as target 12 on trade and finance without such collaboration. What has happened? The Millennium Project reports part of the answer lies in the global economy. Since the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations concluded in 1994, the average tariffs for agricultural products and textiles and clothing have been reduced. However, such tariff and quota reductions do not benefit least developed countries (LDCs) much. It is estimated, for example, that even if tariff protection on such products was reduced by half, only a little over 1 percent of the expected $200 billion gain by 2015 would go to Sub-Saharan Africa, and only another $3.3 billion to South Asia outside of India. "To make trade an effective source of growth, developing countries need to increase the efficiency of their producers, shippers, freight handlers, and customs services—their capacity to trade. Rich countries can help by providing 'aid for trade' and sharing knowledge needed to establish competitive export industries."[58]

The latest set of trade talks in the WTO is the most complex ever. This so-called Doha Development Agenda round of talks, launched in 2001 in Doha, Qatar, has taken up many of the items that were left unsettled by the Uruguay Round, such as agricultural subsidies, special less stringent adherence to trade rules for poor countries, and access to vital medicines and treatments. Although originally scheduled for completion in January 2005, the negotiations have dragged on and on. The current targeted completion date at the time of this writing is December 2006. But the sides are still far apart, especially on issues such as agricultural subsidies. Consider, for example, that subsidies to farmers in OECD countries in 2003 totaled more than $349 billion. As David Lynch has reminded, "This is nearly $1 billion per day and is approximately the same amount as the combined annual GDP of all Sub-Saharan Africa.[59]

For nearly a decade now, UN agencies have been experimenting with new forms of partnerships. The UNDP and World Bank, for example, have initiated a pilot program at the country level to explore the interface between the UN Development Assistance Framework and the World Bank's Country Assistance Strategy. Another collaborative effort grew from the "Money Matters: Private Finance for Development" initiative. It is aimed at assisting emerging market economies to mobilize and attract private finance for sustainable human development. It gave rise to the creation in 1995 of the Money Matters Institute (MMI), a forum for the exchange of experience and ideas among leaders in financial services, international organizations, and policymakers in developing countries about the role of private members of MMI. These members have included Concord International Investments, Fidelity Investments, LIA Worldwide, MFS Investment Management, Prudential Securities, State Street Corporation, and United Gulf Management.[60]

Debt Relief

More concrete action is to be found in the area of debt relief. A vexing issue for many developing countries is making their debt burden sustainable. In 1996 the World Bank and IMF launched a plan to provide debt relief for the world's poorest, most heavily indebted countries. Under this Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative, creditors collectively move to provide exceptional assistance aimed at bringing the debtor country into a position of debt sustainability. As of December 2005, debt-reduction programs had been approved for twenty-eight of the forty-one eligible countries. The total collective debt reduction as of that date was $33 billion with the possibility of a cumulative total of $61 billion, should the remaining thirteen countries reach their decision points for receiving relief. About half comes from bilateral lenders and the remainder from IFIs.[61]

At the Group of 8 meeting in July 2005, heads of government proposed a new Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative to supplement HIPC. Under this plan, three IFIs—the IMF, World Bank, and African Development Bank—would be allowed to provide 100 percent debt relief for countries completing the HIPC process. The IFIs in question have set out to implement this program.[62]

Good Governance

Improving trade and finance alone, even with special attention to debt relief, is insufficient. As the UNDP's *Poverty Report 2000* argued, "if poverty reduction programmes are to succeed, local government must be strengthened," as must popular participation and the role of civil society in governance processes.[63] The UNDP has specifically emphasized governance and has dubbed "good governance" as the "missing link" between antipoverty efforts and poverty reduction. "Poverty eradication and good governance are inseparable. Good governance brings about a proper balance among state action, the private sector, civil society, and the communities themselves."[64] Well-functioning, effective, and accountable public and private institutions that are viewed as legitimate in the eyes of those being governed are required to mobilize the social capital required for sustaining development.[65]

UN agencies like the UNDP, however, find it easier to focus on what might be termed microdemocracy—the participation of stakeholders in UNDP projects—than in traditional macrodemocracy—national election campaigns. The same is true, to a lesser extent, at the World Bank. Whereas public commentary by these international agencies on national election personalities and issues runs the risk of being characterized as unacceptable interference with state sovereignty, involving persons in international development projects is often pictured as less intrusive once the national government has agreed to the project in the first place.

Poorest of the Poor

Another main MDG target related to building a global partnership for development addresses the special needs of LDCs. These poorest of poor countries—measured in terms of low per-capita income, high illiteracy, and low percentage of industry in the GDP—have been especially hard-pressed to deal with globalization processes no matter how one defines them. Although all least developed countries have experienced some improvements in growth rates, they are particularly vulnerable to instability in world markets because of the nature of their economies. Secretary-General Kofi Annan has summarized the three main impediments to sustaining development in Africa, with the bulk of the least developed countries, and other poor countries in general: poor governance, low productivity, and difficulties in mobilizing resources for development, in addition to protracted social conflicts in many countries. Key factors in this regard involved the lack of capacity and the inability to sustain capacity building, which, in turn, is dependent on education, health, nutrition, sanitation, population dynamics, and various other human development factors. Of the thirty-five countries that scored "low" in the human development category in the *Human Development Report 1999,* thirty were from Africa and thirty-one were among the least developed.[66]

The overall situation is exacerbated, especially in the long term, by the impact of diseases, such as HIV/AIDS. Of the thirty-four countries most affected by the pandemic, nearly all (thirty-one) are either African or on the bottom of the development statistics. AIDS is now the leading cause of death in Africa, and it hits especially hard among the professional class. HIV/AIDS is not the only significant health problem. Other core diseases still plaguing poor regions include polio, diphtheria, tuberculosis, measles, tetanus, and whooping cough—for all of which there exist vaccinations, yet a significant proportion of the world's children remain unprotected.

In brief, most very poor countries lack sufficient capacity to integrate productively into the global economy. Many suffer from weak and unpredictable political and economic institutions. Their economies tend to be based on low-productivity traditional sectors. Many of these countries are disadvantaged with respect to such essential development elements as education, sanitation, transportation, communication, clean water, adequate development financing, electrical power and energy resources, and political stability. Globalization has hardly made a dent in these problems and arguably has made them worse.

The Third UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries was hosted by the EU in Brussels in 2001 and specified seven concrete commitments centered around fostering a people-centered policy framework, good governance, human and institutional capacity building, making globalization work for LDCs, enhancing the role of trade in development, environmental protection, and mobilizing financial resources for development. This program of action was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly along with a work plan for the 2001–2010 decade in resolutions 55/279 and 56/227. Doing more for the least also figured prominently in the outcome of the 2005 World Summit.

Geographically Challenged

The MDG strategy also places special emphasis on the situation of landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) and small island developing states (SIDS). These two groups are challenged by the particularities of their geographical situations and have attracted international attention beginning in the 1970s but especially since the early 1990s. The UN has summarized the special situation of landlocked countries concisely:

> Lack of territorial access to the sea, remoteness and isolation from world markets and high transit costs continue to impose serious constraints on the overall socio-economic development of landlocked developing countries. . . . Landlocked developing countries are generally among the poorest of the developing countries, with the weakest growth rates, and are typically heavily dependent on a very limited number of commodities for their export earnings. . . . The lack of territorial access to the sea, remoteness and isolation from world markets appear to be the primary cause of their relative poverty.[67]

A few statistics provide some perspective on the nature of the situation. The distance to seaports and world trade routes is in many cases extreme. Six LLDCs, for example, are located more than 2,000 kilometers from the nearest sea, with Kazakhstan being situated 3,750 kilometers from the sea.[68] Also, over half of the LLDCs are least developed countries, and this adds a further dimension to the plight of these countries as discussed earlier.

In 2001 the General Assembly decided by resolution 56/180 to convene an International Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and Transit Developing States. Kazakhstan offered to host this special conference in Almaty in August 2003. In preparation for this conference, the Secretary-General issued a report in August 2002 to the General Assembly. He summarized six objectives of the LLDCs with respect to their transit needs: secure unfettered access to the sea, reduce transportation costs and improve services to increase competitiveness, reduce delivery costs of imports, clear trade routes from delays, lessen deterioration and loss of goods during transit, and provide mechanisms for expanding trade.[69]

In comparison, small island developing states tend to have small resource bases, be highly subject to climatic conditions and natural and environmental disasters and deterioration, have limited freshwater resources, be dependent on conventional energy resources, and have small domestic markets and small populations with rapid growth rates. The situation confronting SIDS was addressed at the Earth Summit in Rio in 1992 and has been an issue continuously before the Commission on Sustainable Development since its creation.

The big push for an international agenda for dealing with SIDS, however, began with the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States, held in Bridgetown, Barbados, in April–May 1994. The conference

adopted the Barbados Programme of Action (BPoA), which set forth specific recommendations and actions for promoting the sustainable development of SIDS.[70] Five years later, at the Twenty-Second Special Session of the General Assembly, the member states of the UN carried out an assessment of the implementation of the action program and called for more concerted action to carry it out. The 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development recommitted member states to dealing with the special conditions confronting SIDS, and the Johannesburg Plan of Action resulting from the summit called for a ten-year comprehensive review of the BPoA at a high-level international conference. That meeting was held in Mauritius in January 2005, and the member states assembled unanimously adopted a political declaration, the Mauritius Declaration, and a revised plan, the Mauritius Strategy, for further implementing the Barbados Plan of Action.[71]

TRIPS

A key to dealing with endemic diseases like HIV/AIDS is providing affordable access to medicines and treatments. Although the situation in the developed world is far from perfect, access to affordable drugs on a sustainable basis is not available to over one-third of the developing world's population. In both Sub-Saharan Africa and South-central Asia, less than 50 percent have such access. Of course, the situation is far worse for the extremely poor and marginalized parts of these populations.

Solving this problem is challenging because any solution is bundled up with a variety of economic, political, legal, and moral issues. Access to medicines to treat those afflicted with HIV/AIDS has sparked a heated debate between developing and the most developed countries. As discussed above, over 90 percent of the 42 million persons currently living with HIV/AIDS live in the developing world. Yet nearly all the drugs that have been developed to treat the disease and its symptoms are produced and controlled under license by pharmaceutical companies in the developed world.

At the center of the controversy over the access issue in recent years has been the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Negotiated in the context of WTO, TRIPS represented an attempt to strike a balance between protecting the property rights of the inventory and providing access to the consumer. Article 7 of TRIPS recognizes that the protection of intellectual property contributes to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of users and producers of technological knowledge. At the same time, TRIPS attempts to balance the social and human needs of poor countries. TRIPS emerged from a genuine negotiating process where the need for balance was very much to the fore.[72]

The TRIPS agreement has three main aspects. First, the agreement sets minimum standards of protection and obligations for each member country. Second, it specifies general principles that must be followed in all intellectual property rights enforcement procedures. Finally, all disputes under it are subject to WTO dispute settlement procedures.

In the context of international health, TRIPS has meant trying to find a balance between the interests of pharmaceutical companies and their home states, and nontechnologically advanced countries that desire greater access to drugs that are essential for public health reasons. Under Article 31 of the TRIPS agreement, members are allowed to exercise "compulsory licensing" without the authorization of the property-right holder under certain conditions, such as public health necessities. However, the nature of this right is ambiguous and subject to dispute. Moreover, many developing countries do not have adequate enough manufacturing capabilities in pharmaceuticals to enable them even to make effective use of compulsory licensing.

At the WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001, this issue came to a head. Developing country governments, seeking greater access to drugs for treating HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and other endemic diseases, were able to get member states to agree to a compromise. In adopting the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, the member states affirmed that "the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all."[73]

The declaration specified that the least developed countries would be given until January 2016 before being required to implement or enforce the TRIPS agreement with regard to pharmaceutical products. The declaration, however, still left unresolved the issue of how to deal with those countries that do not have sufficient manufacturing capabilities in pharmaceuticals to enable them even to make effective use of compulsory licensing.

This issue remains contested, with the WTO Council on TRIPS attempting to forge a compromise between the United States and other technologically advanced countries as well as those less technologically advanced member states that are demanding more flexible patent rules for cases of national public health exigencies. The shortage in Europe and the United States of a patented drug that treats the symptoms of avian bird flu in humans has prompted many in the advanced industrialized countries to rethink primacy of intellectual property rights in the face of an epidemic.

Information/Communication Technology

The TRIPS debate lies at the heart of the globalization controversy, as does the related issue of making the benefits of new technologies, especially information and communications technologies (ICTs), available to all. As the primary enabling agent for globalization processes that underpin the new information age, ICT is essential. As the Millennium Declaration put it: "We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world's people."

While there is nearly universal telephone and cellular phone usage in devel-
oped countries, less than one-fifth of people in the developing world are sub-
scribers to either. At the turn of the millennium, access to a personal computer
(PC) remained a luxury available for less than 3 percent of the population in the
global South, while in the North PCs were rapidly entering most households. Far
more telling, however, is the fact that yet another growing gap has emerged from
a base of equality in a few years. In 1990, relatively few persons had their own
PCs anywhere in the world. The critical question is how to make the information
revolution work for all peoples of the world.

It would seem in retrospect that the Millennium Declaration greatly understated the complexity of this issue. The inequalities inherent in the present information order—the so-called digital divide—present an extreme challenge for the international community of states:

> The scale of the ICT challenge is immense. Despite the forces of market liberalization and globalization and efforts at public policy reform, the goal of achieving universal access to ICT and the Global Information Infrastructure has remained elusive, and the disparity in access to ICT is growing. Today 96 percent of Internet host computers reside in the highest income nations with only 16 percent of the world's population. There are more Internet hosts in Finland than the whole of Latin America and the Caribbean, more in New York City than on the entire continent of Africa.[74]

The challenge is not only that of coping with and overcoming poverty, hunger, and other aspects of underdevelopment. The imbalance inherent in the current information order also challenges cultural norms, linguistic diversity, local governance capacity, and numerous other dimensions of basic human security. With regard to promoting human development, ICT has a larger context. As suggested in the final report of the UNDP's Digital Opportunity Initiative, "used in the right way and for the right purposes, ICT can have a dramatic impact on achieving specific social and economic development goals as well as play a key role in broader national development strategies."[75] Indeed, "ICT provides developing nations with an unprecedented opportunity to meet vital development goals such as poverty reduction, basic health care, and education far more effectively than before."[76] In the highly globalized information age, development cannot occur without such social and economic networks. The UN system has in many ways been energized by the possibilities that ICT presents for promoting human development and achieving the MDGs. As witnessed during the two-year process surrounding the World Summit on the Information Society, many prickly political problems plague the path to creating a common global vision of the norms and principles underlying the information society.[77]

For some years now, the UNDP has been working with member states and other agencies to make ICT an integral part of development strategies and policies.

Much of this work has focused on assisting countries integrate and prioritize ICT planning in their policy frameworks and Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers. Also, UNDP places emphasis on using ICT to improve governance and the capacity of governments to more effectively achieve the MDGs and to help them foster greater participation by civil society and the private sector.

The creation of effective partnerships among international institutions, governments, civil society, and the private sector for promoting human development has increased. While some of these partnerships have been initiated by UN agencies, others have had their genesis outside the UN system. The Digital Opportunities Task Force (DOT Force), for example, was the initiative of the G-8 summit in Okinawa in July 2000. This initiative integrated the resources and talents of a variety of other partners, including the EU, a number of developing countries, the UNDP, World Bank, ITU, OECD, ECOSOC, UNESCO, and various private-sector associations and NGOs. In the Okinawa Charter, the DOT Force focused on creating national "e-strategies," improving access and connectivity, human capacity building, and promoting participation in e-commerce and enhancing entrepreneurship. The task force presented its recommendations at the G-8 summit meeting in Genoa in 2001, and an implementation strategy was adopted for carrying out the Genoa Plan of Action.

Another important initiative has been the UN Information and Communications Task Force (ICT Task Force), established by the Secretary-General in response to a March 2001 request from ECOSOC. The ICT Task Force was given the task of providing overall leadership to the UN and forging strategic partnerships with private industry, foundations, donors, and other relevant stakeholders. The ICT Task Force works in close cooperation with a growing number of other UN-system networking and capacity-building ICT initiatives, including the Digital Opportunity Initiative (launched by the UNDP, World Bank, Anderson Consulting, and Markle Foundation), the Network Readiness and Resource Initiative (UN Foundation, IBM, Markle Foundation, World Economic Forum, Harvard University, and other partners), the UN Volunteers program's United Nations Information Technology Service, WHO's Health InterNetwork, and Netaid.org. The list alone connotes how wide a net must be cast routinely even to form a task force with relevant expertise and outreach. As with other issues on the globalization agenda, the solutions must be found across disciplines and across countries and across institutions. That is what the "global" part of "globalization" means.

GLOBALIZATION, MDGS, AND PARTNERSHIPS

Where does all this lead us? Depending on who is asked, the answer is likely to be quite different. Globalization is not a panacea. To say, as *New York Times* columnist Thomas Friedman has, that it is a "golden straightjacket" that restricts choice but definitely leads to good things is far too simplistic a judgment.[78] Serious negatives include the following: diseases may move faster and more broadly; wages and other benefits won by labor in one country or region may be undercut by capital moving to exploit cheap and unsophisticated labor elsewhere; and so forth. Trading and investment may be computerized, but that does little good to those beyond the communications revolution. Human rights specialist Rhoda Howard tells us, for example, that free trade and globalization lead to good things in the long run but with much abuse and deprivation along the way.[79]

A formal consensus exists about MDGs, as evidenced by the 2005 World Summit. Of course, the consensus is not universal. But a generally shared orientation, underpinned by shared meanings and shared values, appears to be present. The primary element of disagreement is on the sacrifice that is necessary to make a development strategy work. Governments in Zimbabwe or Liberia, to take but two prominent examples, may vote for the MDGs in New York. But their policies on the ground at home reflect anything but a deep commitment to doing what is necessary to enhance human security. Governments in Washington and Bern may also vote for the MDGs, but whether they are prepared to renegotiate debt relief and enhanced trade arrangements for the developing countries is not always evident. The European Union continues to protect European agricultural producers to the detriment of poor countries attempting to sell their exports in Europe.

UN agencies, the IMF, and the World Bank have formed valuable partnerships in an effort to do something concrete about sustainable human development. Some results are impressive, but unfortunately not in Sub-Sahara Africa or parts of South Asia. But international arrangements, whether called partnerships or international regimes, can do only so much in the context of war, failed states, and chronic thievery by ruling elites.

Our specific analysis indicates that progress thus far toward achieving the MDGs has been mixed. In poverty-ridden Sub-Saharan Africa and least developed countries, the situation is particularly bleak. In this context, Kofi Annan, speaking before the 2002 World Economic Forum in New York, designated poverty as a major threat to global security. In his first annual report on how member states have followed up the Millennium Declaration, he reflected disappointingly that "the world is falling short. If we carry on the way we are, most of the pledges are not going to be fulfilled." He referred to progress toward achieving the MDGs as being a mixed record, with significant differences across the world's regions.[80] The series of reports from the team led by Jeffrey Sachs for the 2005 World Summit also emphasized that the glass was not half-full.

With these goals, targets have been set and indicators specified. Results now are required. The specificity of the MDG process has played a major role in securing general widespread consensus, but it may well be that same specificity that provides the greatest challenge to moving the UN's development agenda forward.

What is equally clear is that the MDGs, even if they are achieved, in and of themselves are not a panacea for bringing about sustainable human development and human security. They do, however, serve to focus governments and peoples on the plight of the world's poor and marginalized peoples. The MDGs provide priorities and a focus for development assistance activities and give clear benchmarks against which to measure success and failure. And, most importantly, states and their intergovernmental institutions are taking concrete steps in the right direction. As we have argued throughout, ideas matter.

EXPLAINING CHANGE

As a concept for guiding thinking and policy changes, sustainable human development may fade. But the social forces and global changes that underlie thinking on sustainability are unlikely to go away, and another concept will arise to help frame policy choices. Thus, students of international organization should struggle to understand why processes and structures in the UN have evolved as they have with regard to sustainable development, and consider what directions development activities might take in the future. In this context, a dispassionate assessment can be made of what the world organization can and cannot reasonably be expected to accomplish.

A traditional starting point for such an assessment is to examine sustainable development activities in the context of functionalism. As noted previously, functionalists argue that "growth of technology and spread and intensification of the desire for higher standards of material welfare" lead to greater international cooperation in search of expanded political authority.[81] A functionalist perspective suggests that popular interest in sustainable development results from expanded technical cooperation in developmental and environmental concerns. Accordingly, technical cooperation for development has spilled over into the environmental area, and technical cooperation on ecological concerns has come to encompass development issues. The interplay between the two has thus become so pervasive that environment and development are no longer separate concepts.

Proponents of this line of reasoning point to the evolving process, beginning around the time of the Stockholm conference, whereby the concept of ecodevelopment came onto the global agenda. In attempting to lay the foundations of a global plan of action for dealing with environmental issues, Maurice Strong and other UN planners quickly came to perceive the inseparability of the two previously separate issues. This orientation evolved over later decades as the environmental science community, development assistance practitioners and scholars, international financiers, government officials, and many others came to see their own work to be achievable only in the context of a more holistic ecodevelopment worldview.

Our two explanations for the spread of cooperation in the human rights area—that is, consensual-knowledge communities and social learning—grow out of this more general functionalist perspective. The first explanation suggests that the convergence of development and environment into sustainable development and the subsequent convergence of sustainable development and human development and human security into sustainable human development on the global public policy agenda grow from consensual agreement over ecodevelopment in private communities of knowledge. The second explanation emphasizes the importance of institutional learning and argues that the normative convergence is a product of a process in which state actors have recognized (or "learned") the inherent inseparability of the two issues.

Proponents of the consensual-knowledge approach point to the growth and involvement, at least of Northern civic actors, in sustainable development politics at the global intergovernmental level. They also point to the evolution of the role of NGOs since Stockholm, to the activities of NGOs in the Rio and subsequent conference processes, and to the influence of knowledge communities on issues such as protection of the ozone layer as evidence that this approach is valid.[82]

The nature of the evolution of NGO involvement in the sustainable human development arena, however, casts doubt on the validity of this view. There are hundreds of opinion communities concerned with sustainable development. Yet the diversity and often outright antagonisms among these communities challenge the notion that some dominant consensual body of knowledge underlies events within global sustainable development processes. The windows broken and the stores looted in such cities as Seattle, Genoa, Montreal, Evian, and Hong Kong (the sites of G-8 or WTO summits) attest to this reality.[83]

This is not to suggest that at a general level the absence of a convergence of interests over sustainability issues exists. Indeed, the concept has come to dominate much of the debate over both development and environment. For example, there was a substantial increase in the number of articles about sustainable development in scientific journals in the years immediately before the Rio conference. These figures, however, can be misleading.

Although growing consensus can be observed within specific areas of environmental concern, that consensus has yet to be translated into a coherent global scientific consensus about sustainable development. Moreover, a large gulf still separates basic and applied scientists over many ecodevelopment issues.

The notion that some coherent and identifiable social learning process underpins global sustainable development activities is suspect yet may hold somewhat more promise. On one hand, for example, it was not until after the election of Barber Conable as World Bank president in 1986 and the application of concerted pressure by NGOs that the World Bank showed any serious signs of becoming environmentally concerned. Before this time, Bank staff demonstrated little, if any, willingness to cooperate with UNEP or nonbusiness civic-based actors. As argued above, the idea of sustainable development has served as a common denominator, helping to bridge the turf and ideological divides that otherwise separate the IFIs from other members of the UN family.[84]

Furthermore, there is no universal consensus about definitions. In global debates, Northern delegates continue to tend to define sustainability rather narrowly as environmental protection and resource conservation. Southerners normally define the concept with specific reference to meeting basic human needs and reducing poverty. The focus here is on people, on promoting economic growth that produces employment and encourages the wider participation of people in economic processes.[85] Economists have their own definition. They say sustainable development is "an economic process in which the quantity and quality of our stocks of natural resources (like forests) and the integrity of biogeochemical cycles (like climate) are sustained and passed on to the future generations unimpaired."[86]

On the other hand, the feedback from seemingly endless conferences and the ever-evolving closer relationship among previously discordant agencies—especially the Bretton Woods institutions and UN organizations—may have well served to create a genuine learning environment. Equally important, the Global Compact was from its origins a normative exercise designed to create social learning. One of its architects, John Ruggie, pointed out:

> Companies submit case studies of what they have done to translate their commitment to the GC principles into concrete corporate practices. This occasions a dialogue among GC participants from all sectors—the UN, labor, and civil society organizations. . . . A research network, led by the Corporate Citizenship Unit of Warwick University, facilitates the dialogue. Its aim is to reach broader consensus-based definitions of what constitutes good practices than any of the parties could achieve alone. Those definitions, together with illustrative case studies, are then publicized in an on-line learning bank, which will become a standard reference source for corporate social responsibility.[87]

These examples do not provide concrete proof of an effective learning process. However, they do point to the possibility that organizational learning may well be occurring and help to explain the growing convergence around the MDG consensual framework.

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CONCLUSION

Learning from Change

In a time when winds of change are blowing very strong, we must rest content with knowing that foresight is always imperfect and that choices must always be made in ignorance of their full consequences. That is the price we pay for being able to make the world over by changing our own behavior, individually and collectively, in response to cherished hopes and shared purposes, framed in words. Our capacity to err is our capacity to learn and thereby achieve partial and imperfect, but real, improvement in the conditions of human life.

—William H. McNeill[1]

FROM THE OUTSET of this book, we have portrayed the United Nations and the broader UN system as highly interdependent with their political contexts. The dynamic interplay of interstate politics is the primary force determining the evolution of the UN system. With Cold War blinders removed, even in a world of clear U.S. military primacy, it is becoming evident that global organizations can influence the course of world politics—especially when viewed from a longer-run perspective. For the United Nations to become the centerpiece of global governance, as envisioned by some of its proponents, states would need to transfer much more loyalty, power, and authority to the world body so that it could control more of its surroundings rather than the reverse. But such a radical change is still distant.

Yet world politics continues to evolve and change, and the need to manage transnational problems remains pressing.[2] Analyzing the UN and charting its future would be easier if we had a surer grasp of the nature of world politics after the Cold War. In William McNeill's words, it would certainly be nice to know in which direction the winds of change are blowing. Alas, this is not easy. The initial euphoria about the end of the Cold War and optimism about possibilities for democratization have given way to a more realistic, and perhaps normal, caution. The winds of hypernationalism and unilateralism that blew from the